Hindu temples in Malaysia to meet over land issues as relocation saga simmers
Malaysia will send representatives to a mass community meeting in Kuala Lumpur this weekend to discuss issues over land occupied by them, as blowback from
a temple relocation in the capital refuses to abate.
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The land rights of Malaysia's 2 million-strong Hindu community were thrust into the spotlight by the row over the relocation of the Dewi Sri Pathrakaliamman temple to make way for the construction of a new mosque.
Observers say the row has been fanned by Muslim hardliners scoring cheap political points, which has led to Hindu temples with alleged discrepancies over land ownership being tagged by their critics on social media.
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim last Thursday presided over the groundbreaking of the new mosque. However, he was still accused by Muslim hardliners of handing Hindus a free piece of prime real estate by relocating their temple to a site just 50 metres away.
The temple furore has prompted questions about the land rights of many of Malaysia's thousands of temples – many established during the colonial era when Indian labourers were brought in by British administrators.
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The Malaysia Hindu Sangam (MHS), which represents the country's Hindus, said decades of ad hoc solutions by government leaders were no longer tenable due to the pernicious impact of social media on public discourse.
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