Is Russia paying Ukrainians to become suicide bombers via Telegram?

First Post

15 hours ago

Ukraine's security services say Russia is remotely recruiting desperate Ukrainians — including minors — via Telegram to unknowingly carry out bombings. Lured with cryptocurrency payments and false promises, some have died in the process. The SBU has foiled multiple such plots, calling it a dangerous new chapter in Russia's hybrid war read more
People take shelter inside a metro station during a Russian military strike, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine, June 29, 2025. File Image/Reuters
Ukrainian officials allege that Russian intelligence agencies are orchestrating a campaign of internal sabotage that now involves the remote recruitment of Ukrainian civilians — including children and young adults — to carry out bombings across Ukraine.
These attacks, according to Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), are part of a broader strategy by Russian intelligence to create instability within Ukrainian society far from the frontlines, all while minimising Russian exposure and maximising plausible deniability.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
A report on Monday (June 30, 2025) by The Guardian details multiple cases by the SBU where individuals have been tricked into transporting explosive devices under false pretenses and have, in some instances, been killed in the process, effectively acting as unknowing suicide bombers.
The recruitment pipeline often begins on Telegram, where anonymous curators lure vulnerable Ukrainians with the promise of easy cash. These activities, officials warn, are part of a growing trend of asymmetric tactics — and represent a troubling evolution in Russia's war against Ukraine.
The evolution of the Russian playbook
According to SBU spokesperson Artem Dekhtiarenko, Russia's internal sabotage efforts in Ukraine began in early 2023 and initially involved low-scale incidents such as the burning of military vehicles, post offices and conscription centres.
These attacks were largely concentrated in Ukraine's western regions — areas distant from the warfront — and were intended to spread confusion and amplify internal discord.
'They started the mass recruitment of Ukrainians to plant bombs: in cars, near conscription offices, near police departments, and so on,' Dekhtiarenko told The Guardian.
The perpetrators, often unemployed or socially isolated individuals, were enticed to perform increasingly dangerous acts under the illusion that they were carrying out minor, non-violent jobs.
The tasks escalated from hanging flyers to surveillance of security installations and, eventually, to transporting devices that turned out to be live bombs.
These attacks were then publicised via pro-Russian Telegram channels to portray internal dissatisfaction in Ukraine and feed narratives against military mobilisation and government authority.
According to a Ukrainian law enforcement source cited by The Guardian, more than 700 individuals have been detained by the SBU since January 2024 for participating in acts of sabotage, arson, or terrorism.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
A significant portion — nearly one in four — are minors, with the youngest case involving an 11-year-old girl from the Odesa region.
Authorities say the apparent goal is to cultivate a decentralised network of unwitting operatives who, despite their ignorance, help execute high-risk attacks deep inside Ukrainian territory.
The Rivne case: A glimpse into Russian tactics
The most illustrative case so far involves Oleh, a 19-year-old from eastern Ukraine, who stumbled upon a job listing on Telegram offering quick, lucrative side work.
The task appeared straightforward: travel to Rivne, collect a bag containing a paint canister, and spray it outside a police station. He was promised $1,000 for the assignment — a staggering sum for someone unemployed and struggling to provide for his new child.
However, when Oleh opened the bag near the designated location, he found what looked like a bomb, complete with protruding wires and a mobile phone apparently rigged for detonation.
'I sat at home and mostly did nothing,' he told The Guardian, recounting the period after he left school.
Desperate for cash, he had earlier connected with a Telegram contact named Anton who paid him $50 in USDT, a stablecoin cryptocurrency, to photograph local government buildings.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
That initial task, like many such first steps, served as a recruitment hook. The SBU says Russian curators typically begin with small, seemingly benign tasks like photographing infrastructure or posting leaflets to gauge the recruit's compliance and reliability.
Once trust is established or leverage is gained — sometimes through flattery, psychological manipulation, or blackmail — recruits are assigned riskier missions.
In Oleh's case, the second handler, going by the name Alexander, surfaced on Telegram weeks after the initial contact. Offering $1,000 for a supposedly safer job, Alexander transferred $200 upfront to cover travel expenses.
Oleh invited his childhood friend Serhiy to join him, offering to split the fee. Like Oleh, Serhiy was also unemployed and a father of two.
The pair journeyed by bus from Sumy to Rivne, where they were instructed to pick up a rucksack and a plastic bag from a garage area marked with a specific pin location.
How the operation unravelled
According to The Guardian, surveillance records and Telegram transcripts indicate that Oleh and Serhiy were being monitored the entire time by the SBU.
The agency had stepped up vigilance following a deadly bombing in Rivne just three days earlier, where an unemployed 21-year-old was recruited through similar channels to carry a device that exploded at a military conscription centre, killing him and wounding eight Ukrainian soldiers.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
In Oleh and Serhiy's case, after collecting the packages, they were directed to the local police station and told to prepare to open the bag near the entrance.
Alexander, the Telegram curator, remained on a call with Oleh, instructing him to extract a white box from the plastic bag. Inside the box was a smaller device equipped with a camera that livestreamed Oleh's location and surroundings to Alexander in real time.
This surveillance-enabled setup was designed to allow Alexander to select the most crowded moment to trigger the bombs — by calling the phones rigged to the explosive devices.
According to an SBU operative involved in the case, one of the devices was loaded with nails and screws, while the smaller unit relayed images and GPS data.
Fortunately, the SBU had anticipated another strike and deployed electronic countermeasures to block remote signals. 'We had certain technical means to block the signals to the telephone,' the operative told The Guardian.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
When Alexander tried to detonate the explosives by phone, the calls failed to go through.
Oleh, growing increasingly suspicious, opened the box and panicked. Fearing for his life and those around him, he approached a police officer and reported that he believed he was carrying a bomb.
It was at this moment that the SBU swooped in, detaining both Oleh and Serhiy and neutralising the explosives.
How operatives use psychological warfare and digital manipulation
The SBU asserts that Russian intelligence operatives often obscure their identities, presenting themselves as sympathetic Ukrainians who oppose the war. This manipulation extends to emotional exploitation and tailored messaging depending on the individual being recruited.
'Sometimes they use threats, sometimes they are friendly and encouraging,' said Dekhtiarenko. 'It depends on who is curating the agent; they use different psychological manipulations on different people.'
In one particularly troubling case, a female teenage recruit was targeted with malware that extracted private content from her phone. When she hesitated to carry out a mission, her handler threatened to publish the images and videos unless she continued working for them.
Often, curators also pretend to offer emotional support to individuals struggling with family or personal issues, further deepening their psychological grip.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
But should the recruit attempt to cut ties, as Oleh once tried by blocking Anton, new handlers often emerge to resume the pressure — sometimes under new names and with new tactics.
Could this tactic extend further into Europe
Ukrainian officials warn that the tactics used by Russia inside Ukraine could soon spread to Europe. While acts of arson and sabotage linked to Russian operatives have already been recorded in several Western nations, those attacks have largely avoided mass casualties.
That may be changing. 'Ukraine is the testing ground for Russian conventional and hybrid warfare,' a Ukrainian security official told The Guardian.
'Look at cyber-attacks, look at arson attacks, look at the sabotage on railways. They test things here, and then they do it in western countries.'
This concern is heightened by the apparent sophistication and decentralisation of the recruitment networks. According to the SBU, Russian handlers rarely interact directly with bomb-makers or transporters.
Instead, multiple layers of operatives — often themselves Ukrainians — carry out different parts of the plan. In one case, a teenage girl was found to be manufacturing explosive devices after being taught how to do so through instructional videos sent via Telegram.
What countermeasures SBU has taken
In response to this growing threat, Ukraine's SBU has rolled out a series of educational programmes aimed at raising awareness among schoolchildren about the dangers of accepting online work from unknown Telegram users.
Officers involved in the initiative told The Guardian that they are teaching students to recognise red flags and report suspicious content through a dedicated chatbot platform.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
'The only free cheese is in a mousetrap, as the saying goes,' one officer remarked.
Despite these efforts, many of those ensnared in such operations face bleak futures. Oleh and Serhiy are currently behind bars, awaiting trial on charges related to terrorism and attempted sabotage.
If convicted, they could face sentences of up to 12 years.
Oleh maintains that he had no idea he was working for Russian intelligence, nor that the task could have led to mass casualties. Yet the fallout has already upended his personal life.
In a short phone call from prison, his girlfriend told him never to contact her or their child again. His parents were equally blunt. 'They said I'm an idiot,' Oleh told The Guardian.
Also Watch:
With inputs from agencies