‘Solemn will': North Korea's Kim reclaims ancestors' legacy with tomb visit
Published: 8:00am, 18 Feb 2025 North Korean leader Kim Jong-un made a rare visit to his ancestors' mausoleum on Sunday, marking the first time in four years he has paid tribute to the tomb on his father's birthday.
Analysts suggest the gesture may have been an attempt to reinforce his regime's legitimacy amid growing international calls for it to denuclearise. On Sunday, Kim, accompanied by top military officials and his influential sister, Kim Yo-jong , visited the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun to honour their late father Kim Jong-il, and grandfather Kim Il-sung. The visit coincided with the Day of the Shining Star, a national holiday in North Korea on February 16, Kim Jong-il's birthday.
According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the younger Kim expressed a 'solemn will' to dedicate himself to the 'sacred struggle' for the nation's eternal prosperity, the safety of its people and the promotion of their well-being.
He vowed to remain faithful to the revolutionary ideals of both his father and grandfather, whose embalmed bodies are housed at the mausoleum. It marked the first time since 2021 that he had visited the mausoleum on his father's birthday.
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Asia Times
4 days ago
- Asia Times
Korean leader Lee likely on a collision course with Trump
The new South Korean president, Lee Jae-myung, calls himself a foreign policy 'pragmatist.' He says he is driven by South Korea's national interest, rather than ideology, and has spoken of his desire to improve relations with China and North Korea. Under the former president, Yoon Suk Yeol, South Korea's relationship with these countries came under increasing strain. Yoon adopted a confrontational stance toward North Korea, and openly sided with Washington in its rivalry with Beijing. Lee's vision may bring his government into conflict with the Trump administration. On the campaign trail, Lee sought to dispel doubts about his commitment to the longstanding military alliance between the US and South Korea. He repeatedly described Seoul's relationship with Washington as the 'basic axis of our diplomacy.' But he signaled that there would be some rebalancing of relations under his leadership, stressing that South Korea should not rely solely on the US. This reflects the fundamental belief of liberal politicians in South Korea. While acknowledging the importance of ties with the US, they want a more balanced relationship with other regional powers like China. Lee says closer relations with China will occur within the framework of South Korea's alliance with the US. But, with Washington and Beijing battling for global influence, this is still likely to become a major point of tension with the US. The Trump administration has taken a hawkish approach towards China and wants its allies to do the same. Lee, for his part, has stated that South Korea should not be forced to choose between the US and China, saying: 'We should not put all our eggs in one basket.' And he has signalled that his government will resist efforts by Washington to draw South Korea into any conflict with China over Taiwan or territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The Lee government clearly has a delicate balancing act ahead when it comes to the two superpowers. Trump has previously criticized the amount South Korea pays for the US forces stationed on its soil, while recent reports suggest he is considering the withdrawal of about 4,500 of 28,500 US troops from the country. Another of Lee's pressing foreign policy issues is how to deal with the North Korean threat. Yoon's government avoided dialogue with the North and encouraged the spread of outside information across the border. Over the past decade, in response to North Korea's improved nuclear and missile capabilities, public opinion in South Korea has shifted in favor of developing an independent nuclear weapons program. This is not a strategy the Lee government will pursue. The Democratic Party, of which Lee is a member, has historically advocated a policy of engagement and peaceful coexistence with North Korea. From 1998 to 2008, and then again from 2017 to 2022, liberal governments in South Korea pursued a so-called 'sunshine policy' towards the North. The goal was to reduce tension through engagement, with the ultimate goal being to create the conditions for unification. In his inaugural address on June 4, Lee said his government would deal with North Korean aggression with 'strong deterrence' – referring to the military alliance with the US. But he also elaborated on the need to again reopen channels of communication with North Korea to deliver peace through talks and cooperation. He added: 'Peace is always cheaper than war.' In a signal of his intent for renewed engagement with the North, Lee has nominated the former unification minister, Lee Jong-seok, as chief of the National Intelligence Service. Lee Jong-seok was the architect of South Korea's policy towards the North between 2003 and 2008, during the presidency of Roh Moo-hyun. However, the geopolitical landscape has changed in recent years. In January 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared South Korea an 'enemy' nation and said the North would no longer be working toward reunification. North Korea has since then stopped any contact with the South and has ceased any economic collaboration. South Korea's sunshine policy had seen the development of projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which involved South Korean businesses establishing factories in North Korea and employing North Korean workers. North Korea is a foreign policy issue in which the Trump administration and the Lee government may pursue similar objectives. Trump has also signalled that he is seeking to renew dialogue with North Korea, and has hinted at the possibility of future summits to discuss a nuclear agreement. Trump's first term saw him become the first US president to meet with a North Korean leader while in office, though he ultimately made no progress in restraining North Korea's nuclear program. Kim is very unlikely to be responsive to efforts by either country to engage in dialogue. North Korea has forged a close partnership with Russia in recent years, which has even seen it send troops to fight against Ukraine, and no longer considers engagement with the US or South Korea necessary. It is instead banking on making significant advances in military technology. Russian assistance has reportedly already contributed to improvements in North Korea's missile guidance systems, while Russia has also supplied North Korea with advanced air defense systems. The new Lee government faces a very challenging international environment. The North Korean threat is growing, the US security guarantee is weakening and it will have to resist Trump's attempts to draw South Korea into a regional military network to contain China. How it meets all of these challenges will become clear in the months and years ahead. Christoph Bluth is professor of international relations and security, University of Bradford This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Asia Times
6 days ago
- Asia Times
Lee Jae-myung takes the helm of a fractured and unmoored Korea
As Lee Jae-myung assumes South Korea's presidency after a decisive electoral victory, the left-leaning leader inherits not just a nation beset by economic distress and political fatigue but a region tilting precariously toward geostrategic recalibration. North Korea, often the most volatile player in this theater, has reason to quietly celebrate. For Pyongyang, the return of a progressive president in the Blue House is the best possible outcome short of Korean reunification on its own terms. Under conservative administrations—especially the now-impeached Yoon Suk Yeol—the North faced a hardline security posture, expanded joint military drills between the US and South Korea, and the near-collapse of any meaningful diplomatic dialogue. Yoon's flirtation with Japan on trilateral military coordination, his vocal hawkishness and alignment with Washington's China containment strategy further agitated the North. Lee, while no apologist for the North, has signaled an openness to resuming inter-Korean dialogue, humanitarian aid and economic cooperation projects. These preferences echo the Sunshine Policy-era instincts of earlier progressive leaders like Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, under whom North Korea was able to leverage peace overtures for both material gain and diplomatic legitimacy. For North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Lee's victory is not just breathing space—it is a new strategic opening. Even modest overtures from Seoul could be used to pressure Washington into easing sanctions, to portray the North as a willing partner in peace and to sow division between the US and South Korea on policy direction. North Korea thrives not in alignment, but in asymmetry. Lee's presidency, therefore, offers precisely that: a fragmented strategic environment ripe for manipulation. China, too, has reasons to be quietly pleased. While Beijing publicly maintains a policy of non-interference, its preference for left-leaning South Korean governments is no secret. The conservative Yoon administration had drawn South Korea deeper into Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy, even hinting at South Korea's involvement in supply chain 'friend-shoring' that would exclude China. Lee, by contrast, has voiced skepticism about the over-militarization of regional diplomacy and hinted at recalibrating Seoul's strategic autonomy. His emphasis on economic revival, job creation and technological innovation aligns with Beijing's vision of a less confrontational regional order. Additionally, Lee's expected moderation on issues like Taiwan and the South China Sea—compared to Yoon's vocally pro-US stance—will make him more acceptable to Chinese policymakers. From Beijing's perspective, the best scenario is a South Korea that remains allied to the US in security terms but is economically interdependent with China and politically wary of strategic entrapment. Lee's presidency will likely fit that mold. Still, Lee's mandate is far from stable in a deeply polarized South Korea. Yoon's impeachment followed months of unrest, accusations of executive overreach and the final misstep of invoking martial law, which many South Koreans interpreted as a grave assault on democracy. Lee's victory represents a public demand for change, but not necessarily a blank check. His own reputation is under scrutiny. Accusations of corruption during his tenure as mayor of Seongnam and governor of Gyeonggi province still linger despite his denials. Legal proceedings will continue, casting a shadow over his presidency. The economy, too, is teetering. South Korea's projected 0.8% GDP growth in 2025 is alarming for a nation that once epitomized go-go economic development. A toxic mix of youth unemployment, housing unaffordability and stagnant wages has bred cynicism among younger voters—many of whom backed Lee not out of loyalty, but frustration. And then there is the healthcare crisis. The mass resignation of junior doctors over medical school reform—aimed at solving a looming doctor shortage—has left hospitals understaffed. Lee must broker a truce between a defiant medical establishment and a public desperate for accessible care. If mishandled, this issue could unravel his domestic credibility faster than any foreign policy stumble. Lee's most treacherous challenge will be in foreign affairs. His task is nothing less than redefining South Korea's role in a region fractured by US-China rivalry, destabilized by a bellicose North Korea and overshadowed by global economic fragmentation. Lee must recalibrate Seoul's policy toward Pyongyang without undermining deterrence. Missile provocations, cyberattacks and nuclear brinkmanship by the North will not abate simply because of Lee's willingness to engage. Any dialogue must be carefully constructed within the framework of UN Security Council sanctions and regional consensus. Kim Jong Un is likely to test Lee early—perhaps with a missile launch or a cyber operation—to assess whether conciliatory rhetoric translates into policy leniency. Lee must respond decisively enough to preserve domestic confidence, yet not so aggressively that he forecloses future dialogue. To be sure, President Donald Trump's return to power complicates Lee's balancing act. Trump has already demanded greater defense spending from allies and suggested reducing America's 28,500-strong troop presence in South Korea unless Seoul pays more. These transactional instincts run counter to the institutionalism that undergirds the US-ROK alliance. Lee must navigate these pressures without appearing submissive to Washington or vulnerable to Pyongyang. Managing the Combined Forces Command relationship and the extended deterrence commitment—especially nuclear—will require cool-headed and consistent diplomacy. Lee must also resist any impulse by Trump to weaponize trade, tariffs or technology against South Korea's economy. China, while economically vital, is diplomatically assertive. South Korea's THAAD deployment in 2016 led to punitive economic retaliation by Beijing, a wound still felt in the Korean tourism, retail and entertainment sectors. Mostly, Lee must avoid being drawn into a binary US-China choice. Instead, his administration should promote a 'strategic pivotal power diplomacy'—partnering more actively with ASEAN, with which Seoul enjoys a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, allowing it to join minilateral forums such as the Mekong-Korea, and supporting multilateral digital governance that reduces dependence on either pole. These moves will signal autonomy without antagonism. Lee enters the Blue House with high expectations but little margin for error. His presidency must be one of pragmatism without paralysis, engagement without appeasement and reform without rupture. For Pyongyang, Lee's rise represents an opportunity. For Beijing, it marks a welcome shift. But for Lee himself, this is a moment of great peril disguised as promise. His legacy will ultimately be judged not by rhetoric but by his ability to stabilize a wounded nation, navigate great-power rivalries and restore the democratic spirit South Koreans so recently took to the streets to protect. Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and a senior visiting fellow at the University of Cambridge.
Asia Times
01-06-2025
- Asia Times
Letter from Seoul: This isn't just another election
Sometimes when momentous things happen in a country, most people don't notice. That's normal. People focus on their lives – jobs, family, finances, and the like. I've been in Seoul, South Korea, for about a week, having been asked to come and see what's going on with the upcoming presidential election. You wouldn't know that an election that might determine South Korea's future is underway. The election was called three months ago after conservative president Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment. He'd declared martial law out of frustration over the leftist-dominated National Assembly using its immense power to make governing impossible. Yoon called it a 'legislative dictatorship.' So now it's a race between Lee Jae-myung from the leftist Democratic Party of Korea (DP) and Kim Moon-soo – of the generally conservative People Power Party (PPP). The DPK contains some hard-core radicals who want to align with the People's Republic of China and North Korea and even end the US-ROK alliance. Lee himself has called the US forces 'occupiers' – and is charged with involvement in sending $8 million to North Korea when he was governor of Gyeonggi Province. One of his lieutenants has already been convicted. Kim – a former labor activist is pro-US alliance. And he has no illusions about or love for South Korean leftists – having once been one of them – or the Chinese communists and North Korea. But there is another conservative candidate running. Lee Jun-seok of the small New Reform Party will siphon off votes from Kim. Polls, not always reliable, put the DPK in the lead. We will know soon enough. Two days of early voting are finished and election day is June 3d. A Kim victory would be better for the US-ROK alliance, although the DP-dominated National Assembly would still make life miserable for a conservative president. If Lee Jae-myung prevails, things could be very different. The leftists will have nearly every lever of power in South Korea. They just need the presidency. They already have the National Assembly (189 seats of 300), much of the judiciary and the police, the media, academia, labor unions and the all-powerful National Election Commission (NEC). Big business has been under attack, and even the ROK military has been put on notice. South Korean leftists have long wanted total and permanent control. But it started in earnest around 2017 when leftist, Moon Jae-in was elected president following the controversial removal of conservative president Park Chung-hee If Lee wins, he won't sever the US alliance or nestle up to the PRC and North Korea right away. US officialdom will tell itself the leftists are pragmatists and won't end the good thing they have with the United States. But bit by bit the US-ROK relationship will grow colder. Seoul's relationships with Beijing and Pyongyang will warm up. Ties with Japan – improved under President Yoon – will enter the walk-in freezer. The National Assembly and the leftist president will do whatever they want – and nobody can stop them. South Korea will effectively be a one-party state. Future elections won't matter. The National Election Commission will see to that. It has been stonewalling widespread and detailed citizen-produced evidence of electoral irregularities starting with the 2020 National Assembly election – which gave the DP a solid majority for the first time. Similar evidence was produced after the 2022 presidential election and the 2024 National Assembly election. Mention election integrit, however, and South Koreans can find the police at their doorstep and charges leveled. Being ridiculed as a conspiracy theorist is a given. But consider the fact that the NEC declared its system was unhackable – when citizens demanded transparency. Yet in 2023 the North Korean Lazarus Group repeatedly hacked the NEC network. Public outcry allowed the National Intelligence Service (not yet entirely under leftist domination) to run penetration tests. NIS ran wild and reported how the electoral system can be electronically manipulated. I came to Korea in 2020 to investigate allegations of rigging at the request of concerned citizens. I expected to find nothing much. In short order, it was obvious there were problems. Nothing has changed. It's still a system ripe for and apparently rife with manipulation. And authorities will not examine the evidence. Some South Koreans are trying to ensure honest elections. But they are beleaguered. They would sorely appreciate a kind word from President Trump. But the Trump administration stands by mute, with eyes primly averted. It declares the relationship 'rock solid' and 'forged in blood? And 'who are we to meddle in another country's politics?' But rather than electoral interference it would be providing oxygen to people who want to be free and are under pressure. There's nothing wrong with speaking up for consensual government, and civil liberties – and for your friends. And it puts the bad guys on notice. If they think America doesn't care or won't do anything at all they'll smother the opposition. Recall support for dissidents in Russia and Poland and elsewhere in the Cold War? It mattered. The US stayed quiet when Hugo Chavez came along in Venezuela in the early 1990's. The honest people just wanted something suggesting USA gave two hoots. They got nothing. And Venezuela is now in the China / Cuba camp. At least one big problem still remains for the leftists who see their goal in sight. That is the fact that most South Koreans don't want to be like China or North Korea – and support for the US alliance is strong, even among more than a few Democratic Party voters. And Koreans can be mercurial. They may not quietly go along with what South Korea's hard-core radicals have in mind. So this isn't just another election. If Washington hasn't paid proper attention to South Korea yet, it will have no choice but to do so before long.
