Scheduled Commercial Banks further improved their liquidity positions
The aggregate gross-non-performing-asset ratio of the 46 banks may marginally edge up from 2.3% in March 2025 to 2.5% in March 2027 under the baseline scenario and to 5.6% and 5.3% under the adverse scenario of geopolitical risk and adverse scenario of global growth slowdown respectively.
The results revealed that the aggregate capital adequacy ratio of major scheduled commercial banks may marginally dip to 17% by March 2027 from 17.2% in March 2025, under the baseline scenario. It may decline to 14.2% under the adverse scenario of geopolitical risks and to 14.6% under the adverse scenario of global growth slowdown.
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Mint
an hour ago
- Mint
Why QED-backed Leo1 needs a sharp turnaround to stabilise its ship
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The Hindu
4 hours ago
- The Hindu
The Sisyphean quest to bolster manufacturing in India
78 Years of Freedom The Narendra Modi government's quest to bolster the domestic manufacturing sector is not the first time a government has tried this. In fact, the manufacturing sector has been the focus of government policy — in one way or the other — ever since 1956, to relatively modest success. At the time of Independence or thereabouts, the Indian economy looked very different from its current state both in terms of size as well as composition. At the time, agriculture was the overwhelmingly dominant driver of the economy, contributing about half of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as per data with the Reserve Bank of India. The nascent manufacturing sector, on the other hand, made up about 11% of the GDP. Now, the services sector has taken over the dominant role vacated by agriculture, while manufacturing has remained largely where it was. The first Five Year Plan (1951-56) focused on the idea of increasing domestic savings, since it was presumed that higher savings would directly translate into higher investments. This policy, however, ran into a fundamental problem: investments could not materially increase as the country did not have a domestic capital goods producing sector. The second Five Year Plan (1956-61), based on the ideas of PC Mahalanobis, and successive Plans sought to address this by increasing investments in the capital goods producing sectors themselves. The idea was to increase government investment in capital goods production, while the micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) would cater to the consumer goods market. 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The 1991 reforms and the resultant end of the 'licence raj', the opening up of the economy to the private sector and international competition further helped things, with the manufacturing sector growing strongly and contributing a steady 15-18% of a rapidly-growing GDP till about 2015. Steep fall That year saw a marked change, however, with the share of manufacturing in GDP consistently falling for the next decade. A major reason for this change was the non-performing assets (NPA) crisis in the banking sector. Profligate lending by banks in the 2009-14 period led to a build-up of bad loans, which came to light in 2015-18 following an Asset Quality Review of the banking sector. Such was the crisis and its fallout that bank lending to large industry virtually dried up. 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Economic Times
5 hours ago
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Bank of Azad Hind: When Netaji gave India its own currency
Synopsis In 1944 Rangoon, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose established the Bank of Azad Hind to fund his liberation campaign, demonstrating India's financial capabilities before independence. Capitalised by the Indian diaspora, the bank became the Provisional Government's treasury, issuing its own currency and supporting various war efforts. Image: Netaji Research Bureau It is April 1944 in Rangoon. In a vacant bungalow off Jamal Avenue, carpenters are at work turning bare rooms into a working bank. Just a week earlier, this was an empty space. Now, it is about to become the headquarters of a bank and no, this one is not the story of how the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was birthed. This bank was under the authority of the Provisional Government of Free India, led by Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose. Five years before the RBI became fully independent in 1949, Bose launched the Bank of Azad Hind to fund his liberation campaign and to demonstrate that India could run its own financial institutions before it had even won its political freedom. Also Read: Independence Day 2025: Tryst with growth — India's economic journey from Nehru to now The short but strong saga of this bank has been well drafted in S.A. Ayer's book, "Unto Him a Witness". Ayer, who served in Bose's cabinet, wrote, 'At this stage, Netaji established the first National Bank of Azad Hind outside India in Rangoon on the 5th of April, 1944, to finance the war of India's liberation.' The 'stage' Ayer refers to was a tense moment. Bose was preparing to leave for the front in the Imphal–Kohima campaign. Japanese and Burmese authorities were sceptical about establishing a bank in wartime, fearing political complications. Some colleagues worried about capital, stability, and the timing. But Bose was unmoved and unbothered. 'Have a bank I must, and that too within a few days, before I leave for the front. I must open the bank and then go to the front,' Ayer quoted Bose as came quickly from the Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia. Ayer recounted how four Indians stepped forward to fund the initial days of the newly founded bank, with a vision of free India. 'Perhaps, you may be surprised to hear that four Indians have come forward to find between themselves all the required capital for the bank. They are prepared to write off the capital, if necessary, though I am quite sure they won't have to. In any event, they are ready to assign to the Provisional Government of Azad Hind eighty per cent of the annual profits.'This show of support ended Japanese resistance. 'That silenced the Japanese pretty effectively,' Ayer notes. What followed was a full and renewed case of dedication. Also Read: India's space race: From bullock carts to Gaganyaan'How one man, Yellappa, and the other four patriotic Indians worked like Trojans night and day for a week and converted a vacant building into a full-fledged bank — with an authorised capital of rupees fifty lakhs is a romantic story that deserves a chapter all by itself,' Ayer Fay, in his book "The Forgotten Army", recounts how Netaji's appeal in Rangoon for rupees 5 million triggered an extraordinary outpouring of support from the Indian community in Burma and Malaya, ultimately swelling the Azad Hind Bank's reserves to about 215 million rupees – more than 150 million rupees from Burma media reports and later historical accounts identify some of the most prominent donors: Abdul Habeeb Yusuf Marfani, a Gujarati businessman in Rangoon, is said to have pledged his entire fortune of roughly 1 crore rupees; the Betai family, Hiraben and Hemraj, reportedly contributed 50 lakh rupees in cash and assets; and Iqbal Singh Narula famously offered silver equal to Netaji's own Bank of Azad Hind soon became the treasury of the Provisional Government. 'The funds of the Provisional Government were banked with this bank,' Ayer wrote. It accepted donations 'in cash as well as in kind' from traders, shopkeepers, and plantation workers. These resources funded soldier pay, procurement, propaganda, and relief efforts. Also Read: UPI and beyond: The great Indian banking leap The bank even issued its own currency, denominated in rupees, which circulated in INA-controlled territories, a symbolic assertion of monetary sovereignty even if it carried no value in British himself served as chairman. 'The National Bank of Azad Hind was established in Rangoon in April 1944. I know a man called Dina Nath. He was one of the Directors of the Bank. I was the Chairman of the Bank,' he institution's life was brief. It closed by the end of World War II or precisely after the INA's retreat and the fall of Rangoon. But decades later, it resurfaced in an unexpected way. Following the Modi government's decision in 2016 to declassify files related to Bose, the finance ministry began receiving unusual petitions. Several borrowers wrote offering to repay their loans using Azad Hind Bank currency notes, some promising the bearer sums as high as ₹1 lakh. 'We have received representations from some individuals who want the currency issued by Azad Hind Bank or similar variants to be recognised as legal tender,' a government official told ET at the Reserve Bank of India, citing Section 22 of the RBI Act, 1934, rejected the requests, saying it had no record of such an entity and that only the RBI has the sole authority to issue banknotes. Some petitioners pushed back, arguing the RBI 'itself was formed by the British' and that the government should take a fresh Ayer's view, the bank was never merely a repository of funds for Bose: Perhaps it was a pledge of a nation to free itself, having 'our own currency and our own bank' alongside an army and a government.
