Taliban celebrates as the US lifts bounties on senior officials
The US has lifted bounties on three senior Taliban figures, including the interior minister who also heads a powerful network blamed for bloody attacks against Afghanistan's former Western-backed government, officials in Kabul said Sunday.
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Sirajuddin Haqqani, who acknowledged planning a January 2008 attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul, which killed six people, including US citizen Thor David Hesla, no longer appears on the State Department's Rewards for Justice website. The FBI website on Sunday still featured a wanted poster for him.
Interior Ministry spokesman Abdul Mateen Qani said the US government had revoked the bounties placed on Haqqani, Abdul Aziz Haqqani, and Yahya Haqqani.
'These three individuals are two brothers and one paternal cousin,' Qani said.
The Haqqani network grew into one of the deadliest arms of the Taliban after the US-led 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. The group employed roadside bombs, suicide bombings and other attacks, including on the Indian and US embassies, the Afghan presidency, and other major targets. They also have been linked to extortion, kidnapping and other criminal activity.
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A Foreign Ministry official, Zakir Jalaly, said the Taliban's release of US prisoner George Glezmann on Friday and the removal of bounties showed both sides were 'moving beyond the effects of the wartime phase and taking constructive steps to pave the way for progress' in bilateral relations.
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Asia Times
8 hours ago
- Asia Times
Indonesia torn between China's J-10 and US F-15EX
Indonesia's fighter jet dilemma pits cost, capability, and geopolitical leverage as it weighs China's now-battle-tested J-10s against pricier Western rivals. This month, Reuters reported that Indonesia is evaluating the potential acquisition of China's J-10 fighter jets, weighing their affordability and advanced capabilities against other options, including the US-made F-15EX. Deputy Defense Minister Donny Ermawan Taufanto confirmed that discussions are ongoing with China, which has also reportedly pitched naval vessels and armaments. Indonesia's evaluation considers system compatibility, after-sales support and pricing. The deliberations follow Indonesia's broader military modernization push, which saw the 2022 purchase of 42 French Rafale jets worth US$8.1 billion. Six Rafales are expected to be delivered next year. While Indonesia's interest in the J-10 predates recent India-Pakistan air skirmishes, Pakistan's use of J-10s to down at least one Indian-flown Rafale has added a new dimension to Jakarta's evaluation. Meanwhile, Indonesia is still mulling its planned F-15EX purchase, with questions rising around the $8 billion price tag for 24 jets. France remains a contender, with President Emmanuel Macron's recent visit to Indonesia resulting in a preliminary defense pact that could lead to further Rafale acquisitions. Taufanto emphasized Indonesia's budget constraints and strategic options, noting ongoing assessments of multiple offers. Highlighting the J-10's capabilities, Justin Bronk notes in an October 2020 report by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that the J-10 is China's response to the US F-16 and Swedish Gripen, offering comparable capabilities at a significantly lower acquisition cost. 'Think of the J-10C as roughly equivalent to a late-model F-16, but with some features, like its long-range missile suite, that could give it the edge in certain scenarios,' says David Jordan, a senior lecturer in defense studies at King's College London, in a May 2025 Business Insider article. 'You may well see a very viable competitor to Western products entering contests for the purchase of new fighter aircraft,' says Jordan. However, no matter how capable the J-10 may be on paper, Indonesia's chronic procurement dysfunction, underfunding, weak institutional support and fragmented planning raise serious questions about its ability to field any advanced fighter effectively. 'Indonesia's air force modernization and fleet recapitalization has been marred with multiple challenges, including lack of funding, lack of government commitment, as well as inefficient and highly personalized acquisition policy,' says Olli Suorsa in a March 2021 S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) report. For Indonesia's cash-strapped air force, which by all accounts is in serious need of modernization, the J-10 presents a compelling case. However, Indonesia may be proceeding with caution before making its move. Dave Laksono, a senior member of Indonesia's House of Representatives, said that 'unverified claims in conflict zones cannot be used as the sole basis for assessing the effectiveness or failure of a particular weapons system,' according to a May 2025 Defense Security Asia report. 'Even the most advanced jets, such as the F-16, F/A-18, and F-22, have experienced incidents of being shot down or crashed due to certain tactical conditions,' says Laksono. Further, Alfin Bansundoro notes in a June 2024 East Asia Forum article that while Indonesia has previously purchased Chinese weapons, such as CH-4B drones, C-705 and C-802 anti-ship missiles, and TD-2000B self-propelled air defense systems, bilateral territorial disputes over the Natuna Islands cast doubt on future purchases from China. Bansundoro points out that China has sold downgraded weapons to Indonesia several times, mentioning that the former sold the export version of the C-802, known as the YJ-83, which has a reduced range. In addition, he says Indonesia runs the risk of jeopardizing purchases from Western partners if it pushes through with acquiring Chinese weapons, emphasizing the risk of Western economic weaponization. However, Evan Laksmana warns in a May 2024 article for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) that without a well-institutionalized defense partnership, Indonesia's long-term relationship with China will lack strategic heft and balance. Beyond military cooperation, such arms deals often bleed into economic diplomacy. Fighter jets can act as entry points for deeper bilateral entanglements, requiring long-term cooperation in training, maintenance and logistics. Jake Rinaldi argues in a November 2024 article for the US Army War College that China often pairs arms sales with economic perks, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which Indonesia is a member. In the Indonesian context, Rinaldi notes that China's arms sales may aim to establish relationships with senior civilian and military leaders, thereby expanding diplomatic and strategic influence. Pointing out the quid pro quo between China and Indonesia, Oene Marseille and other writers mention in a November 2024 article for CDR Essential Intelligence that China has financed major projects, including the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail, in exchange for strengthened economic ties. In return, Marseille and others state that Indonesia provides China with access to crucial resources, particularly nickel, for electric vehicle production. However, they note that while Indonesia benefits from economic modernization, China leverages these projects to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, intertwining trade with strategic leverage, while Indonesia cautiously balances partnerships. Although Indonesia has planned to purchase F-15EX jets from the US, a decision to purchase them, like a potential acquisition of China's J-10s, may be driven more by political and economic considerations than by Indonesia's actual defense requirements. An April 2023 D-Insights article reports that Indonesia's plan to purchase F-15EX jets from the US is likely to fail due to cost, as the aircraft are too expensive for the country's limited defense budget. Similar budget issues have strained Indonesia's past cooperation with South Korea on next-generation fighter projects, including delayed payments and alleged data leaks, as reported by the Korean JoongAng Daily in May 2025. D-Insights posits that Indonesia may have raised the possibility of F-15EX purchases to keep good relations with the US, ultimately making it a political gesture more than anything else. Even if driven by politics, Indonesia may still attempt to extract tangible benefits from potential F-15EX purchases. Aryojati Ardipandanto argues in an April 2025 article for Info Singkat that Indonesia could use F-15EX purchases to negotiate the 32% 'reciprocal' tariffs Donald Trump imposed on the country in April and has since paused. Ardipandanto says Indonesia needs the F-15EX as part of its defense diplomacy to blunt the effects of US tariffs on its micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), considering the possibility of layoffs in Indonesian companies that export to the US. Whichever jet Indonesia chooses, the decision will have far-reaching consequences, shaping its defense posture, great power alignments and the price it pays for sovereignty.
HKFP
10 hours ago
- HKFP
Safeguarding national security should become Hong Kong's ‘culture,' leader John Lee says
Safeguarding national security should become a 'culture' in Hong Kong, Chief Executive John Lee has said, vowing to strengthen public education and train officers to counter 'state-level' threats. In an interview with the Beijing-backed newspaper Wen Wei Po, published on Friday, Lee said the government's effort to safeguard national security was still at its 'starting stage.' His remarks come almost five years after Beijing imposed a national security law in Hong Kong in the summer of 2020, following large-scale pro-democracy protests and unrest in 2019. The city enacted a homegrown security law, known locally as Article 23, in March 2024. Last month, subsidiary legislation for Article 23 was enacted. Six new offences were created to facilitate the work of China's Office for Safeguarding National Security (OSNS) in the city, and six sites occupied by the office were declared 'prohibited places,' with hefty penalties for intruders or spies. Lee said in his interview that Hong Kong was still 'setting up the institution' of safeguarding national security. 'We have to strengthen our information network to become more aware of the acts that endanger national security, as well as the opponents' financial capability, other resources, and manpower,' he said in Cantonese. He also said that authorities should step up the training of national security agents against state-level threats, such as spies. Spies 'could be highly discreet. Things that appear normal on the surface may involve a large conspiracy and a grand scheme behind,' he said. 'Ultimately, their motives and goals are to endanger our national security.' The city's government has been in 'good communication' with mainland Chinese authorities in training agents, he added. Meanwhile, Hong Kong will continue to promote national security education, Lee said, in a bid to make residents capable of recognising national security threats instantly. 'I hope they become more identified [with national security] and more proactive, so that safeguarding national security can become a culture,' he said. Over 300 people have been arrested for 'acts endangering national security' since Beijing's national security law came into effect. Beijing inserted national security legislation directly into Hong Kong's mini-constitution in June 2020 following a year of pro-democracy protests and unrest. It criminalised subversion, secession, collusion with foreign forces and terrorist acts – broadly defined to include disruption to transport and other infrastructure. The move gave police sweeping new powers and led to hundreds of arrests amid new legal precedents, while dozens of civil society groups disappeared. The authorities say it restored stability and peace to the city, rejecting criticism from trade partners, the UN and NGOs. Separate from the 2020 Beijing-enacted security law, the homegrown Safeguarding National Security Ordinance targets treason, insurrection, sabotage, external interference, sedition, theft of state secrets and espionage. It allows for pre-charge detention of up to 16 days, and suspects' access to lawyers may be restricted, with penalties involving up to life in prison. Article 23 was shelved in 2003 amid mass protests, remaining taboo for years. But, on March 23, 2024, it was enacted having been fast-tracked and unanimously approved at the city's opposition-free legislature. The law has been criticised by rights NGOs, Western states and the UN as vague, broad and 'regressive.' Authorities, however, cited perceived foreign interference and a constitutional duty to 'close loopholes' after the 2019 protests and unrest.
Asia Times
11 hours ago
- Asia Times
Hopes for a Xi-Trump summit are naively misplaced
US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping's surprise phone call—marking the first direct communication between the leaders in months—may signal a temporary thaw in an otherwise frosty and structurally adversarial relationship. While America's restoration of Chinese student visas and China's resumption of blocked critical mineral trade suggest detente, this contact, like others in the history of US-China summits, could quickly prove to be more performative than substantive. The danger lies not in dialogue but in the illusion that the leader-to-leader call, which Beijing insisted Trump requested, will meaningfully alter the deep geopolitical, ideological and economic divergences that define Sino-American relations today. News reports said Xi told Trump to roll back tariffs and other trade measures that are roiling the global economy while warning him about intensifying the dispute over Taiwan. Trump claimed on social media that the call delivered a 'positive conclusion', including on China's restrictions on critical mineral exports, and that lower-level discussions on trade would follow. He said, 'We're in very good shape with China and the trade deal.' Both leaders invited each other to visit their countries. However, reports noted that there was nothing in either side's official statements to indicate the critical mineral issue had been resolved. And China has reasonable cause to remain on guard despite Trump's post-call positivity. Let us count the many impediments to real and lasting reconciliation: The most acute danger stems from Trump's lack of strategic coherence. Unlike the Kissinger-Nixon doctrine of detente, which was structured, calculated and guided by a realpolitik vision of global balance, Trump's approach is reactive and transactional and thus prone to Chinese manipulation. Concessions, including the reopening of student exchanges on the US side and lifting critcal mineral restrictions on China's—appear to be issued in exchange for vague 'reciprocity' rather than any long-term strategic realignment. For Beijing, such inconsistency is easily exploitable. Xi understands that Trump is prone to tactical surprises and policy reversals, allowing China to notch one-by-one concessions while offering minimal structural reforms or broad policy changes in return. This understanding of Trump's tactics and views may also embolden China to keep testing US resolve and commitment in the Taiwan Strait, East Sea and South China Seas, knowing that by doing so it strengthens its negotiating leverage in wresting future US concessions. Much has been made of US-endorsed 'de-risking' from China without actually 'decoupling.' The resumption of trade in critical minerals—crucial to US defense and clean energy sectors—signals a potential pause in America's techno-economic containment of China, which if lasting, would contradict the bipartisan consensus in Washington that China poses a 'systemic challenge.' This could also send mixed messages to allies such as Japan, South Korea and key ASEAN economies, many of which are now being pressured to restrict technology transfers to China, particularly in regard to AI and quantum computing. If Trump reverses this posture, potentially at a Trump-Xi in-person summit, it would necessarily undercut the anti-China coalition the US has been trying to build since 2017 and signal a climbdown of epic proportions. An in-person summit with Xi would give both leaders global optics, something they arguably both need as their hardline stances cause political tremors at home and restlessness abroad. Yet symbolism without substance carries its own risks. The 2019 Mar-a-Lago summit and the 2018 G20 truce in Argentina were celebrated photo ops that ultimately yielded few strategic gains. Indeed, they were followed by tariff escalations, cyber accusations and deepened distrust. Xi, ever conscious of China's 'national rejuvenation' drive, may use a summit with Trump to signal that China is not isolated—even amid Western efforts to contain it – and that he brought the US to heel through his tough negotiating posture. Should he succeed in presenting Trump as a president willing to do business without political preconditions, it will bolster China's power on the world stage. This symbolism would serve Xi well amid research that shows China is straining under the weight of assisting various countries when its own economy remains fragile. There will be a temptation to portray a Trump-Xi summit as a return to the two sides' previous 'managed rivalry' model. Yet this notion is predicated on mutual trust, which no longer exists. A brief thaw may offer breathing space for both, but there is no sign yet of lasting strategic stability. During the previous Cold War, the US and Soviet Union were able to negotiate arms control and crisis management protocols. No such guardrails exist between the US and China today. The resumption of critical mineral trade and educational exchanges, while welcome, won't be enough to reverse mutual mistrust, especially when military encounters in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea could easily still spiral out of control. Increasingly politicized charges against Chinese nationals in the US are fueling that mistrust. Those include new accusations that China is involved in 'agro-terrorism' that aims to wipe out US barley, wheat and corn yields by up to 50%. A PhD researcher of Chinese origin at the University of Michigan has been arrested in this connection. A potential Trump-Xi summit – despite stage-managed positive vibes and smiles for the cameras, could be yet another empty ritual—a theatrical handshake over unresolved and deep contradictions. To be sure, both leaders have reasons to engage. Trump seeks headlines as his popularity slips ahead of 2026 midterm elections; Xi seeks legitimacy for his tough negotiating posture that risks millions of Chinese factory jobs. But neither is offering a strategic roadmap that can reassure domestic or global audiences. Without a shared understanding of what strategic competition entails, and without mechanisms for escalation control, the optics of detente will only mask a rivalry that still threatens to spiral deeper and deeper into conflict.
