Opinion: Review of F-35 fighter jet purchase should heed lessons from the past

National Post

5 days ago

By Tom Lawson and Gaëlle Rivard Piché
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As the Liberal government proceeds with its review of the F-35 acquisition, it finds itself trying to balance two competing impulses: the strategic necessity to replace the aging CF-18 fleet with the most capable fighter available — Lockheed Martin's F-35 — versus a reluctance to purchase yet another product from the U.S. defence industry. Before making a final decision, it would be wise for the government to reflect on a previous Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) procurement — one that offers a cautionary tale about what can happen when political discomfort trumps operational need.
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In 1992, the Progressive Conservative government signed a $4.8-billion contract with a European consortium to replace the aging Sea King helicopters deployed aboard Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) ships. For purely political reasons, when the Liberals came to power the following year, they cancelled the deal — incurring $500 million in termination penalties — and set out to find a more politically acceptable solution. That search dragged on for over a decade, culminating in a 2004 contract with Sikorsky to procure 28 CH-148 Cyclone helicopters.
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What the government failed to realize — or chose to overlook — was that Sikorsky was not offering a ready-made military platform. Instead, it proposed to adapt its civilian S-92 model into a maritime helicopter fit for military use, with the hope of replicating the global success of its venerable Sea King.
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But developmental issues plagued the project from the outset. The original delivery schedule of 2009 slipped repeatedly, prompting then-minister of national defence Peter MacKay to call the procurement 'the worst in the history of Canada.' By 2014, the program was on the brink of cancellation. Only a tense meeting between senior ministers and Sikorsky's president salvaged the deal, leading to a revised agreement that saw the Cyclone finally enter operational service in 2018.
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Yet the challenges did not end there. The Cyclone has consistently posted poor serviceability rates. A crash that cost the lives of six Canadian Armed Forces members in early 2020 was linked to inadequate documentation and flawed software. More recently, the fleet has again been largely grounded — this time due to a shortage of spare parts. The Commander of the RCN has voiced public frustration over the shortage of deployable helicopters, even threatening to replace them with drones if necessary.
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To be fair, Sikorsky is not solely to blame. It offered an attractive idea: a modern fly-by-wire maritime helicopter based on a successful civilian platform. The government accepted, underestimating the complexity of the transformation. The key lesson here — one that directly applies to the current fighter jet debate — is that there is enormous risk in buying aircraft, like the Cyclone, that exist in limited numbers worldwide.
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The best path forward with the Cyclone may now be to phase out the fleet and absorb the sunk costs. A more reliable option could be the MH-60 Seahawk, also made by Sikorsky. Unlike the Cyclone, the Seahawk is a proven design, with nearly 1,000 units in active service with the U.S., Australian and some NATO navies. While it would be politically awkward to cancel a Sikorsky platform only to purchase another from the same manufacturer, pragmatism must prevail. Perhaps a deal could be struck to return the Cyclones for parts, recouping some value through the civilian S-92 supply chain.
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This brings us back to the F-35. If the government decides to alter or abandon the current plan to acquire 88 of these jets, a series of negative consequences will quickly follow:
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First, Canadian companies involved in the F-35 global supply chain — currently contributing over $2 million in parts for every jet produced — will lose contracts. Those roles will go to suppliers in member nations that remain committed to the program.
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Second, the RCAF will be saddled with a purchase of inferior, older-generation fighters flown by a limited number of air forces.
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While there are already 1,200 F-35s in service with NATO allies and other close partners, that number is expected to exceed 2,500 within a decade and double that number over the full life of the fleet. Such a global user base ensures plentiful parts, broad interoperability and shared development. By contrast, only around 300 Swedish Gripens have been produced since 1987. Their operators include countries like Brazil, South Africa and Hungary — not exactly paragons of long-term defence collaboration. The French Rafale has similar production numbers and is used by nations such as Egypt and India, with whom interoperability is not required. While both the Gripen and Rafale are reasonably capable platforms, the crucial point is this: there is safety in numbers.
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To its credit, the government is taking a broader view of procurement — aiming to distribute defence dollars more globally and support Canadian industry. But fighter procurement is not the place to make that stand. The F-35 is not only the fighter of today — it is the fighter of the next 50 years. It will serve Canada and its allies reliably, effectively, and in sync with the evolving demands of modern warfare.
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The Cyclone saga offers a painful reminder of what happens when procurement decisions prioritize optics over operational outcomes. Let's not repeat that mistake. The F-35 path is not only well charted — it's the right one.
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