Moneyweb launches G20-focused podcast hosted by Jeremy Maggs
Launching on Monday, 21 July 2025, this weekly series will track the political, economic, and diplomatic developments leading up to the November summit in Johannesburg – a milestone moment for Africa and the global economy.
Each Monday, a new episode will unpack the major themes shaping the G20 agenda – from debt, diplomacy and climate justice to global trade tensions, digital transformation, infrastructure gaps, and Africa's voice at the table.
With sharp editorial analysis, high-profile guests, and behind-the-scenes insights, Mandates and Megaphones promises to be essential listening for business leaders, policymakers, and anyone seeking to understand how the G20 influences global economic direction – and what it means for South Africa.
The man behind the mic
Jeremy Maggs is one of South Africa's most respected media professionals, with over four decades of experience across television, radio, and print.
He currently hosts Moneyweb@Midday and Hot Business on Hot 102.7. Maggs has held senior editorial roles at eNCA and Radio 702's Eyewitness News.
He is also the author of the bestseller Win!, co-author of A Century Ignited, and founder of a respected media training consultancy. Pan Macmillan published his memoir, My Final Answer, in 2021. His radio show, The Power Update on Power 98.7, was awarded Best Current Affairs Programme at the 2017 Liberty Radio Awards. He was inducted into the SA Radio Hall of Fame the same year.
'The G20 is more than just a diplomatic gathering – it's a battleground of mandates, influence, and priorities,' says Maggs. 'This podcast is about helping South Africans make sense of how those decisions affect our economy and our future.'
A platform for strategic dialogue
Ryk van Niekerk, editor of Moneyweb, adds: 'Mandates and Megaphones will be the premier South African podcast covering the G20 – incisive, authoritative, and essential listening for policymakers, industry leaders and global observers.'
With South Africa stepping onto the world stage as G20 host, this podcast is more than just a media product – it's a space for meaningful dialogue. With Jeremy Maggs at the helm, Mandates and Megaphones will resonate in boardrooms, media briefings, and diplomatic circles alike. The podcast is brought to you by Standard Bank Group, the lead sponsor of the B20, the official business dialogue forum of the G20. The series will explore both public and private sector perspectives on Africa's evolving economic role.
Release schedule
The first episode will air on Monday, 21 July. New episodes will be released every Monday until the summit concludes in late November.
Follow Mandates and Megaphones wherever you get your podcasts, or download the Moneyweb app to stay informed – anytime, anywhere.
Breaking news at your fingertips… Follow Caxton Network News on Facebook and join our WhatsApp channel.
Nuus wat saakmaak. Volg Caxton Netwerk-nuus op Facebook en sluit aan by ons WhatsApp-kanaal.
Read original story on www.citizen.co.za
At Caxton, we employ humans to generate daily fresh news, not AI intervention. Happy reading!
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
IOL News
33 minutes ago
- IOL News
BRICS+ Series: BRICS is Facilitating France's declining Colonial Grip on West Africa
Togo's Foreign Minister Robert Dussey (L), South Sudanese President Salva Kiir (C) and Senegalese President Macky Sall (R) attend a meeting during the 2023 BRICS Summit at the Sandton Convention Centre in Johannesburg. Image: AFP By 2025, the slow death of Françafrique, France's long-standing political, economic, and military dominance in West and Central Africa has evolved from a continental rejection into a strategic recalibration. Playing part of this transition is the rise of the BRICS bloc, now expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE with partner countries such as Nigeria, Uganda, Thailand, etc, which is rapidly becoming the primary force enabling African nations to break free from Paris' postcolonial shadow. Through financial alternatives, infrastructure investment, and political alignment, BRICS is steadily dismantling the pillars that once propped up French influence in West Africa. France traditionally exerted influence in the region through elite political networks, military partnerships, and currency control, notably via the CFA franc. However, as France's credibility declines, BRICS nations have moved to fill this void with attractive alternatives. China, India, Russia, and newer BRICS+ members are now offering African countries different options for support, IMF-backed structural adjustment programs, and economic partnerships that are not exclusive. From Military Expulsion to Security Realignment France's military withdrawal has revealed the most significant weakness in the Françafrique system. After conducting security operations for years under Operation Barkhane, France was expelled from Mali (2022), Burkina Faso (2023), and Niger (2023). These three nations, now members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), have publicly sought security assistance from Russia. The Wagner Group initially, and later state-sponsored military training initiatives, largely supplanted the French presence. These agreements, despite their contentious nature, marked a turning point: France's monopoly on security in its former colonies was over. BRICS, via its New Development Bank (NDB), offers West African nations like Senegal and Guinea an alternative to Western-controlled financial institutions by providing funding for infrastructure and energy projects by 2025. The NDB, headquartered in Shanghai, helps countries avoid political conditions often tied to IMF or AFD loans, fostering financial independence. Challenging the CFA Franc with BRICS Alternatives The CFA franc, historically representing French economic dominance in 14 African nations, faces diminishing influence due to BRICS-backed financial technologies. The 2024 piloting of BRICS Pay in Guinea and Togo aims to streamline cross-border transactions using local currencies, reducing reliance on SWIFT. Concurrently, BRICS nations are assisting the development of the ECOWAS common currency, the Eco. Trade Diversification Beyond France West Africa is experiencing a rapid diversification of its trade partnerships. While China remains the leading trading partner, countries like India, Brazil, and the UAE are significantly expanding their economic influence. This shift is highlighted by India's concessional oil agreements with Senegal, Russia's growing energy ties with Mali, and the UAE's strategic investments in West African ports and logistics. These developments signal a departure from France's historical extractive and monopolistic commercial dominance. Data from the African Development Bank (AfDB) reveals that BRICS nations now account for nearly 35% of West Africa's total trade, a substantial rise from 22% in 2015. Senegal's Strategic Pivot Toward BRICS President Faye of Senegal plans a strategic shift, re-evaluating military ties with France, seeking BRICS observer status, and collaborating with India and China on digital infrastructure and solar energy. This emphasis on sovereignty aligns with other BRICS-sympathetic African leaders who see the bloc as a balanced development path. Redefining Postcolonial Independence in West Africa France's cultural influence is declining. Its soft power, once strong through language, media, and education, is diminishing as younger generations favor English, Arabic, and local languages. Meanwhile, BRICS-supported media like RT and CGTN are gaining traction in Africa by offering alternative viewpoints, exemplified by CGTN Africa's 2024 French platform challenging France's perceived role as Africa's automatic partner. France is attempting to rebrand its Africa policy, aiming to be seen as a development partner rather than a neocolonial power. However, these efforts are often undermined by widespread protests, youth activism, and the tangible investments made by BRICS nations. This has created friction in the decline of Françafrique. A 2024 Afrobarometer poll revealed that over 70% of respondents in Francophone West Africa held positive views of BRICS countries, while fewer than 30% trusted France to act in their nation's best interest. BRICS's emergence is playing one of the major roles in the decline of Françafrique. By offering alternative financing, promoting trade diversification, fostering political solidarity, and encouraging technological cooperation, BRICS is enabling West African countries to redefine their interactions. The long-standing French dominance, once considered insurmountable, is now actively being dismantled. Should this trend persist, BRICS could not only surpass France in West Africa but also fundamentally reshape the meaning of postcolonial independence for the region. Written by: Dr Iqbal Survé Past chairman of the BRICS Business Council and co-chairman of the BRICS Media Forum and the BRNN *Sesona Mdlokovana Associate at BRICS+ Consulting Group African Specialist ** MORE ARTICLES ON OUR WEBSITEhttps:// ** Follow @brics_daily on X/Twitter & @brics_daily on Instagram for daily BRICS+ updates
IOL News
33 minutes ago
- IOL News
The MKP's two-faced foreign relations on Western Sahara
South Africa's genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) relied on its reputation for principled support of the occupied peoples. Image: Leon Lestrade / Independent Newspapers. THE Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a complete African Union (AU) member state and is recognised by more than 40 United Nations (UN) member states. Despite decades of occupation by Morocco and the ongoing struggle for self-determination, its existence is a testament to the resilience of its people and the enduring principles of international law regarding decolonisation. The UN classified this contested territory as a non-self-governing territory in 1963, following Spain's submission of information under Article 73(e) of the UN Charter. However, the territory has remained in a state of legal limbo despite multiple resolutions, diplomatic interventions and a protracted conflict involving Morocco, the Polisario Front and Algeria. This status affirms that the Sahrawi people have yet to exercise their right to self-determination under international law. The recent political stunt by Jacob Zuma's Umkhonto weSizwe Party (MK Party), which dismissed this right as 'Balkanisation', reflects a troubling ahistorisation of a people's identity and a flagrant disregard for international legal norms. South Africa's genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) relied on its reputation for principled support of the occupied peoples. The MK Party's stance on Western Sahara would cripple this moral standing, inviting accusations of hypocrisy. Worse, Zuma's use of the national flag during party-to-government talks with Morocco was improper, as he acted solely in his MK Party capacity, not in any official national role. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ Ad loading In an op-ed, MK Party parliamentarian Mzanyele Manyi attempts to reframe the party's position as a rejection of 'Eurocentric binaries' and a commitment to precolonial African structures. A closer examination reveals a deeply contradictory and, frankly, two-faced approach that undermines the very principles the MK Party claims to uphold. Manyi's argument hinges on a romanticised and selective interpretation of history, conveniently overlooking the realities of international law and the fundamental right to self-determination that the AU has consistently championed. To suggest that Western Sahara was merely 'integrated with Morocco' through 'trade, kinship and religious institutions' before colonialism, and that this somehow equates to legitimate sovereignty, is to deliberately blur the lines between historical influence and political dominion. While precolonial connections existed, they do not negate the distinct identity of the Saharawi people or their internationally recognised right to choose their destiny. The assertion that Moroccan Sultans exercised 'spiritual and political suzerainty' akin to the British monarch's role over the Commonwealth is a disingenuous comparison. Based on colonial logics, the Commonwealth is a voluntary association of so-called independent states. Thus, it does not provide a historical justification for territorial claims over a people who have consistently sought their statehood. Furthermore, equating Morocco's actions in Western Sahara to an 'African character' while simultaneously dismissing the Saharawi's struggle for independence as 'intellectually lazy and historically dishonest' reveals a profound bias. Who, then, defines 'African character' in this narrative? Is it only those who align with pre-colonial monarchies, regardless of the aspirations of indigenous populations? Nevertheless, the 1975 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion found no ties of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and Morocco. Manyi's dismissal of this advisory opinion as 'just that… an opinion, not a binding judgment' is a classic legal evasion, as it ignores its foundational role in the UN and AU's stance on decolonisation. While advisory opinions are not directly binding in the same way as contentious judgments, they carry significant legal weight and are highly influential in international law. The ICJ explicitly stated that it 'did not find any ties of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity'. This critical finding, conveniently downplayed by Manyi, directly challenges the MK Party's narrative of historical Moroccan suzerainty. To suggest that those who rely on this opinion are 'disingenuously using it as a hammer' is to accuse the international legal framework itself of being disingenuous when it doesn't align with the MK Party's preferred outcome. Furthermore, it is crucial to recall that Spain's 1975 tripartite agreement with Morocco and Mauritania, which ceded administrative control of Western Sahara without a referendum, was a direct violation of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which affirms the right to self-determination for all colonial territories. The MK Party's purported 'rejection of the Balkanisation of Africa' is perhaps the most glaring hypocrisy. For a party to claim it stands 'firmly against the further splintering of our continent into externally sponsored micro-states' while simultaneously advocating for the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco is a monumental contradiction. The Saharawi Republic is a member of the AU, recognised by a significant number of African states, including South Africa. Its struggle is one of decolonisation and self-determination, not 'external sponsorship' designed to create a 'micro-state' for foreign interests. This is a classic case of projection, where the MK Party attributes to the Saharawi what many accuse Morocco of pursuing: territorial expansion under the guise of historical claims. The appeal to 'African sovereignty' and the 'legitimacy of political structures that preceded colonial conquest,' specifically the Moroccan monarchy, is a dangerous precedent. While respecting indigenous institutions is crucial, it cannot come at the expense of human rights or the universally accepted principle of self-determination. If the MK Party genuinely champions African Renaissance, it should uphold the rights of all African peoples, not just those aligned with powerful historical monarchies. To suggest that the AU's decision to readmit Morocco was purely an act of 'African agency' without considering geopolitical manoeuvring or economic influence is naive at best and intellectually dishonest at worst. Morocco had voluntarily left the continental body in 1984 because it disagreed with the decision of the AU's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to admit the Sahrawi Republic as a full member — effectively refusing to share a room with the very people it claims to share heritage and historical ties with. What Manyi omits to mention is that Western Sahara suffered a similar fate to that of black South Africans during the 1960s, when Britain conferred political independence on Afrikaners. Spain ceded the territory to Rabat instead of the Sahrawi people, leading to a political standoff with Mauritania, which had also made a concurrent claim. Following the colonial terra nullius myth, Afrikaners also make false claims that the land was empty or unused prior to their arrival and that Black South Africans were latecomers, erasing centuries of indigenous presence, land use, and political organisation by African communities. Moroccans follow almost an identical logic in Western Sahara, portraying the territory as historically ungoverned or inherently part of Morocco, thus denying the Sahrawi people's longstanding political identity and their right to self-determination. Like Zambia and others, MK Party appears to have also fallen under the spell of the despotic foreign policy of a pariah state that seeks validation from former colonial powers. In effect, Morocco exercises what Moses Ochonu calls 'colonialism by proxy', a form of indirect rule on behalf of European interests eager to exploit Western Sahara's rich mineral wealth, particularly phosphates and iron ore, without Sahrawi consent. Phosphates are crucial for fertiliser production and global agriculture. Morocco's extractivist agenda violates international law and entrenches neocolonial control over resources that rightfully belong to the Sahrawi people. The export of phosphates from Boucraa has been the subject of international legal challenges, including rulings by the European Court of Justice that trade agreements with Morocco cannot legally include resources from Western Sahara without the consent of the Sahrawi people. Beyond phosphates, Morocco has developed significant wind and solar farms in the occupied territory, such as Nareva's 50MW Foum el Oued farm, specifically powering the Bou Craa phosphate mines. Furthermore, European Union (EU) and Russian fishing fleets continue to plunder Western Sahara's rich Atlantic waters under trade agreements that, per ECJ rulings, cannot lawfully apply to Sahrawi territory. Similarly, Morocco has permitted large-scale agribusiness exports, including citrus and tomatoes, using water-intensive farming on occupied Sahrawi land, exacerbating local water scarcity and environmental degradation. Under international law, primarily UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (1962) on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the Sahrawi people are the rightful owners of these resources. However, as the territory remains non-self-governing and partially occupied by Morocco, any extraction or export without their free, prior and informed consent is considered illegal by many legal scholars, the AU and the UN. Despite international efforts to find a resolution, including the Baker Plans (Baker I and Baker II), which proposed varying degrees of autonomy for Western Sahara followed by a referendum on self-determination, viable alternatives remain underdeveloped. These UN-backed proposals, though at times accepted by one party and rejected by the other, represent pathways that prioritise the Sahrawi people's right to choose, offering a stark contrast to Morocco's unilateral autonomy initiative. Beyond the MK Party's internal contradictions, Rabat's international manoeuvring also merits scrutiny. France's 2024 endorsement of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, following the US recognition, indicates a concerning shift by major powers, prioritising geopolitical interests over international law and Western Sahara's self-determination. This trend is further amplified by Morocco's strategic utilisation of Israel normalisation, particularly through the Abraham Accords. This exploits a complex regional dynamic to garner global support for its occupation, at the expense of established principles of decolonisation and human rights. The MK Party's position on Western Sahara, as articulated by Manyi, is not a nuanced 'African-centred reading of history'. It is a thinly veiled justification for an international relations position that prioritises a selective historical narrative and the interests of a specific state over the fundamental right of a people to determine their future. MK Party's stance effectively legitimises resource theft disguised as anti-Western posturing. Therefore, the MK Party's foreign relations strategy is not only inconsistent but also fundamentally two-faced: it champions African unity and decolonisation in rhetoric, while actively undermining it in practice, particularly concerning the Saharawi people. The 'ghosts of colonial borders' that Manyi wishes to reject seem to linger quite strongly in the MK Party's approach, but only when it suits their political agenda. There is a need to address the MKP's rhetoric-reality gap, evident in their endorsement of Morocco's 'autonomy plan' as 'decolonisation' while simultaneously silencing Sahrawi self-determination. This constitutes a colonial proxy masked in anti-Western slogans. Siyayibanga le economy! * Siyabonga Hadebe is an independent commentator based in Geneva on socio-economic, political and global matters. ** The views expressed here do not reflect those of the Sunday Independent, Independent Media, or IOL. Get the real story on the go: Follow the Sunday Independent on WhatsApp.
The Citizen
33 minutes ago
- The Citizen
A brighter future for South African steel?
Key drivers for steel include renewed public investment, an infrastructure-led recovery and rising private-sector activity in renewable energy and manufacturing. South Africa's steel sector stands at an inflection point. After years of stagnation and brutal trading conditions hampered by power outages, logistics bottlenecks and cheap imports, demand for steel is poised to recover. Public investment surge will fuel demand. National Treasury's 2025 budget earmarks over R1 trillion in infrastructure investment through to 2028, spanning transport, energy, water and sanitation. Additionally, the recently announced World Bank $1.5 billion loan is dedicated to upgrading transport and energy infrastructure. This loan addresses grid and logistics deficiencies that have historically constrained steel use. Additionally, the US$500 million World Bank guarantee is designed to direct private investment into electricity transmission, supporting Eskom's grid expansion and underpinning steel-intensive activity. These combined investments promise robust demand for steel, particularly rails, pylons, transformers and transmission infrastructure. ALSO READ: ArcelorMittal warns it might close without urgent solution to challenges SOE roll-out and renewables drive will increase uptake The SOE roll-out and renewables drive, which will increase steel uptake, has begun. The Eskom grid build-out, confirmed in June 2025, relates to 5 GW repowering projects and long-delayed transmission upgrades, and will hinge on local steel supply for pylons and infrastructure. The Transnet and South African National Roads Agency pipelines include rail and port expansions totalling R47 billion, further igniting demand for rails, sleepers and fastener components. The renewable energy boom requires extensive steel infrastructure—frames, towers, pylons—all expected to be sourced locally in line with industrial policy objectives. Resurgent private sector, manufacturing and mining is likely to result from renewed manufacturing activity. With stable power and logistics, sectors from auto to appliance manufacturing will increasingly show output recovery, translating into increased demand for flat and long steel products. Mining sector improvement is slowly gathering momentum. Coal and other mineral transport require steel-intensive conveyance and loading infrastructure—already increasing modestly, with potential growth ahead. ALSO READ: ArcelorMittal hauls Transnet to Competition Tribunal for market abuse Also growth in African steel demand African continental growth steel demand is also expanding. Africa's steel market reached approximately 39.5 million tonnes in 2024 and is projected to expand at ~3.1% CAGR through 2034. South Africa can leverage rising demand across manufacturing and construction markets continent-wide, especially under AfCFTA. Given the infrastructure investment pipeline, further steel-demand growth of 5–7% annually is realistic – outpacing GDP growth. Ultimately, we anticipate seeing a level of palpable demand not seen for some time. Improvements to local sourcing policies can ensure public and private projects use South African steel, reducing imports through localisation and designation, especially for SOEs and government departments and strengthening local steel capacity utilisation will have a solid effect. Stable order pipelines could grow substantially. SOEs alone could generate tens of billions annually in repeat steel demand, providing much-needed predictability and scale. Steel is the linchpin of multiple value chains, from transformers and rails to agricultural equipment. ALSO READ: Warning from industry that Steel Master Plan has stalled Robust demand will revitalise sectors and support thousands of jobs Robust steel demand revitalises sectors and supports thousands of jobs downstream, and consequently, a multiplier effect can be expected once policy supports local demand strongly. Importantly, reliance on imported steel introduces supply risk and volatility. A strong local industry ensures South Africa remains resilient amid global disruptions. The question is not whether steel demand will grow, but how effectively we ensure that this growth benefits domestic producers and fosters sustained industrial development. In the coming months, policymakers and industry leaders must align demand signals with supply capacity, thus creating a virtuous cycle of investment, production, and socio-economic returns. Steel isn't just a commodity; it is the concrete evidence of a nation building itself, bridge by bridge, pylon by pylon, job by job.
