South Korean president ousted over martial law debacle
The Constitutional Court of South Korea on Friday formally ousted former President Yoon Suk Yeol over his controversial decision to impose martial law late last year.
The unanimous verdict upheld parliament's decision to impeach the president, which plunged the country into political chaos.
Yoon declared emergency martial law on December 3 last year, claiming the country's opposition was plotting a
'rebellion'
and accusing his opponents of sympathizing with North Korea. The order, however, flopped and was promptly overruled by the parliament, with the backing of the military. He was impeached in mid-December and arrested on January 15.
The court dismissed all of Yoon's attempts to justify his actions, ruling that the president had overstepped his authority through
'unlawful and unconstitutional'
conduct.
'The defendant mobilized military and police forces to dismantle the authority of constitutional institutions and infringed upon the fundamental rights of the people. In doing so, he abandoned his constitutional duty to uphold the constitution and gravely betrayed the trust of the Korean people,'
acting chief justice Moon Hyung-bae stated.
READ MORE:
South Korean president indicted
'The negative consequences and ripple effects of these actions are substantial, and the benefit of restoring constitutional order through removal from office outweighs the national costs associated with the dismissal of a sitting president,'
the judge added.
Yoon accepted the court's verdict, who said it had been a
'great honor'
to work in his role and expressed gratitude to his supporters who backed him despite his
'many shortcomings.'
Yoon's arrest triggered a new wave of violent unrest, with his supporters storming the Seoul Western District Court. The ousted leader was ultimately indicted for leading an insurrection, one of the charges for which a South Korean president does not have immunity. If convicted, Yoon could face life imprisonment or capital punishment.
According to South Korean laws, a new president must be chosen within 60-days. Prime Minister Han Duck-soo will act as an interim president until a new leader is sworn in.
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Russia Today
2 days ago
- Russia Today
‘Korean Donald Trump' emerges from the chaos in Seoul
On June 3, 2025, a snap presidential election was held in the Republic of Korea in which Democratic candidate Lee Jae-myung won with over 49% of the vote. The election followed an attempt on December 3, 2024 to impose martial law in the country, which led the Constitutional Court to unanimously vote for the impeachment of then-President Yoon Suk-yeol. There were several candidates, but the main contest took place between the ruling conservative People Power Party and the opposition Democratic Party. Chairman Lee is a striking and controversial figure. During the presidency of the previous Democrat, Moon Jae-in, Lee led an independent faction within the party and was considered an even more leftist populist than Moon. Moon viewed him as a dangerous rival and tried to remove him via a series of criminal cases. Lee managed to fend off these attacks and eventually became the Democratic Party's presidential candidate in 2022 after all of Moon's protégés lost the primaries. Although he once called himself the 'Korean Bernie Sanders' due to his populist slogans and ideas such as universal basic income, his circle now prefers the term 'Korean Donald Trump', as both share a flamboyant style and peculiar reputations. Even before entering the presidential race, Lee was implicated in several criminal cases involving corruption, abuse of power, perjury, election law violations, and even cash smuggling into North Korea. The accusations were serious – several of Lee's close associates were imprisoned. He was, however, saved by a series of miraculous coincidences: Five key witnesses in different cases who could testify against him either committed suicide or died from various causes. Though his enemies consider the deaths highly suspicious, police found no evidence of foul play. The constitutional crisis that led to the snap election began when, on November 15, 2024, Lee received a suspended sentence. Although conditional, the verdict threatened his political career. If upheld by the Supreme Court, Lee would be barred from holding public office for five years. With nearly two-thirds of the seats in parliament, the Democrats intensified their opposition. Yoon attempted to 'cut the Gordian knot' by declaring martial law, but the public saw this as a return to military dictatorship, which unsurprisingly failed. After a long deliberation and despite contentious points, the Constitutional Court unanimously impeached the president, as reinstating him would plunge the country into chaos. Lee easily won his party's primary with 89.77% of the vote. His opponents were the former independent left-centrist Kim Dong-yeon and ex-Governor Kim Kyung-soo, an ally of Moon Jae-in. Before the parliamentary elections, Lee either subdued or pushed out strong figures from other factions, earning accusations that he turned the Democratic Party into a personal fan club. Still, Lee's path to the presidency was not easy. On March 26, 2025, the Seoul appellate court overturned Lee's conviction, formally reopening his political path. This surprised legal experts, especially conservatives. The reason became clear: The presiding judges were members of a progressive NGO associated with the Democratic Party. However, on May 1, 2025, the Supreme Court reversed the acquittal and sent the case for retrial. Theoretically, this could disqualify Lee if the outcome was unfavorable, but the Democrats launched protests, calling the court's decision a coup comparable to martial law. Facing threats of impeachment (parliament can impeach any official, including judges), the judiciary made a 'compromise' decision: Lee's retrial and other investigations would resume only after the election. Disqualifying Lee would decapitate the opposition, which lacked a viable substitute. But there's an unusual dilemma: The Constitution states that a sitting president can only be imprisoned for treason or rebellion. Yet, if someone under criminal investigation wins and is later convicted, there is no clear precedent. Democrats are preemptively addressing this: A parliamentary committee has reviewed a law that would terminate all criminal proceedings against an elected president and amend the penal code to decriminalize the charges Lee faced. Such legal manipulation doesn't please everyone. Hence, Lee enjoys both the highest approval and disapproval ratings – meaning a sizable bloc could unite under the slogan 'anyone but Lee Jae-myung'. While Lee achieved party unity, the conservatives have been plagued by infighting. The party has factions – center-rights, Yoon loyalists, and traditional conservatives. Initially, eight candidates entered the race, and a three-stage process narrowed the field. The first round eliminated four weaker or controversial figures, such as ex-Speaker Na Kyung-won. In the second round, moderate An Heol-su ('the Korean Kaspersky') and classical conservative Won Joon-pyo – who ran against Moon Jae-in in 2017 and might have been the nominee again if not for Yoon – were dropped. Two finalists remained. One was Han Dong-hoon, Yoon's longtime ally from the Prosecutor's Office, former justice minister and party leader. However, Han opposed martial law and voted against it. After Yoon's impeachment, Han resigned. Analysts saw in him a fresh conservative image, but he lost the final round. Instead, the 2025 conservative candidate is ex-Labor Minister Kim Moon-soo. He has two notable qualities: A former union activist repressed under military rule, he later joined the conservatives. And he was the only cabinet member who refused to apologize after the failed martial law attempt. Instead, he argued that Yoon may have erred in methods, but the problem required resolution. Kim became a symbol of uncompromising conservatism. But party leaders worried whether he could attract undecided voters – those alienated by both Lee and Yoon. Fortunately, they had an alternative. After some thought, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo (also acting president post-impeachment) entered the race. Once a leftist and prime minister in the 2000s, he too joined the conservatives. Some see him as a centrist technocrat; others, a political opportunist. On May 2, 2025 – after the conservative primaries ended – Han announced his independent candidacy. He vowed to act as a transitional 'technical president' to reform the government and step down, ushering in a 'Seventh Republic.' In fact, all major candidates proposed constitutional reforms. Most advocated limiting presidential power and replacing the current five-year single term with two four-year terms, US-style. Given nearly 40 years since the last constitution, some anti-dictatorship clauses seem outdated. Han's resignation triggered a mini-government crisis. Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok, next in line, resigned minutes before a parliamentary impeachment vote against him. The role of acting leader passed to Education Minister Lee Joo-ho. Han effectively represented the conservative camp. Yoon's allies saw him as a unifying, rational figure. A split right would guarantee Lee's win. The party pressured Kim Moon-soo to withdraw for Han, even voiding the primary results. Kim denounced this as betrayal, demanded a new vote – and won again. The old leadership resigned. Han withdrew, urging support for Kim. Meanwhile, Kim softened his rhetoric and leaned toward the center. This showed in debates about whether Yoon should leave the party. While a symbol for conservatives, his presence burdened them with his failures – especially martial law. Ultimately, Yoon left People Power, but might form a new party post-election. There were more candidates. Some from truly left-wing parties, as Lee has shifted right – dropping the idea of basic income and even proposing Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Independents include ex-conservative leader Hwang Kyo-ahn, now ultra-right. But only one got over 5%: Lee Jun-seok, leader of the Reform Party. A center-right former conservative leader ousted for opposing Yoon, Lee is youthful and energetic. Though his party failed to become a 'third force', he remains popular. Conservatives wanted him to quit and unify the right. Some party members disenchanted with him have even joined the Democrats. Many promises were made by all candidates, and listing them all here is pointless – each of them essentially promises good things and opposes bad things. Beyond key issues such as North Korea-US relations, party platforms differ little. Where they do, differences stem more from factional struggles than ideology. If conservatives say a cat is black, Democrats will insist it's white – regardless of the truth. As for where Lee's victory will take South Korea, that remains to be seen – stay tuned for the next article.
Russia Today
03-05-2025
- Russia Today
So North Koreans fought for Russia. What does that change?
On April 26, 2025, during a report to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov mentioned that, in Kursk Region, soldiers of the Korean People's Army (KPA) operated alongside Russian servicemen. 'Soldiers and officers of the Korean People's Army, fulfilling combat missions shoulder to shoulder with Russian servicemen, demonstrated high professionalism, resilience, courage, and heroism in battle while repelling the Ukrainian invasion,' Gerasimov stated. The next day, the Central Military Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea issued a statement saying that 'The victorious completion of the operation to liberate areas of the Kursk region is a triumph of justice over injustice, and a new chapter in history demonstrating a strong military alliance between the DPRK and Russia – the highest strategic level of allied and brotherly relations between the peoples of the two countries.' It was noted that the decision to deploy DPRK military units was made by Kim Jong-un based on the provisions of the Russia-DPRK Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty. On April 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin personally referenced the KPA fighters: 'The Russian people will never forget the feat of the Korean special forces fighters. We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on par with their Russian brothers-in-arms,' according to a statement on the Kremlin's website. Putin thanked Kim Jong Un for deploying troops in support of the war with Ukraine, promising that their bilateral friendship, forged on the battlefield, would continue to strengthen. South Korea and the United States immediately condemned the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia, calling it a violation of UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting military cooperation with Pyongyang. Seoul accused Pyongyang of mocking the international community and called for an immediate withdrawal of troops from Russia. A US State Department spokesperson blamed 'North Korea' and other third countries for 'perpetuating the Russia-Ukraine war,' adding that the deployment of DPRK troops to Russia and any Russian compensation in return must end. On June 19, 2024, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Article 4 of the treaty provided for the immediate military assistance by all available means in the event that 'one of the parties finds itself in a state of war due to an armed attack by one or more states.' As emphasized by the Russian Foreign Ministry, this clause represented an 'exclusively defensive position.' Although Western and South Korean media immediately began discussing the possibility of military action, the reference to a 'state of war' implied a very specific definition of conflict. In the early morning of August 6, 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine invaded Kursk Region, which altered the course of the Russian campaign and created the conditions for appealing to Pyongyang for assistance – the 'core' territory of the Russian Federation had come under aggression. On November 1, 2024, during negotiations in Moscow with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui officially confirmed for the first time that Pyongyang was providing assistance to Moscow: 'From the very beginning of the special military operation, the respected Comrade Chairman of State Affairs Kim Jong-un instructed us to unwaveringly and powerfully support and assist the Russian army and the Russian people in their sacred war, without regard to others.' That same month, the treaty was ratified. It is believed that around this time, Kim Jong-un concluded that 'the emerging wartime situation met the conditions for activating Article 4 of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the DPRK and the Russian Federation,' and decided to involve North Korea's armed forces in the war, notifying the Russian side of his decision. Shortly afterward, the first KPA fighters appeared at Russian training grounds. The exact number of military personnel remains unknown, but according to estimates by South Korea's National Intelligence Service, over 10,000 troops were sent to Russia in the fall of 2024, and another 3,000 in the winter of 2025. Given the likelihood of rotation, this is not a very large number. At the same time, starting at a certain point, the Russian authorities neither confirmed nor denied information about the presence of North Korean forces, consistently avoiding direct answers. Meanwhile, in Ukrainian propaganda, the topic of North Korea began to gain traction as early as the beginning of October. On April 24, 2025, the DPRK's leading newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, published an article dedicated to the sixth anniversary of the first summit between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un. The article stated that the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership had created a 'guarantee for preserving peace and security on the Eurasian continent.' It further emphasized that 'the DPRK and Russia are strengthening cooperation, jointly enhancing defense against the reckless conspiracies of hostile forces, and will build a new world together based on the new treaty.' The piece asserted that 'the vile attempts of hegemonic forces, which sought to plunge Eurasia into chaos through confrontation and war, are being thwarted. The changing era and the complex international situation clearly prove that developing strong friendly relations was the right decision.' Setting aside the Western propaganda narrative that 'things are going so poorly at the frontline that Moscow cannot succeed without help from allies,' and without access to classified information, two interrelated reasons behind this decision can be identified. The first reason relates to the way the military operation is being conducted by the Russian side. Aiming to place minimal wartime burdens on society and to involve as few unwilling participants as possible, the Russian leadership strives to keep the military operation and civilian life separate – avoiding mobilization and waging a war of attrition while preserving its own personnel as much as possible. This approach makes the campaign protracted and slow, whereas achieving decisive successes requires additional, well-prepared human resources. The second reason stems from Article 8 of the Russia-DPRK Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: 'The Parties shall establish mechanisms for conducting joint activities aimed at strengthening defense capabilities in the interest of preventing war and ensuring regional and international peace and security.' One of the shortcomings of the Korean People's Army (KPA) is its insufficient training and preparedness for the specific demands of modern warfare, which became evident during the Russian military operation. The KPA possesses a certain reputation and many strengths; however, that reputation is largely based on past narratives and/or displays of individual martial prowess – demonstrations that do not necessarily correlate with the skills required to survive in modern combat, where what matters most is not the ability to break bricks with one's head, but the ability to dodge FPV drones. Despite all its strengths, the KPA lacks experience in the kind of modern warfare that the Russian army is currently gaining. Additionally, a shortage of resources – caused by economic isolation and the aftermath of the 'Arduous March' – has led to a chronic lack of fuel and spare parts, preventing the KPA from regularly conducting large-scale exercises across all branches of the military, such as those held by South Korea or in joint US–South Korean drills. There is also no known record of regular command-and-staff exercises aimed at cultivating officers and generals en masse who are prepared for modern warfare. Of course, the lack of real combat experience is characteristic of both North and South Korea (the only countries to have been consistently engaged in military action since the early 21st century are Russia, the US, and Israel). Nevertheless, such circumstances may lead to an insufficient understanding – especially at the middle and lower levels – of the demands of contemporary warfare, even though Kim Jong Un, who has received a military education, is well aware of what conducting war in the modern age entails. Therefore, the military cooperation between the two countries was aimed at enriching the KPA with practical experience, with their deployment in Kursk Region serving as a kind of final internship. Initially, the focus was on training at military ranges, familiarizing troops with new weaponry and updated protocols (for instance, the advent of drones altered the previously standard reaction to the command 'Air!' traditionally used to alert personnel of approaching bombers). Only afterward was this experience reinforced under combat conditions. It is claimed that even their deployment to the front line was gradual, beginning with assigning them to relieve duties in the rear. It is important to note that although the military operation spans several fronts, North Korean forces did not cross Russia's 'old' borders. In this author's view, this was also due to several reasons. First, the legal basis for the participation of the DPRK military in combat operations was laid out in the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Article 4 of the document explicitly states that in the event of an armed attack on one of the parties, the other is obliged to immediately provide military and other assistance using all available means. Repelling an attack on Russia's core territory fits within this definition. Second, this limitation curtails the potential of Ukrainian propaganda to depict 'atrocities against civilians' or to portray efforts to capture or persuade North Korean soldiers to defect and be used in propaganda campaigns. Third, the small size of the contingent and the limited scope of their mission helped avoid a number of problems and risks that might have arisen had the cooperation been structured differently. What problems were largely avoided? Let's begin with the technical challenges of integrating the KPA with the Russian Armed Forces. The deployment of a large, entirely foreign contingent into the military operation zone – especially if introduced into combat without prior preparation – would have caused numerous administrative, logistical, and even communication difficulties, particularly due to the number of interpreters required to ensure effective communication and coordination not only at the headquarters level but also 'in the field.' However, given the small size of the contingent, these issues were resolved on the spot. The fact that the North Koreans had their own sector of operations helped avoid the risk of the KPA being used as a tool to solve internal problems. Had North Korean units been subordinated to Russian formations and placed under Russian command, Russian commanders might have faced a dilemma when tasked with conducting operations likely to result in significant casualties: should they send their own subordinates or deploy well-prepared foreign troops? Everyone recognized this issue, and it's no coincidence that enemy propaganda actively promoted the narrative of North Koreans being used as cannon fodder. Meanwhile, gaining effective combat experience as a unit is only possible through rotation after reaching an acceptable loss threshold. A unit that suffers excessive casualties cannot pass on its experience to newly arrived reinforcements or upon returning to permanent duty stations. However, it appears that the Russian authorities opted for a different strategy: the North Koreans were given their own sector and operated there more or less independently. There was also concern about how Russian society would react to North Korean assistance. Although Article 20 of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership specifically addresses the issue of 'strengthening coordination in countering disinformation and aggressive information campaigns,' a significant portion of the Russian population remains influenced by long-standing anti-Pyongyang propaganda, and the image of North Korea in the public consciousness remains rather odious. In this context, the opposing side counted on a reputational blow to the Russian leadership: the internationalization of the war would be perceived by part of Russian society as proof that Moscow lacked the strength to secure victory in Ukraine on its own and was therefore forced to enlist such allies – despite the fact that the military operation is regarded by many as an internal matter for Russia. However, the absence of North Koreans from the public eye meant the issue was barely discussed, and the narrative of 'nothing would have worked without them' never took hold in the public consciousness. Additionally, the negative perception of the DPRK was partly offset by rhetoric about combat brotherhood, the understanding that their presence could reduce overall casualties, and the lack of any reports of misconduct by the North Korean troops. The limited role assigned to the KPA also helped reduce the risk of further internationalization of the conflict. The West could have used the 'North Korean card' to justify sending a NATO contingent to Ukraine 'in response to the KPA invasion.' However, from, nothing the West could have interpreted as an 'invasion of Ukraine' by North Korean forces occurred. Additionally, the new US policy and the EU's unwillingness to accept serious risks played a role in tempering the response. As for the so-called 'reputational risks for Russia,' from the Western perspective, Russia has already been cast as a menacing superpower that has seized half the world and hungrily eyes the other half. The level of demonization and Russophobia in the West is so extreme that the involvement of the KPA is unlikely to have any critical impact on Russia's image. It is also worth noting that the situation did not provoke a new surge of tension in East Asia. Military activity within the Washington–Tokyo–Seoul triangle has continued at the same pace as under the Biden administration, and the South Korean leadership is primarily concerned not with the presence of North Korean soldiers on Russia's western borders, but with the risk of breakthrough military technologies being transferred to the DPRK. The US course toward creating an Asian equivalent of NATO or expanding NATO eastward has not accelerated as a result. The recognition of military cooperation has undoubtedly strengthened the ties between the two countries, and in this context, South Korean media are actively discussing whether Kim Jong-un will attend the Victory Day Parade in May or the Eastern Economic Forum in the fall. There is no direct confirmation of this yet, but the participation of DPRK military personnel in the May celebrations appears likely. The combat brotherhood will be glorified: most likely, distinguished members of the KPA will receive Russian military honors, and a monument will be erected in the DPRK, similar to those dedicated to Soviet soldiers or Chinese People's Volunteers. To this, we can add the rise of popular mythologization. Thanks to the efforts of both enemy propaganda and patriotic bloggers, North Koreans in the SMO have become part of the 'barracks legends' – the kind of stories told in the gear room. Military cooperation itself is also unlikely to come to an end, though the form it will take remains an interesting topic for discussion. The more probable scenario is that the training of soldiers and officers on Russian territory will continue and become more open, but without direct combat involvement. A less likely possibility is that KPA personnel will continue to provide assistance, although an increase in the size of the North Korean contingent and/or its deployment beyond the pre-2022 Russian borders would raise concerns related to the costs and risks outlined above. At the same time, the KPA in reality and the KPA in the post-truth world will remain two different entities. Those who want to see North Koreans – even where they are not present – will find them, and everyone will believe in the version of events that suits them best. What about the situation on the Korean Peninsula? The demonstration of the Moscow–Pyongyang alliance reduces the risk of an armed conflict, similar to the dynamics of the Cold War. Our side will not strike first, and the risks of a regional conflict escalating into a broader or nuclear confrontation are simply too high. As for everything else – we should watch the level of confrontation between the US and China, which will require Donald Trump to coordinate with allies, as well as the policy of South Korea's future president.
Russia Today
30-04-2025
- Russia Today
Brothers in arms: inside North Korea's deployment to Russia
Earlier this week, both Moscow and Pyongyang confirmed what had long been rumored: North Korean soldiers are actively participating in Russia's military operations. The announcement came on the heels of the full recapture of Russia's Kursk region – where, it turns out, North Korean units played a key role. 'The Russian people will never forget the sacrifice of the Korean special forces,' Russian President Vladimir Putin declared. 'We will forever honor these heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our shared freedom.' He praised the allied units for fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with Russian troops, defending the country as if it were their own. RT takes a closer look at the roots of this unlikely battlefield brotherhood and how it has evolved into a modern-day military partnership. Moscow and Pyongyang have a history of military cooperation that dates back to the Korean War. In the early 1950s, as the Cold War reached a boiling point on the Korean Peninsula, the United States backed South Korea with boots on the ground, while China threw its full military weight behind the North. The Soviet Union, though officially neutral, fought its own shadow war – less with words than with jet engines and steel. Soviet tanks, Katyusha rocket launchers, and small arms poured into North Korea, breathing life into its struggling army. But the real game-changer was in the skies: elite Soviet pilots, many of them veterans of World War II, flew cutting-edge MiG-15 jet fighters under the guise of being 'volunteers,' sometimes even donning Chinese or North Korean uniforms. These squadrons engaged US F-86 Sabres in brutal dogfights over Korean airspace. The USSR's 64th Fighter Aviation Corps – complete with anti-aircraft units and signal troops – played a decisive role in that air war. The ties forged during those years never fully faded, and now, decades later, it's North Korea coming to Russia's aid. As Russia's military confrontation with Ukraine dragged on, it began using munitions manufactured in North Korea. Isolated from the West, Moscow has been deepening ties with non-Western partners, and Pyongyang has emerged as one of its most reliable suppliers of military equipment. On October 24 of last year, the two nations ratified a sweeping Strategic Partnership Treaty. It obligates each side to provide military assistance 'by all available means' in the event of an armed attack. That agreement laid the groundwork for North Korean troops to deploy to Korean leader Kim Jong Un called the soldiers who fought in Kursk 'heroes,' framing their involvement as a 'sacred mission' to strengthen ties with Russia. Pyongyang plans to erect a monument in their honor. While official numbers remain classified, South Korea's National Intelligence Service estimates that up to 15,000 North Korean troops have fought on Russia's side. According to Russian war correspondent Alexander Kots, the North Koreans began with intensive training at Russian ranges before being deployed to the front. 'They lived in field conditions,' he said. 'At first, they were held in reserve, then moved to more active positions – eventually participating in direct assaults.' The troops reportedly impressed Russian commanders with their discipline, coordination, and tenacity. And they had a standing order: never be taken alive. One Russian soldier remarked that this ethos reminded him of Wagner Group fighters, who were known to carry grenades 'just in case.' 'They were instantly accepted by our former Wagner guys,' he noted. Another correspondent, Semyon Pegov of WarGonzo, described their combat debut near Kursk as 'nothing short of cinematic.' Drones captured footage of large North Korean formations advancing steadily, five to six meters apart, under heavy Ukrainian artillery fire – including cluster munitions. At first, it seemed the group had been wiped out. But hours later, survivors emerged from the snow and resumed the assault. 'Seventy percent of them got up and pressed forward, covering up to eight kilometers in a single day,' Pegov reported, adding that casualties were in the dozens. North Korean troops were primarily stationed in the southern Suzhansky district – around the villages of Plekhovo, Guevo, and Kurilovka. The contingent included special forces, conscripts, and a dedicated medical evacuation unit. According to Russian outlet Mash, the troops lived separately and communicated via a designated interpreter. They were equipped with North Korean-made weapons, including the 170mm 'Koksan' artillery piece. They also sampled Russian food – and reportedly became fans of Russian rap music. The language barrier proved to be a significant hurdle at first. To overcome it, the soldiers memorized a cheat sheet of 20 essential Russian commands like 'Take cover,' 'Cover me,' and 'Fire!' – allowing them to train without an interpreter. A Russian officer with the callsign 'Kondrat' said the most difficult challenge was adjusting the North Korean troops' attack strategies. 'They wanted to charge in formation, textbook-style,' he explained. 'We had to convince them that small, flexible units were more effective – and they adapted quickly once the bullets started flying.' 'Once one wave stalled, another would follow with the same relentless rhythm and fatalism,' a Russian battalion member remarked. 'What drives men to fight like that? It must be something stronger than fear of death.' Andrei Kolesnik, a member of the Russian parliament's defense committee, praised the North Koreans' performance. 'They were a real asset. Our guys have been fighting since 2014, and there's a lot to learn from that. The North Koreans helped us – but they also gained experience. An army that doesn't fight loses its edge.' He added that their presence may also have been symbolic, a gesture of gratitude for the USSR's support during the Korean War. 'Of course they took losses. Everyone does. But they fought with remarkable bravery and discipline. In today's world, where international agreements mean so little, their commitment stands out. Others could learn a thing or two from Pyongyang.' Military analyst Boris Rozhin echoed that sentiment, saying the deployment gave North Korea's military a rare opportunity to test itself in 21st century warfare. 'This was a live-fire lab,' said analyst Oleg Glazunov. 'Their special forces are among the best in the world, but they haven't seen real combat since the 1950s. Now they've faced drones, modern artillery, and a new kind of battlefield.' He suggested North Korea may continue rotating units through Russia's conflict zones to build a combat-hardened force – one group at a time.
