Iran committed to Non-Proliferation Treaty, Foreign Minister says
"Our cooperation with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) will be channeled through Iran's Supreme National Security Council for obvious safety and security reasons," Mr. Araghchi wrote in a post on X.
President Masoud Pezeshkian on Wednesday (July 2, 2025) enacted the legislation passed by Parliament last week to suspend cooperation with the IAEA, a move the U.S. called "unacceptable."
Fake news. Iran remains committed to the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement. In accordance with the new legislation by Majlis, sparked by the unlawful attacks against our nuclear facilities by Israel and the U.S., our cooperation with @iaeaorg will be channeled through Iran's… https://t.co/i1995s6Z6m — Seyed Abbas Araghchi (@araghchi) July 3, 2025
Mr. Araghchi's comment on X was in response to a call from Germany's Foreign Ministry urging Tehran to reverse its decision to shelve cooperation with the IAEA.
Mr. Araghchi accused Germany of "explicit support for Israel's unlawful attack on Iran, including safeguarded nuclear sites".
Iran has accused the IAEA of siding with Western countries and providing a justification for Israel's June 13-24 airstrikes on Iranian nuclear installations, which began a day after the U.N. agency's board of governors voted to declare Tehran in violation of its obligations under the NPT.
Western powers have long suspected that Iran has sought to develop the means to build atomic bombs through its declared civilian atomic energy programme. Iran has repeatedly said it is enriching uranium only for peaceful nuclear ends.
IAEA inspectors are mandated to ensure compliance with the NPT by seeking to verify that nuclear programmes in treaty countries are not diverted for military purposes.
The law that went into effect on Wednesday mandates that any future inspection of Iranian nuclear sites by the IAEA needs approval by Tehran's Supreme National Security Council.
"We are aware of these reports. The IAEA is awaiting further official information from Iran," the Vienna-based global nuclear watchdog said in a statement. U.S. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce told a regular briefing on Wednesday that Iran needed to cooperate fully with the IAEA without further delay.
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