China dreams of building its own jumbo jet. Can it do it without the West?
China has long held ambitions of turning global aviation into an 'ABC' market: breaking the duopoly of Airbus and Boeing with the entry of world-class Chinese jets. That strategy is already well under way, with the state-owned Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (Comac) having already received orders for hundreds of its regional and narrowbody planes, the C909 and C919.
Now, the Chinese aircraft manufacturer is doubling down on plans to expand its fleet to include widebody models – including a self-developed answer to Boeing's iconic 747 jumbo jet.
Enter the C929 and C939.
Comac appears laser-focused on producing its own liners capable of undertaking long-haul flights, an endeavour that is not only being driven by market demand but also political and strategic factors.
'There are not too many other engineering products other than big planes that are so visible, so recognisable,' said David Yu, a professor at New York University Shanghai specialising in aviation financing.
'Just like America and Europe, China has many reasons to develop and fly home-grown widebodies that reflect its status and ambitions.'
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