Japan seeks 8th round of tariffs talks in U.S. amid Trump impasse
With President Donald Trump appearing to harden his stance ahead of next Wednesday's deadline for his administration's 90-day pause on country-specific tariffs, Japan's last-ditch effort will hinge on whether Ryosei Akazawa can secure a deal that includes a reduced tariff rate on cars, the source said.
In rounds of talks since April, the United States has been reluctant to accept Tokyo's request to withdraw or reduce the additional 25 percent tariff on cars.
Amid the stalemate, Japan is seeking an extension of the tariff suspension deadline to allow talks to continue.
Trump, however, on Tuesday floated the idea of raising tariffs on imports from Japan to as high as 30 or 35 percent, while complaining about Japan's purchases of American rice and cars.
"I'm not sure we're going to make a deal. I doubt it," Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One, calling Japan "very tough" and "very spoiled."
The dispute over auto tariffs has been a key obstacle to a deal, with Washington also pressuring its Asian security ally to boost imports of U.S. farm products, including rice, cars and oil, to help reduce its large trade deficit.
In return, Japan has highlighted its contributions to the U.S. economy and proposed a package deal that includes increased investment in the United States and cooperation on economic security, the source said.
Without an extension to the 90-day pause on part of the so-called reciprocal tariffs, Japan will face an additional 14 percent country-specific tariff on top of the 10 percent baseline duty the United States has imposed on imports from all countries.
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is aiming to make progress in the tariff talks as campaigning for the House of Councillors election kicked off Thursday.
The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this week that the United States warned Japanese officials during talks in late May that it might demand a cap on the number of vehicles Japan could export to the United States -- a policy known as a voluntary export restriction, citing people familiar with the matter.
But Japanese officials held firm, telling their U.S. counterparts they would not accept any deal that preserves Trump's 25 percent automotive tariff, resulting in a deadlock in the negotiations, the U.S. newspaper said.
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