
As Indonesia mulls buying China's J-10 fighter jets, what factors weigh on its mind?
They add that the deal could jeopardise Indonesia's neutrality and credibility over the South China Sea issue, trigger an arms race in the region, and risk its airforce's operational readiness, with one observer warning that it could serve China's long-term strategic goals more than Indonesia's own interests.
Earlier this month, media reports confirmed that China offered to sell its J-10 fighter jets to Jakarta, citing remarks from Deputy Defence Minister Donny Ermawan Taufanto.
Interests in purchasing the Chinese planes intensified after reports that a J-10 flown by Pakistan shot down multiple jets operated by India last month, including newly-acquired French-made Rafale fighter jets.
On May 30, Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin announced that Jakarta would be sending several military pilots to China 'for a J-10 fighter jet training' and visiting its production facility in Chengdu.
The price may be J-10s biggest selling point for Indonesia, particularly as the country is imposing a number of austerity measures to finance President Prabowo Subianto's ambitious programmes of providing free meals and affordable housing to millions of Indonesians.
But the downsides may outweigh the benefits, analysts said, arguing that a closer military alignment with China is bound to provoke mixed reactions at home and abroad.
'Indonesia really needs to tread carefully and base its decision not just on short-term gains but how the decision might affect our long-term security interests,' Khairul Fahmi of the think-tank Institute for Security and Strategic Studies (ISESS) told CNA.
China has reportedly been persuading Southeast Asia's biggest economy to buy the jets numerous times. The latest was when the Indonesian Air Force chief of staff, Air Marshal Mohamad Tonny Harjono and other high-ranking officials visited the China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai last November.
'At the airshow, (the Indonesian officials) saw the (J-10) planes and they were offered to buy them,' Donny, himself a retired air marshal, told reporters on Jun 4, as quoted by CNN Indonesia. 'This is a good plane, it meets the criteria we set and the price is cheap. So why not?'
But striking such a deal with Beijing could affect Indonesia's ties with existing military partners as the majority of them view China as a threat to their security and stability, said experts.
Beijing's encroachment of Indonesia's exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea has fuelled anti-China sentiments back home.
Jakarta has been looking to modernise its ageing military hardware in recent years as well as diversify its defence suppliers. In 2022, Indonesia purchased 42 Rafale jets for US$8.1 billion. The first six of these French jets are slated for delivery next year.
Costing up to US$120 million for its most basic model, the Rafale is one of the most expensive fighter jets in the world. Meanwhile, the J-10, which like the Rafale is considered a 4.5-generation aircraft, is said to be priced at around US$40 million each.
Both may cost more with optional extras such as training or infrastructure packages.
Fighter jet generations are classed according to their capabilities, performance and year of development. Currently, fifth-generation fighters are the most technologically advanced jets.
Indonesia currently has a total of 110 fighter planes made in various countries including the United States's F-16, Russia's Su-27 and Su-30, Brazil's EMB-314 Super Tucano and the United Kingdom's BAE Hawk 200.
'Indonesia has been seeking to diversify its fleet to reduce dependence on a particular country or bloc,' Beni Sukadis of the Jakarta-based think-tank, the Indonesian Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (Lesperssi), told CNA.
It is also said to have inked a deal with Turkey to procure 48 KAAN fighter jets, developed by the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said in an X post on Wednesday (Jun 11).
The deal is reportedly valued at more than US$10 billion and will span over the course of 10 years. It also includes the co-production of some KAAN jet components in Indonesia.
Launched last year, the KAAN is considered a fifth-generation fighter jet.
DRAWBACKS AND POTENTIAL BACKLASH
So far, Indonesia has remained tight-lipped about its interests in the J-10, including whether it is eyeing brand new J-10Cs or a few of the J-10As which China's People's Liberation Army Air Force is looking to retire.
The J-10 has three main models: J10A, B and C with the J-10A being the oldest and most basic and the J-10C being the latest and most advanced.
All models have the same maximum speed of Mach 1.8 and a range of 1,850km. The latest model however has more advanced radars, better stealth capabilities and other improvements.
The jets involved in the Pakistan-India standoff were the export variant of the J-10C.
Mach is used as a unit of measurement in stating the speed of a moving object in relation to the speed of sound.
For some experts, the secrecy hinted that Indonesia is still unsure about the J-10's capabilities and took the Chinese jets' recent dogfight success with a grain of salt.
'There are many factors behind a dogfight victory: Technologies, battle strategies, pilot's abilities. So it is not just about what jet was used,' Khairul said. 'Indonesia never buys military equipment impulsively.'
Experts say how well and how soon Indonesian pilots and ground crew familiarise themselves with Chinese-made military equipment could be a deal-breaker.
'France and the United States are NATO countries. Their military equipment follows NATO standards and more importantly, they are inter-operable,' Beni said.
Inter-operability refers to how well equipment manufactured by different countries or companies communicate and work with each other, a crucial feature in areas such as healthcare, public safety and defence.
'Inter-operability also means that a pilot or a technician who is familiar with American jets will not have a hard time familiarising himself with one made by France or the United Kingdom,' Beni continued.
'Buying the J-10 means we will have to send pilots and technicians for training, spare parts will have to come from China and the J-10 might not work well with our radar or communication system which were made by NATO countries.'
Security is another thing to consider, particularly as some countries are suspicious of Chinese technologies, believing that they might be designed to allow Beijing to launch cyberattacks or gather intelligence.
'(Indonesia) may have close economic ties with China but we don't yet have a strong military relationship with China,' Teuku Rezasyah, an international relations expert from Padjadjaran University, told CNA.
'How well can we trust that China will not use this advanced technology to spy on us?' the expert asked. 'Can we trust the J-10 if we have to send one to the Natunas for example?'
Teuku was referring to a chain of islands in Indonesia's Riau Islands province which borders the South China Sea.
Beijing is laying claim to most of the South China Sea, prompting disputes and clashes with several Southeast Asian countries. Although Indonesia is not a claimant party in the dispute, China's 'nine-dash line' cuts into Indonesia's exclusive economic zones.
REGIONAL STABILITY AT RISK
For more than a decade, Indonesia has been championing ASEAN to formulate a code of conduct in the South China Sea. However, apparent divergence between countries with close military ties to China, such as Cambodia and Laos, and those without, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, has made reaching a consensus nearly impossible.
'Indonesia establishing close military ties with China would put into question Indonesia's neutrality and credibility in the South China Sea issue or other disputes involving China,' Teuku said.
The international expert also cautioned the possibility of an arms race in the region.
Since Indonesia purchased the 4.5-generation Rafale jets, Thailand has announced plans to buy 12 JAS-39E Gripens from Sweden's Saab over the next 10 years while the Philippines has signed a contract to purchase 12 FA-50 Golden Eagles from Korea Aerospace Industries.
Like the Rafales, the Gripens is a 4.5-generation fighter jet while the FA-50 is a fourth-generation aircraft which puts it on par with the US F-16.
Indonesia is also negotiating the purchase of 24 of the 4.5-generation F-15EX from the US.
Its reported agreement with Turkey to purchase KAAN fifth-generation planes would make it the second country in ASEAN to have such advanced fighter jets.
Singapore last year announced plans to acquire eight F-35A fighter aircraft, complementing the previously announced purchase of 12 F-35Bs. The US is limiting the sales of the F-35 to a few select countries while restricting the sales of the F-22 outside of the US.
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia have had their request to buy the F-35 rejected on several occasions.
Purchasing the J-10, experts say, might one day open the possibility for China to sell its fifth-generation fighters to Indonesia. China currently has two fifth-generation fighter jets: the Chengdu J-20 and the Shenyang J-35.
SWEETENING THE DEAL
With its comparatively cheap price, the J-10 should in theory be a hit to countries seeking affordable alternatives to Western or Russian jets. But despite being around since 2003, the J-10 is only operated in two countries: China and Pakistan, with the latter receiving their first batch in 2022.
Experts say other countries may have their own security and diplomatic concerns.
Even after the J-10s reported success in the Pakistan-India standoff, only a handful of countries like Egypt and Colombia are expressing interest in purchasing the Chinese jets.
Indonesia – the world's fourth-most populous nation with strong diplomatic clout among developing countries across the globe – buying the J-10 could change all that, say experts.
'Just like China's profile in the transportation industry was lifted by the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail project, Indonesia purchasing the Chinese J-10 would immediately boost China's profile as a global defence manufacturer,' Teuku, the international relations expert said.
In 2023, Indonesia launched Southeast Asia's first high-speed railway, Whoosh, a joint venture between Indonesian and Chinese firms which was financed mainly by loans from the China Development Bank.
Following Whoosh's success, several countries including Vietnam and Pakistan have announced interest in adopting Chinese technologies for their high-speed rail ambitions.
To woo Indonesia, experts said China could sweeten the deal by agreeing to buy more Indonesian goods, an enticing proposition amid the threat of a tariff war initiated by US President Donald Trump.
China might also offer joint manufacturing or assembly of the J-10, as it did with Pakistan, or promise more investment in other sectors.
'Prabowo realises that Indonesia needs Chinese investment which may ultimately compel him to go ahead with the purchase,' defence expert Beni said.
The expert highlighted that during his campaign run last year, Prabowo promised to create 19 million jobs and grow the country's economy by eight per cent annually during his first term.
Chinese investments were also instrumental in Indonesia's ambition to become a key player in the electric vehicle battery industry.
In 2024, Chinese investment in Indonesia reached US$8.1 billion. China injected another US$1.8 billion into the country in the first quarter of 2025.
Experts said the final decision will depend on what China has to offer and how much Jakarta is willing to risk in return.
'Indonesia may ultimately buy a limited number of J-10s as a symbolic gesture of goodwill or it may politely decline and go with existing procurement paths,' Khairul of ISESS said.
'Only time will tell.'
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