
Europe's plan to take back the Black Sea from Russia
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, little has been done to contain Russia's consolidated dominance in the murky waters of the Black Sea.
The dissolution of the Soviet bloc saw Moscow inherit much of the Black Sea fleet, a regional force it shared with Ukraine, and a leasing arrangement for the strategic naval base of Sevastopol, Crimea.
Vladimir Putin's eventual illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula not only gave him complete control over the fleet's home base but also further territory to dominate the Black Sea.
It allowed Russia control over Ukraine's shipping routes, and the modernisation of its military presence on the peninsula saw the introduction of area denial capabilities – known as A2/AD in military parlance – such as coastal defences, more submarines and surface-to-air missiles to contest Nato's presence.
On the first day of the Russian invasion, in February 2022, Putin's men pushed as far as Snake Island, a 46-acre rocky outcrop just off Ukraine. Kyrylo Budanov, Kyiv's spy chief, once said the island grants control of 'the surface, and to some extent the air, situation in southern Ukraine'.
But more than three years since Putin's full-scale invasion, Snake Island is back in Ukrainian hands and the Russian choke hold over the Black Sea has all but ended.
Through Kyiv's use of domestically engineered maritime drones and missiles donated by the West, such as Storm Shadow and Atacms, the Black Sea fleet has been driven back to ports on the Russian coast.
Now, with the Black Sea's waters once again up for grabs, the European Union has rolled out its first 'Black Sea Strategy' in the hope of countering any Russian re-emergence in the region.
Of the six countries bordering the landlocked waters, two – Bulgaria and Romania – are EU members. Ukraine is a key ally and on the verge of also joining the bloc. The same applies to Georgia, although it has drifted from its EU path in recent years. Turkey, a Nato ally, is technically still a candidate for accession.
The last nation, Russia, is now – and it took a generation – a sworn enemy.
With this in mind, Kaja Kallas, the EU's top diplomat, unveiled what is an attempt by Brussels to project itself as a geopolitical power in the region.
Its three-pronged approach aims at loosening the Russian choke hold on the Black Sea to protect trade routes and critical infrastructure, as well as boost preparations for war.
The most striking promise is to invest in regional ports, railways and airports to make it faster and easier to deliver military hardware to the region in the event of hostilities heating up.
'Upgrades will help ensure troops can be where they are needed, when they are needed. Getting equipment to the region faster strengthens deterrence and also supports Nato,' Ms Kallas told a news conference in Brussels on Wednesday.
Crumbling infrastructure has long posed one of the biggest threats to the Western military alliance's ability to rush troops eastwards if Russia ever attacks.
Two of the five key logistical routes designated to deter invasion by Moscow travel through Bulgaria and end in Romania.
Brussels is essentially left in charge of improving the civilian transport links that could one day be used by the military.
Previous estimates have suggested that at least €75 billion (£62.8 billion) would be the cost of upgrading transport infrastructure across the entire continent to make it fit for military use.
Any investments in Romania and Bulgaria will be carefully monitored to prevent ports, railway lines and airports coming under questionable foreign ownership.
China has been trying to muscle in with purchases of ports in Georgia.
Secondly, Brussels aims to open a monitoring command centre, dubbed Black Sea Maritime Security Hub, to give the bloc's members better situational awareness over the region.
The EU's strategy is designed to deliver real-time information 'from space to seabed' about the movements of Russian vessels, both military and civilian.
In theory, it would provide early warning alerts about potential Russian sabotage of the undersea section of an electricity cable running between Azerbaijan and Europe or offshore oil and gas rigs belonging to Romania and Bulgaria.
Monitoring trade routes is seen as necessary after Russia proved how easy it was to shut down Ukraine's grain exports through the Black Sea.
Kyiv eventually managed to open a protected corridor, which hugs Romania and Bulgaria, but threats remain to the key revenue generator.
Another application could be the monitoring of Russia's so-called 'shadow fleet' of sanction-busting oil tankers or any future ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.
The exact size, shape and location of the monitoring station is still up for negotiation between EU member states, Ms Kallas said.
Other EU projects could be extended to map, monitor and eventually remove mines that were placed in the Black Sea by both Ukraine and Russia.
Lastly, the EU's strategy foresees an attempt to boost partnerships across the region, which it describes as a 'vital trade artery' between the bloc, the southern Caucasus and Central Asia.
'We want to develop new energy, transport and digital corridors in the region that will connect us to the Caucasus and Central Asia,' Marta Kos, the EU's enlargement commissioner, said.
Partnering with Turkey will be one of the key challenges.
While officially an EU candidate country and a member of Nato, Turkey maintains its own, significant, interests in the Black Sea, including continued trade with Russia.
Through the Bosphorus strait, Ankara controls access and trade in and out of the Black Sea.
This means there is little to no hope of any significant European naval presence being brought into the region.
Under the terms of the Montreux Convention, Turkey essentially closes the Black Sea to foreign warships and submarines in times of war. Only vessels belonging to Black Sea nations are allowed to return.
Ms Kallas said that the new strategy 'is also an invitation for closer cooperation on issues of interest to all countries around the Black Sea, including Turkey'.
She added: 'We are committed to working closely with our partners and also to exchanging information about what is happening and what we can do about it with all Black Sea partners. And this is in Turkey's interest as well.'
Given its interests and influence over the region, Turkey is likely to push back against any large-scale attempt by Europe to muscle in on the Black Sea.
It is unlikely to allow Brussels to challenge Russia head-on, and will instead seek to balance influence in the region.
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