Will join combat if reserved forces are called upon: Uttam
A fighter pilot, who once flew MiG-23s, spoke candidly on Friday about his IAF sting and referred to the current tensions between India and Pakistan.
Speaking to reporters at Gandhi Bhavan on Friday, Mr. Uttam recalled having joined the armed forces at the age of 16 years and by 1982 he was flying MiG-21s, and later got behind the controls of the MiG-23 — a jet so fast it could hit speeds more than twice the speed of sound.
'I was just 20, already a fighter pilot,' he said referring to his postings in Air Stations in Uttar Pradesh, Srinagar, and Amritsar — areas that have long been on the edge when it comes to national security.
He termed the April 22 incident a terror attack backed by Pakistan and slammed the killings, especially those carried out in the name of religion. 'India had every reason to hit back,' he said, referring to the recent military response.
Mr. Uttam also touched on Operation Sindoor, claiming Rafale jets and Kamikaze drones were deployed from within Indian territory as part of the mission. He argued that such strong responses are crucial if India ever hopes to achieve a lasting solution to the Kashmir issue.
'Personally, I believe the Kashmir conflict won't truly end until India takes back Pakistan-occupied Kashmir,' he said without hesitation.
According to Mr. Uttam Kumar Reddy, the assault on Jammu left India no choice but to respond — and any continued aggression from across the border could spell disaster for Pakistan. 'No other nation is going to step in with military support,' he noted.
And if it comes down to war? Mr. Uttam Kumar Reddy's message was clear: 'If there's a full-scale conflict and I'm needed — I'll fight again.'
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