Syro-Malabar Church condemns misinformation by Janam TV
In a statement issued by the Syro Malabar Church Media Commission, the Church noted that while Govindachamy was the name recorded in police files, court verdicts, and Supreme Court documents, the Janam TV continued to use the alias Charlie Thomas, a move the Church alleged was calculated, in violation of both journalistic ethics and moral decency.
The commission further clarified that Govindachamy had a pattern of giving multiple false identities to authorities, including names like Charlie, Krishnan, Raj, and Ramesh. 'While early police reports may have used the alias Charlie Thomas, subsequent investigation—and all legal proceedings—have conclusively established his real identity as Govindachamy. The Supreme Court, in its final verdict, recorded his name as Govindaswamy, further affirming the falsity of the alternative names,' it said.
The Church expressed deep concern over the continued use of this discredited alias by Janam TV, saying it was not used for factual accuracy, but to inflame communal sentiments. 'It is evident that this is an attempt to sow the seeds of religious hatred among their viewership and revive the baseless conversion narrative,' the statement reads.
Fr. Tom Olikkarott, secretary and spokesperson of the Commission for Media of the Syro-Malabar Church, said that the Supreme Court verdict also confirmed that the original name of the accused was Govindachamy. 'No other media highlighted the false name of the accused, and I suspect that there is some malicious intent behind the repeated false narrative. The Church cannot admit such false propaganda being spread in society,' said Fr. Olikkarott.
'The authorities of Janam TV should explain the circumstances under which they used the false name,' said the priest.
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