Track credit schemes, add re focus in Capex survey: MoSPI
MoSPI
) on Tuesday called for monitoring the utilisation and impact of credit access programmes such as
MUDRA
to support enterprise formalisation and
financial inclusion
in the upcoming
Private Sector Capital Expenditure
(CAPEX) and Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises (
ASUSE
) surveys.
In a statement issued after the Data Users Conference in Hyderabad, the ministry said there is a need to include "dedicated questions on investment intentions in renewable energy sources such as biomass, solar, and wind in the upcoming round of the
CAPEX survey
."
Addressing the gathering, V Anantha Nageswaran, Chief Economic Advisor (CEA), stated that conviction for policy reform must be sustained by the pulse of granular data.
"The ASUSE and the Private Sector CAPEX Investment Intention Survey together cover wide ground in providing a realistic picture of activity in India's private sector," he said.
The ministry also recommended enriching the ASUSE database by profiling the age of proprietary and partnership establishments and proposed capturing information on the reasons behind starting businesses in the unincorporated sector to enhance establishment profiling.
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Indian Express
6 hours ago
- Indian Express
How gender remains a primary barrier to women's workforce participation
— Rituparna Patgiri As India celebrates the 79th Independence Day, it is also a moment to reflect on the country's journey towards inclusive growth. Over the years, women's participation in the workforce has evolved. However, data shows that their participation varies across regions (such as rural and urban), types of work (such as blue- and grey-collar jobs and gig-based employment), etc. Let's explore structural and social factors affecting women's participation in the workforce and ways to address this. In addition to old age, disability and factors that keep adults of legal working age away from participating in the labour force, there is a clear gender dimension to workforce participation in India. According to the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) 2022-2023 conducted by the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) under the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 8 in 10 men are part of the labour force, compared to only 4 in 10 women. The female labour force participation rate remains lower than in other countries with comparable income and development levels. As such, women are considerably underrepresented in India's labour force. Many are still working, but in ways that are not counted in the gross domestic product (GDP) of the nation. This gap is not just confined to rural India or women with lower levels of education. Women in urban areas, including those with graduate or higher education degrees, also remain outside the workforce. The professionalisation of any type of work usually means that men have better employment prospects than women. This is particularly true in blue- and grey-collar jobs. According to the PLFS 2022-2023, women's representation in blue- and grey-collar roles has increased from 16 per cent in FY20-21 to 19 per cent in FY23-24. Although this shows some progress, the proportion remains very low. Blue and grey collar roles involve manual labour or technical work encompassing industries like retail, construction, logistics, manufacturing, maintenance, and transportation. These often involve physical work, require technical or mechanical skills, and, as such, vocational training and apprenticeship. Work settings are usually outdoors – factories, workshops, construction sites, etc. According to the 2025 survey by Indeed, women hold just one in five jobs in India's blue- and grey-collar workforce. Similarly, a report by the Udaiti Foundation, in partnership with Quess Corp Ltd. and titled State of Women in the Blue-Grey Collar Workforce 2025, highlights systemic barriers and the need for immediate policy interventions in this sector. Although women have equal rights under the law, in practice they continue to face barriers to workforce participation. Most of these barriers are structural. Rigid work schedules, wage inequality, limited training and upskilling opportunities, lack of digital skills, inadequate safety norms, and familial and childcare responsibilities all obstruct women's participation in the workforce, particularly in the blue and grey-collar roles. Many of these jobs have fixed and long work schedules. Families often discourage women from engaging in such jobs, and the dual burden of household duties and paid employment leaves them at a disadvantage. Women also face wage gaps and inequality in the workforce, forcing some to exit the workforce. Disparity in the gender pay gap remains a significant global issue, highlighting deep-rooted inequities in labour markets. According to the Bureau of Labour Statistics, as of 2024, women worldwide earn $0.83 for each dollar earned by men, indicating a pay gap of 17 per cent. The Udaiti Foundation report reveals that women in India's blue- and grey-collar jobs earn only about 70 per cent of men's wages. Half of these women are unhappy with their pay, and 80 per cent save less than 2,000 a month or, in many cases, nothing at all. Along with lower pay, factors such as poor work-life balance, male-dominated workplace cultures, and a lack of respect and recognition also contribute to women's decisions to leave. The report also highlights that 52 per cent of women with less than a year of work experience plan to quit within the next 12 months. With wages low and working conditions unsafe, women have minimal motivation or incentives to continue such jobs. But the primary barrier continues to be gender, which is the perception that women are not capable of performing physical and hard labour. Due to such perceptions, employers often hesitate to hire them. Many employers also believe that women prioritise family and childcare responsibilities, which prevents them from hiring more women. Most importantly, many of them do not want to provide maternity benefits and other entitlements, hence they hire fewer women. The rise of the gig-based platform economy has also contributed to gender disparities. Many platform jobs, such as driving and delivery, are male-dominated and often perceived as unsafe or socially inappropriate for women. Social stigma further discourages them from entering these roles. Studies led by economists such as Uma Rani show that the gig-based platforms reinforce existing gender biases, although they often promote themselves as flexible and empowering. Women are pushed into lower-paid gig work like domestic help, parlour services, while men dominate the better-paid delivery or transport sectors. Public space is less accessible to women, especially at night. Platform work is heavily dependent on mobility, something that has historically constrained Indian women's workforce participation. This issue has been studied by scholars such as Shilpa Phadke, Sameera Khan and Shilpa Ranade in their book Why Loiter?: Women and Risk on Mumbai Streets (2011). Scholars have shown how gendered experiences of commuting in cities affect women's participation in the workforce. Transport inequality also intersects with caste and poverty, as women from marginalised communities often face additional barriers as they live in peripheral areas with poor transport connectivity. There are also regional and identity-based variations among women. The PLFS report shows that the unemployment rate for women has increased to 3.2 per cent from 2.9 per cent. A large part of this increase is driven by educated rural women who are unable to find work in the blue- and grey-collar sector. This is largely because of a lack of digital skills and vocational training. Sonalde Desai notes in The Paradox of Declining Female Work Participation in an Era of Economic Growth (2019) that it is the absence of suitable jobs rather than women's withdrawal from the labour force that accounts for declining female work participation. Upper-caste women historically have lower labour force participation rates, particularly in blue- and grey-collar jobs. This is because paid work, particularly in these sectors, is often viewed as low status, leading families to discourage women from working outside the home. Muslim upper-caste women also face similar cultural barriers, and as such, their labour force participation remains low. In comparison, women from lower castes tend to have greater labour force participation rates, often in informal, low-skilled and underpaid roles, reflecting their intersectional vulnerability. This has been examined by several sociologists and economists, including Mukesh Eswaran, Bharat Ramaswami, and Wilima Wadhwa in Status, Caste, and the Time Allocation of Women in Rural India (2013), and Muzna Fatima Alvi in Caste, Religion and the Labour Force Participation of Women: Evidence from India (2023). Arun Kumar Bairwa and Jadhav Chakradhar's study, Caste Affiliation and Access to High-Authority Jobs in the Indian Service Sector (2024), also shows significant disparities between lower and upper castes in securing high-authority positions. To mitigate these challenges, a multi-pronged strategy addressing structural, cultural, and economic barriers is essential. Implementation and enforcement of a minimum wage can also help close the wage gaps between men and women. Moreover, childcare and maternity costs need to be factored into employment policies to encourage women to be part of the workforce. Safety remains yet another key concern, as many workplaces often lack basic measures like CCTV cameras and adequate lighting. Therefore, strengthening workplace infrastructure, providing adequate sanitation, childcare facilities, and women-friendly amenities are crucial. Offering transport and accommodation for women can also help companies improve retention. At the policy level, greater emphasis on vocational and skill-based training for women, particularly rural women, along with better mechanisms to connect trained women to suitable jobs, would be a step in the right direction. Moreover, many field-facing roles across sectors do not have any formal grievance redressal systems. Establishing such mechanisms would help women feel safe to report workplace issues and offer them better assurance that their concerns will be addressed. Similarly, more transparency in hiring rather than relying on word-of-mouth and reference-based recruitment that often discourages women from applying would further help. Expansion and enforcement of labour laws, with provisions for formal contracts and social security, would complement other efforts. Scholars such as Naila Kabeer (Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women's Empowerment, 1992), Ashwini Deshpande (Norms that Matter: Exploring the Distribution of Women's Work between Income Generation, Expenditure-saving and Unpaid Domestic Responsibilities in India, 2024), and Devaki Jain (Valuing Work: Time as a Measure, 1996) have advocated for adopting a broader view of employment that includes agency, dignity, and choice. Women's work needs to be viewed from this lens. Only then can we move towards narrowing the gender gap in the workforce. What explains women's lower participation in the workforce across rural and urban areas? Why does the gender pay gap persist in both formal and informal sectors despite legal equality? How do wage disparities within the blue- and grey-collar sectors reflect broader patterns of gendered labour market segmentation? What policy interventions could most effectively improve women's participation in the blue- and grey-collar workforce? How can vocational training programs be redesigned to connect women—especially in rural areas—with suitable employment? (Rituparna Patgiri is an Assistant Professor at the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Guwahati.) Share your thoughts and ideas on UPSC Special articles with Subscribe to our UPSC newsletter and stay updated with the news cues from the past week. Stay updated with the latest UPSC articles by joining our Telegram channel – IndianExpress UPSC Hub, and follow us on Instagram and X.
Mint
11 hours ago
- Mint
Data upgrade: How to get an accurate picture of India's MSME sector
Micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) are the backbone of our economic structure, driving value addition, employment and exports. There are more than 70 million such enterprises, accounting for nearly 30% of India's GDP and over 40% of exports. Yet, policymakers operate with an incomplete and somewhat distorted statistical picture. We have two major sources of data on unincorporated MSMEs—those not registered as a company or a limited liability partnership. The first is the Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises (ASUSE) conducted by the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO). It covers non-agricultural, non-construction and unincorporated establishments. Before it became an annual exercise in 2021-22, this was conducted only in 2015-16 and 2011. The second source includes the two main administrative databases Udyam (for MSME registration) and the Goods and Services Tax Network (GSTN), which provide a count of registered units. But there is a glaring disconnect between these sources, resulting in misleading estimates of output, employment and formalization in the sector. Also Read: The budget gives MSMEs a big boost to help make India self-reliant ASUSE 2023-24 estimated about 77 million non-agricultural, non-construction unincorporated establishments. Of these, 99% reported turnover below ₹1 crore and only 0.4% had Udyam registration. But the Udyam dashboard lists 66.5 million registered MSMEs, the vast majority being micro-enterprises. Similarly, 2023-24 GSTN data shows 7 million taxpayers with an annual topline below ₹1 crore. Yet, the ASUSE finds under 1.2 million such GST-registered establishments. A mismatch this big isn't explained by ASUSE's coverage exclusions (i.e., companies, agriculture, construction) alone. If we take ASUSE and administrative databases at face value, India may have 140 million enterprises, employing nearly 400 million workers, which, with 250 million added in agriculture, overshoots total employment estimates of about 600 million as per the KLEMS database. Plausibly, the ASUSE is under-capturing formalized unincorporated enterprises, especially those with GST or Udyam registrations. This omission has three major consequences: First, it leads to an underestimation of economic contribution. Enterprises with GST or Udyam registration tend to have higher turnover, more workers and formal labour. Missing them skews averages downward, reinforcing a narrative of extreme informality and low productivity. Second, it leads to policy misalignment, as schemes designed for credit access, digitalization or skill upgrading could be mis-targeted. Third, undercounting registered MSMEs, which often participate in export-oriented supply chains, distorts the understanding of India's export base. Also Read: Small businesses still outside the formal structure? There exist challenges. The data gap may be due to a design issue. The unit of inquiry for ASUSE is 'Establishment' and not 'Enterprise.' So, it is possible that single enterprises with multiple establishments are counted separately. But for unincorporated businesses, most have only one location. Also, the ASUSE identifies establishments by listing households, potentially missing enterprises not clearly linked to households (like shops in commercial complexes). Further, respondents are given a cap of only three registrations to report. There are multiple ones beyond Udyam and GST, including state and city licences. Thus, if Udyam or GST are not among their top three, they go unrecorded. Respondents may not even recognize Udyam or GST as 'registrations' in the same way as local trade licences or transport permits. Thus, ASUSE may not be capturing the true pace of digital formalization. Recall that the U. K. Sinha Committee of the Reserve Bank of India had highlighted MSME data deficiencies and called for a centralized database to integrate multiple administrative sources. It also called for granular segmentation and dynamic updates. We thus need an integration of GST, Udyam, EPFO, ESIC and export promotion databases for a better picture. Also Read: Govt looks to scrap minor penalties for MSMEs in ease of doing business push A strengthened ASUSE can: First, use GST and Udyam databases for supplementary sampling to ensure proportional representation; second, allow the recording of all, not just three registrations; third, refine establishment identification to include the listing of commercial premises and not just household-linked enterprises; fourth, update the sampling weights more frequently; fifth, collect data on more financial and digital indicators, including on digital payment adoption, e-commerce activity and supply-chain linkages; and sixth, triangulate ASUSE data with other data sources and ensure that ASUSE turnover or investment bands align with the MSME Act. Lastly, the NSSO must publish anonymized unit-level data for independent verification and analysis. The ASUSE is a rich source of data and can offer a realistic picture of MSME output as well as employment; it can help identify sub-segments with high growth and export potential; optimize credit guarantee, interest subvention and technology adoption schemes; track the economy's formalization shift; and lastly, help tailor public policy to regional needs, since MSME characteristics vary sharply across states. Also Read: TCA Anant: A household income survey will be valuable if clarity beats confusion Better data will help dispel the false dichotomy of administrative databases portraying rapidly formalizing MSMEs while ASUSE data depicts a stagnant and largely informal sector. Bridging this gap is essential not just for statistical accuracy, but to make MSMEs genuine engines of productivity growth and export competitiveness. The author are, respectively, senior fellow, Pune International Centre and senior research fellow, deAsra Foundation.
The Print
a day ago
- The Print
How mining, manufacturing & power sectors weighed on India's industrial output since January 2024
A similar story played out for the power sector which saw sporadic contractions during this period, the most significant in May 2025 (-4.7 percent), suggesting overcapacity, misaligned demand, or temporary disruptions such as fuel shortages. Sectoral data shows the mining sector saw negative growth four times since January 2024—August (2024), April (2025), May (2025) and June (2025). New Delhi: The mining and power sectors have been weighing on India's industrial output, an analysis by ThePrint of industrial growth data of the period between January 2024 and June 2025 shows. Mining, for instance, saw sharp contractions during this period, from 10.3 percent growth in June 2024 to -8.7 percent growth in June this year. These were among the factors that weighed heavily on India's industrial output growth as it saw a 10-month low in June 2025, data from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) showed. It also pointed out that the Index of Industrial Production (IIP) grew by a mere 1.5 percent in the month of June 2025, as against 1.9 percent the previous month—marking a decline for the third consecutive month. The IIP broadly tracks three key sectors: mining, manufacturing, and electricity. The monthly report, compiled by the Central Statistics Office (CSO), pegged the deceleration principally on poor performance in the mining and power sectors, both affected by the early onset of monsoon. In June 2025, mining output fell by a steep 8.7 percent, while electricity output fell by 2.6 percent compared to the previous month. Also Read: Smartphones, gems, pharma: Which Indian exports will be worst hit by Trump tariffs, which will be spared January 2024 to January 2025 Since January 2024, India's industrial output has been on a tumultuous terrain. It peaked in May 2024 when the industrial growth rate touched 6.3 percent before falling steeply to 4.9 percent the very next month. The fall in output was a result of contraction in manufacturing and power sectors. Compared to the previous month, manufacturing growth declined from 5.1 percent to 3.5 percent in June 2024, while growth in the power sector declined from 13.7 percent to 8.6 percent during the same period. Growth in the mining sector, on the other hand, went up from 6.6 percent in May 2024 to 10.3 percent in June of the same year. In August 2024, India noted a contraction of 0.1 percent in industrial output growth, marking the first such year-on-year contraction after October 2022. This was a result of negative growth in the power (-3.7 percent) and mining (-4.3 percent) sectors, and a slowdown in manufacturing to 1.2 percent from 4.7 percent the previous month. Industrial growth, however, picked up in November 2024, with IIP again touching the 5 percent threshold. After a minor hiccup in December 2024, industrial growth touched 5.2 percent in January 2025. While there isn't any universally agreed-upon 'ideal' IIP benchmark, a 3-5 percent annual growth rate is seen as healthy and sustainable. Return to path of decline Following the recovery in January, industrial growth once again embarked on a path of decline from February 2025 (2.7 percent), ultimately reaching a 10-month low in June 2025. It was 3.9 percent in March, 2.6 percent in April and 1.9 percent in May. Though the mining sector grew rapidly in the first half of 2024, registering 8.1 percent growth in February 2024 and 10.3 percent growth in June 2024, by August 2024, it had declined to 4.3 percent. This trajectory continued till June this year when the mining sector contracted by 8.7 percent. These fluctuations in the industry were caused by issues like domestic weather disruptions or mining-specific regulations, as well as external commodity pricing difficulties. Manufacturing has recovered more steadily than mining, despite its slow-paced growth. The sector hit a peak of 5.8 percent in January 2025 after plunging to a low of 3.6 percent in January 2024. Following a brief decline to 2.8 percent in February 2025, manufacturing growth was 4 percent in March 2025. But, this was short-lived. After falling to 3.1 percent in April 2025, it rose slowly until June 2025, when it averaged roughly 3.9 percent. This indicates the sector's capacity for adaptation and recovery and is possibly the result of supply chain support, government stimulus, and the post-pandemic normalisation of demand. However, the recovery's sluggish pace underlines persistent demand from weak export markets and widespread supply chain concerns. With notable double-digit growth in May 2024 (13.7 percent), the electricity sector dominated the growth charts for the majority of the time. These spikes frequently corresponded with the push for infrastructure and seasonal demand. The IIP data from January 2024 to June 2025 depicts the volatile state of the country's industrial sector, with major sectors seeing fast growth, abrupt decrease, and resilience. (Edited by Tony Rai) Also Read: GDP to IIP—Indian statistical systems have bigger problems than 'underestimating' population
