Evaluating Heat's asset management and rationale: The regrettable and defensible

Miami Herald

6 hours ago

In this NBA era when free agency is no longer much of a thing, the biggest winners generally acquire superstars via the draft or trade; or get the better end of trades involving very good players (case in point: Indiana with Tyrese Haliburton and Pascal Siakam) or collect a treasure trove of assets, particularly first-round picks, that can then be flipped for good players (see the Knicks and Spurs as two examples).
The Heat's asset management has been the focus of criticism among a segment of fans frustrated by three consecutive years of needing to qualify for the playoffs through the play-in (Miami made the NBA Finals the first of those years), combined with a current roster that looks far closer to a play-in team than a championship contender.
A team source said that the reason Heat hasn't tried to collect a cornucopia of first-round picks — as the Knicks, Rockets and Spurs have done — is twofold. Doing that would run counter to Miami's core philosophy of:
1). Never again tanking and intentionally taking steps back with the hope of a brighter future.
2). Always trying to win as many games as possible every season, even if the roster isn't championship-caliber. Trying to miss the playoffs with the hope of landing the top pick in the draft would never be considered under this ownership and management team.
With the Heat seemingly stuck in a hamster wheel of mediocrity, some asset management decisions can reasonably be questioned.
The view here on which of this decade's decisions were regrettable, commendable and defensible:
▪ The 2023 trade that sent Terry Rozier and a lottery-protected 2027 first-round pick to Charlotte for Kyle Lowry, whose contract was set to expire after that season.
The Heat, at the time, wanted to dump Lowry — who was unhappy about his diminished role — and believed Rozier would give Miami an offensive infusion. In Miami's defense, nobody could have envisioned Rozier's stunning regression – from a 23.2 points per game, 35.8 percent three-point shooter during his final half season in Charlotte to a 10.6 ppg, 29.5 distance shooter last season with Miami.
But a difficult lesson was learned: Do not trade a first-round pick for a player who isn't close to an All-Star. First-rounders must be treated as precious commodities, and applying lottery protections to the pick (while sensible) prevented Miami not only from trading its first-round picks in 2027 or 2028 but also keeps the Heat from including a 2029 first-round pick in a trade.
The going rate to acquire small point guards, such as Rozier, subsequently became much lower. Charlotte, this summer, needed to deal only center Jusuf Nurkic (9.2 points, 6.5 rebounds last season) to Charlotte for Colin Sexton (23.2 points, 6.6 assists last season). The Jazz threw in a second-round pick to boot.
The Rozier trade ultimately was Miami's most damaging transaction of the decade. But as Heat TV announcer Eric Reid said Sunday, it's difficult to think of a good player who had the sudden in-his-prime regression to the extent Rozier did. Rozier has one season left on his contract at $26.7 million, and the Heat has been unable to find a taker in a trade.
▪ The need to include second-round picks in several trades to offload contracts or create a roster spot or flexibility, though most of the deals individually can be rationalized.
The Heat needed to relinquish two future second-round picks to OKC to dump Victor Oladipo's $9.4 million salary, one second-rounder to San Antonio to offload Dwayne Dedmon's $4.7 million contract and another second-rounder to rid itself of Haywood Highsmith's $5.6 million salary.
Miami will get a second-round pick back in the Highsmith trade only if the Nets finish with one of the five best records in the league next season.
The Dedmon move could be justified because it gave Miami the flexibility and roster spot to add Kevin Love, who was more helpful than Dedmon.
The Oladipo trade allowed Miami to avoid surpassing the second apron, which comes with punitive financial and competitive disadvantages.
More difficult to justify (in our view) was the Highsmith trade, because Miami had until the end of the upcoming regular season to get under the luxury tax line that it's determined not to surpass next season after paying a tax the past two seasons.
Could Miami have found a better deal for Highsmith or another player before the trade deadline in order to climb below the tax? Impossible to say. The Heat was not sure it could and identified Highsmith as a player it was comfortable moving on from.
Highsmith's defensive metrics have dropped significantly. In 2022-23, players guarded by Highsmith shot 42.5%. That rose to 45 two seasons ago. Last season, players shot 47.4% against him — higher than the 45.6% they shot overall.
In our view, this was the Heat's first trade this decade in which it somewhat diminished the on-court product purely for financial reasons. The Heat doesn't look at it that way because of Highsmith's defensive regression, as Ethan Skolnick reported. But his three-point shooting (39.6 and 38.2% the past two years) and effort and defensive verve were assets.
And just last April, coach Erik Spoelstra was praising Highsmith's tenacity and noting of Highsmith (and Davion Mitchell) that 'you want guys that are just going to be disruptive and change the energy of the game.'
It's not a big loss, but it's a loss.
This decade, Miami gave up five second-round picks essentially for 2 1/2 months of Trevor Ariza (acquired for Meyers Leonard and a second round pick), a year-and-a-half of Love and tax relief. That leaves the Heat with one future second-rounder (2027).
To the Heat's credit, Miami has not dealt a first-round pick as a carrot to dump salary and remains opposed to doing that.
But the need to trade second-round picks to offload salary or create roster spots isn't ideal. Remember, Houston used four second-round picks (plus a first rounder and the dubious contracts of Jalen Green and Dillon Brooks) to land Kevin Durant this summer. Portland used two second-round picks and Anfernee Simons to acquire Jrue Holiday from Boston.
Three second-round picks were an important component of Cleveland's trade for DeAndre Hunter earlier this year — a deal that sent Caris Lavert and Georges Niang to Atlanta.
Possessing second-round picks aren't critical but they are, at times, helpful.
▪ Trading Love and Kyle Anderson for Norm Powell in July.
Dealing two borderline rotation players for a highly skilled scorer was a coup, the zenith of the offseason.
Powell was one of only six NBA players last season to average at least 21 points while shooting better than 48% from the field and 40% from three-point range. The other players in this exclusive group: Nikola Jokic, Durant, Karl-Anthony Towns, Zach LaVine and Kawhi Leonard.
That deal also justified the Heat's decision to give Love a second guaranteed season at $4.2 million, because it helped facilitate the Powell trade.
▪ Dealing P.J. Tucker, a second-round pick and cash to Toronto for Mitchell in February.
After the Raptors changed their mind about acquiring Tucker in the five-team Jimmy Butler trade with Golden State, Miami smartly pivoted and acquired Mitchell, who was a revelation at point guard and agreed to a two-year, $24 million deal this summer.
▪ Not trading Max Strus, Gabe Vincent or Caleb Martin before their contracts expired.
Though some wondered why Miami didn't ship them off before they became free agents, none likely would have netted a first-round pick in return.
And the contributions of Strus and Vincent during the Heat's 2023 NBA Finals run outweighed the value of any second-round pick that could have been netted for either before the trade deadline.
As it turns out, Miami acquired a second-round pick plus a conditional second-round pick for helping facilitate Strus' sign-and-trade with Cleveland.
In Martin's case, there was less of a payoff for retaining him through the Heat's first-round loss to Boston in 2024, which followed Jimmy Butler's devastating knee injury in the play-in game against Philadelphia.
But Miami kept Martin with the intention of trying to re-sign him. The Heat ultimately dodged a luxury tax bullet when he rejected the Heat's five-year, $65 million offer 14 months ago.
▪ Not proactively trading Butler before last season.
A team source insists that there was no indication that Miami could have received more than one first-round pick — or a superior package — than what it ultimately obtained from the five-team trade (Andrew Wiggins, Anderson, Mitchell and a 2025 first-round pick).
The teams that inquired about Butler last summer, when Miami wasn't trying to trade him, never discussed offering multiple first-round picks.
Though the Knicks reportedly had interest, there was never a firm offer, the source said. And though the Warriors had interest last summer, the source said Golden State never presented a proposal that included multiple first round picks.
Could the Heat have snagged two first-round picks if it had actively shopped him last summer? It's impossible to know.
As one Western Conference source said, for all of Butler's greatness, he's an acquired taste with a limited market.
The Heat assuredly could have acquired a better package if Butler had been dealt after the Heat's 2023 Finals run, but Miami never considered that and understandably so. The Heat perhaps could have acquired more if he had been traded before the 2024 trade deadline, but that's speculative.
A Heat source said Butler's agent, Bernie Lee, promised Miami that Butler would comport himself well last season and would never complain about not getting a contract extension. That proved to be untrue, leaving the Heat without any bargaining position at the trade deadline. In retrospect, the Heat should have sought that assurance directly from Butler last July.
▪ The handling of the Duncan Robinson contract.
If Robinson had not opted out of his contract, Miami could have tried to dangle him to a team eager to shave $10 million off its luxury tax commitment.
That team could have acquired and waived Robinson, whose unique contract included a $19.9 million salary but only $9.9 million guaranteed.
But Robinson was eligible to be traded this offseason only if he opted in and not before any decision. And Robinson ultimately opted out because the Heat told his representation that it would work with him on a sign-and-trade if he did so.
Ultimately, Miami agreed to a sign-and-trade with Detroit and decided that paying former Pistons forward Simone Fontecchio $8.3 million to play for the Heat was smarter than paying Robinson $9.9 million not to play for the Heat – and then needing to spend additional money to sign his replacement.
Miami never had any intention of keeping Robinson at $19.9 million. Through that prism, the Robinson trade could be rationalized.
Could the Heat have acquired a better player than Fontecchio if Miami had tried to trade him midway through last season? That's unclear.
The Heat can be questioned for several moves over the past two years, including the choice not to go 'all-in' and include Nikola Jovic and a pick swap in a Durant trade proposal (that was a difficult call for Miami); the Rozier trade and the decision to use its 14th roster spot on Dru Smith instead of a much-needed backup center such as Precious Achiuwa, Kai Jones or Trey Lyles.
With the Heat finishing with the league's 20th-best record last season, a case could be made to try to acquire more first-round picks as assets to trade if another star player asks to be dealt.
But the Heat, still eager to win as many games as it can in a diminished Eastern Conference, isn't looking to trade its best players for the purpose of adding future draft picks.