C Raja Mohan writes: New America, churn in Asia and India's path

Indian Express

3 days ago

Two recent developments to India's east offer insights into the rapidly shifting contours of Asian geopolitics. The first was the annual Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in Singapore, where US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth outlined the administration's priorities for Asia. French President Emmanuel Macron's keynote address offered a European perspective on Asian security that diverged from Washington's in key respects. The second was South Korea's presidential election, where the likely victory of left-leaning candidate Lee Jae-myung could reshape not only Korea's political trajectory but also the strategic dynamics of Northeast Asia. More broadly, South Korea's political churn reflects the growing dilemmas across Asia in responding to an assertive China and an increasingly unpredictable US.
As expected, US-China relations dominated discussions at the SLD. The absence of China's defence minister underscored the current crisis in bilateral ties. The SLD historically served as a valuable platform for US-China dialogue on regional security. Much of Asia was eager to hear from Hegseth about the Trump administration's strategic intentions. Many countries remain caught in the crossfire of President Donald Trump's trade wars and were watching closely to see if Washington would uphold traditional alliances or, as in Europe, move to dismantle them.
Hegseth, however, steered clear of economics, saying his focus was 'tanks, not tariffs'. He had strong words on China's military capabilities and ambitions of annexing Taiwan. Even as Hegseth warned against Chinese hegemony, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced the breakdown of the trade truce with Beijing he had negotiated last month. Asia and the world, which welcomed the relaxation of US-China commercial tensions, must now brace for more turbulence. For those in the region worried about a US-China condominium or a potential G2 arrangement, there was some relief: A strategic alignment isn't imminent. Nor is Washington likely to cede an Asian sphere of influence to Beijing. However, Hegseth reinforced concerns about the risks of an escalating US-China rivalry, economic and geopolitical.
On regional security, Hegseth reaffirmed a strong US commitment to alliances and partnerships in Asia. 'No one should doubt America's commitment to our Indo-Pacific allies and partners… We will continue to wrap our arms around our friends and find new ways to work together.' Yet, he made it clear that US support would not be unconditional: He called on allies to shoulder more responsibility, notably by raising their defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP. This is an impossible ask for most Asian nations. Japan has promised to raise it to 2 per cent but is having trouble mobilising the financial resources for it. India, despite a two-front threat from China and Pakistan, spends only about 2 per cent.
Asked about NATO's potential role in Asia, Hegseth urged Europe to remain focused on Russia rather than overstretch its resources in the Indo-Pacific. Macron, however, had a different message. He emphasised Europe's stake in Indo-Pacific security and called for new coalitions between Europe and Asian partners. Macron stressed the importance of 'strategic autonomy' and a balanced approach to global power shifts. Kaja Kallas, the EU's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, echoed Macron. She argued that the security of Europe and Asia is deeply interconnected. Both were critical of China but avoided overt confrontation, reflecting the nuanced European posture amid the shifting dynamics involving the US, Russia and China.
No Asian nation illustrates the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy more vividly than South Korea. The current election, prompted by the fall of conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol, follows a period of political turbulence. The frontrunner, Lee Jae-myung, represents the progressive tradition that seeks a more autonomous foreign policy. Yoon deepened South Korea's alignment with the US and Japan and adopted a tough stance on China and North Korea. Lee, by contrast, promotes 'pragmatic realism' — aimed at repositioning South Korea as a strategic balancer rather than a compliant US ally. While affirming the alliance with Washington, Lee advocates greater autonomy and legislative oversight over South Korea's military involvement in US-led operations, especially concerning Taiwan. This could complicate American contingency planning in the Indo-Pacific.
Lee's China policy prioritises economic pragmatism over ideological confrontation. With China absorbing about a quarter of South Korea's exports, Lee seeks to stabilise trade and supply chains, especially in strategic sectors like semiconductors and batteries. Balancing economic ties with China against security expectations from the US will be a delicate act. On North Korea, Lee favours a return to engagement. He supports reopening joint projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex in exchange for verifiable progress on denuclearisation. A potential diplomatic outreach from Trump — who has promised to re-engage Pyongyang — could provide new opportunities for Lee. On Japan, Lee diverges sharply from Yoon's approach. While supporting trilateral defence initiatives, he insists on historical accountability from Tokyo for its imperial-era abuses. This dual-track approach may resonate domestically but could generate diplomatic friction with Japan and the US, both of which have encouraged Seoul and Tokyo to move past historical disputes.
Lee Jae-myung's foreign policy vision represents a significant departure from tradition, aiming to balance strategic autonomy, economic security, and principled diplomacy. His success will depend on managing the deep internal divisions on foreign and security policies, stabilising ties with the US, insulating the economy from US-China tensions, and navigating a complex external environment.
Both the SLD and South Korea's political turn underscore the deepening uncertainty in Asian geopolitics, shaped by the tension between alliance building and strategic autonomy, between economic integration and commercial de-risking, and vastly divergent views within Asian polities on dealing with the changing external conditions. For over three decades, India's Asian strategy was premised on great-power harmony, regional stability, economic interdependence and stronger regional institutions. That era may be ending. Delhi must now contend with growing disorder, which demands both stronger national capabilities and enhanced strategic flexibility.
(The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express and holds the Korea Chair at the Council on Strategic and Defence Research, Delhi)