
Op Sindoor shows India's success in carving out space for conventional conflict below nuclear threshold
Written by Arun Sahgal and Ambuj Sahu
After three days of intense, technology-driven conflict — marked by missile strikes, drone incursions, air combat, and artillery exchanges — the kinetic phase of the India-Pakistan standoff has wound down to a temporary pause following a declared ceasefire. It is now time to take a preliminary call on both the causes and the dynamics of the crisis and situate its implications on the nuclear equation between both countries.
First, the crisis demonstrated India's technological and tactical prowess: The capability to execute precision strikes inside Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) on both terrorist bases and deep-set targets of air bases and air infrastructure, along with the robustness of indigenous air defence systems. Yet, despite these operational gains, the most consequential outcome of Operation Sindoor lies elsewhere.
The principal takeaway is India's success in carving out space for conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold — taking the battle to the Pakistani mainland, inflicting substantial damage on military assets, while simultaneously averting nuclear escalation. For years, New Delhi has grappled with the challenge of responding to cross-border terrorism under the shadow of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, which absurdly narrowed the threshold for conflict and effectively neutralised India's punitive options. This time was different. As the Prime Minister asserted in his address to the nation, India, in the future, will fiercely retaliate against all acts of terror and not capitulate to Pakistan's nuclear blackmail. This carries profound implications for any future India-Pakistan crisis.
Pakistan has long employed its so-called doctrine of Full Spectrum Deterrence to paralyse India's strategic calculus by asserting escalation dominance across every rung of the conflict ladder. Lt General Khalid Kidwai, former Director General of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and now an advisor to Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA), articulated four thresholds for deterrence failure: Spatial (loss of territory), military (destruction of key assets and air bases), economic (threats to the national economy), and political (internal destabilisation).
Under this doctrinal umbrella, Pakistan pursued cross-border terrorism with impunity, leveraging the threat of nuclear retaliation to prevent Indian military responses. This posture rested on two flawed assumptions: First, that Pakistan had both the capability and confidence to respond to any calibrated Indian retaliation; second, after the initial responses, India would face a dilemma — either escalate dangerously close to the nuclear threshold or seek an off-ramp.
Any premature de-escalation by India, in this calculus, would deliver a propaganda victory to Pakistan and place India on the back foot. Pakistan believed India would be forced into higher-magnitude escalation to preserve its doctrine of punitive response. It would ultimately risk the breakdown of conventional deterrence and enable Pakistan to threaten the use of low-yield nuclear weapons under its Full Spectrum Deterrence. This framework, to a considerable extent, succeeded in drawing international attention each time India contemplated higher-order military action.
Operation Sindoor shattered this self-serving narrative. On May 7, India executed precision strikes against nine terror camps located within Pakistan and PoK. In retaliation, Pakistan launched a barrage of drone, missile, and artillery strikes against both civilian and military infrastructure. India's air defence systems — refined since the standoff with China four years ago — held firm, achieving a 99 per cent kill rate by successfully intercepting and neutralising most incoming threats.
At the second rung, on the morning of May 9, India destroyed Pakistan's Chinese-origin HQ-9B air defence system stationed in Lahore. Pakistan escalated its drone and missile attacks, targeting 26 sites and cities along the western border. India's counter-response was immediate and overwhelming: Massive retaliatory strikes were launched across both the International Border and the Line of Control. By the morning of May 10, the Indian Air Force had decimated major Pakistani air bases, including high-value targets such as Nur Khan (just 10 kilometres from Islamabad) and Sargodha (reportedly housing nuclear-capable F-16s). India had thus shifted its posture from a proportionate to a clearly disproportionate response, effectively dismantling Pakistan's nuclear doctrine.
Furthermore, a reported strike near the Kirna Hills — suspected of housing Pakistan's nuclear assets in underground silos — caused panic within the NCA, revealing the vulnerability of its command-and-control infrastructure. The sudden announcement of an NCA meeting (later denied) and possible orders for nuclear weapon deployment (unverified) were acts of brinkmanship, aimed at signalling proximity to the nuclear threshold.
What stands out starkly is India's determination to deal a decisive blow to terror infrastructure and convey unequivocally that such acts will be met with overwhelming force — that no terrorist or their handler will find sanctuary. Subsequent strikes on Pakistan's air defences, air bases, and critical infrastructure across its territory showcased India's intent to degrade military capabilities while exposing the hollowness of Pakistan's 'First Use' doctrine. The Balakot strike of 2019 had already exposed the cracks in Pakistan's nuclear bluff; Operation Sindoor has now widened that breach and tested its strategic boundaries.
In summary, there are four takeaways. One, India called out Pakistan's nuclear doctrine effectively, ascending multiple rungs on the escalation ladder without provoking nuclear retaliation. Two, it established a doctrine of deterrence by punishment, that any future terrorist attack will exact severe costs. Three, India has drawn a new red line — acts of terrorism will now be treated as acts of war. This framing may enhance deterrence by denial. Four, the non-military thresholds of full spectrum doctrine are breached. Not only do the Indus Waters Treaty and other economic levers exercised after the Pahalgam attack remain untouched after the ceasefire, but India has also left the door ajar for testing economic and political thresholds in future crises.
Pakistan had leveraged nuclear brinkmanship to establish a perceived parity with India on the global stage. But the world must now acknowledge Pakistan as a haven for transnational terrorist groups and recognise its reckless nuclear posturing for what it is: A threat to regional and global stability. An effective Indian deterrent now rests on communicating one clear message: Nuclear threats will no longer serve as a shield for state-sponsored terrorism.
Arun Sahgal is former founder-director, Net Assessment, HQ Integrated Defence Staff. Ambuj Sahu is a PhD Candidate at Indiana University Bloomington
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