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The Print
2 days ago
- Politics
- The Print
With nuke lunacy, Asim Munir joins Pakistan's Hall of Generals who swapped brains for bluster
In reality, they end up destroying themselves and damaging Pakistan. Ayub, Yahya, Zia, Musharraf make a straight line. The first launched a war in 1965 and lost. The second lost half his country. The third diminished Pakistan into the 'University of Jihad'. The fourth ruined the economy and globally affirmed Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. The fifth, Asim Munir, is now using language more alarming than his infamous predecessors. Infamous and miserable in defeat, dishonour, exile or assassination. Munir obviously thinks fate is going to treat him better. You can read his shocking rant in this Praveen Swami exclusive. But then, of course, he's much more of a true believer in scriptural dogma as he has interpreted it. He's saying that unlike others, he's willing to go for broke, even if it risks taking his country 'and half the world' down with him. To understand where he is coming from, I will pick 10 points. Also Read: Kutch was the cue, Sindoor the signal. India needs a 6-month, 2-yr & 5-yr plan for Asim Munir The first, he's attempting to restore the nuclear blackmail that has vanished after Op Sindoor. It was defied in the post-Uri surgical strikes and challenged in Balakot. Op Sindoor buried it. From where Munir sits, if his nuclear blackmail is gone, what's he got left? This closes his options on Kashmir. We have to understand this carefully. The Indian nuclear doctrine is publicly disclosed and adheres to the no-first-use principle. Pakistan has no such disclosure or commitment. The clearest articulation of the Pakistani nuclear threshold was given in 2002 (during Op Parakram) by its then director general of Strategic Plans Division (SPD) Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai. He sent out these thresholds under four heads: space (significant loss of territory), military (loss of a significant portion of Pakistani forces and degradation), economic (strangulation or blockade threatening economic survival) and political (large-scale internal subversion or destabilisation). While this is sweeping and non-specific, it underlines an important doctrinal point—that Pakistan fully sees its nuclear weapons as a loser's option. That's at least a rational view. Munir is now saying, don't count on us being rational. The second point is that not only is he reminding India, but also the rest of the world that Pakistan holds this destructive power and may be inclined to unleash it, whatever the consequences. Thereby, he is trying to shift the global emphasis from the threat of cross-border terrorism to the fear of nuclear war in the Subcontinent. In many India-Pakistan crises from 1987, Pakistan has been the only side to hold out a nuclear threat. The third, therefore, is that Munir is worried India and America have stopped worrying. He's, therefore, putting the gun to his own head. He's taking us back, or at least trying to, to the summer of 1990, when the Pakistanis sent out a threat to the V.P. Singh government that they will start the war with a nuclear strike. Gujral recorded this in his memoir. Munir is now indicating a return to pre-emptive deterrence. In simpler English, it's the return of the nuclear blackmail. Four, he's acknowledging that Pakistan has been left far behind by India. That's where his 'crude analogy' of a 'shining Mercedes driving like a Ferrari' versus a 'dump truck filled with gravel' comes in. So, won't you Indians lose more? Five, we can see the bitter envy play out. Mark the reference to that 'tweet we had put out' with a line from the scriptures on how Allah sent birds to drop stones at enemy war elephants and reduce them to straw, with a picture of Mukesh Ambani. Four decades back, Pakistan was way ahead of India in economic and industrial development. Today, it is far behind, and sliding alarmingly for him. He has no solution to reverse Pakistan's slide. He's only thinking of stopping India's march. Also Read: Asim Munir just stole his 5th star & has nothing to show for it. It'll make him desperate, dangerous Six, he has further elaborated on his DG-ISPR's boast to The Economist that in the next conflict, Pakistan will begin with the east. Some in India have hastily jumped to think of a collusive attack with Bangladesh. Think harder, especially now that Munir has elaborated on it. The east, where he says 'they keep their most valuable' assets. Now, we know that most of our big economic assets are along the west coast and in the south. What he's talking about isn't economic. What he is hinting at, I'd rather not talk about. Smart people in the establishment would know. Seven, he knows that the Pahalgam move backfired. Even if there is no resumption of hostilities, the apprehension over Indus waters will remain. He's reassuring his base with the threat of 'firing 10 missiles and getting rid of a dam' that Indians 'build' on the Indus system. He knows no dam can be built overnight, or in his tenure however long. He thinks he can brag safely right for now. Eight is just a repetition of what he's been saying lately, beginning with that 16 April speech to an overseas Pakistanis' convention, that Pakistan was the only state founded on the Islamic 'Kalma' after the Holy Prophet's Medina. Therefore, the existence of massive minerals under its soil is pre-ordained. This is the snake oil he has sold to Donald Trump. The ninth is of the greatest immediate importance to him. He's signalling to his own population that they should know (if there were any doubts) he's fully the boss now. That he hasn't yet taken over the presidency formally doesn't matter. Nor does it mean that he won't do so. Army chiefs always have a tenure and those wasting away in the line of succession will get impatient at some point. The model that's worked in Pakistan is uniform with the presidency. And the 10th should set us thinking hard, even as we ridicule Munir. He's insecure. In Pakistan, insecurity doesn't just mean losing your job. You can't hand over to any next guy and go home to play golf. However his propaganda packages it, the world has seen pictures of his damaged air bases. A puffed-up bully is often a recent loser. That makes for a very dangerous combination in Pakistan. The final lesson, therefore, is for India. Be alive to not just the possibility, but the likelihood that he will be at our throats again. History tells us that every Pakistani war has been launched on us through one intellectually challenged man's miscalculation. Also Read: What is Asim Munir thinking?
Hindustan Times
2 days ago
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Decoding the threat in Munir's desperate talk
History is the best place to learn where Asim Munir's reckless nuclear boast is coming from. It's an established fact that Pakistani military dictators aren't particularly gifted with strategic intellect, political discretion, or a vision for their nation. They trade minor tactics for high strategy. In reality, they end up destroying themselves and damaging Pakistan. Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf make a straight line. The first launched a war in 1965 and lost. The second lost half his country. The third diminished Pakistan into the 'University of Jihad'. The fourth ruined the economy and globally affirmed Pakistan as a State sponsor of terrorism. The fifth, Munir, is now using language more alarming than his infamous predecessors, as first reported by ThePrint's Praveen Swami. Infamous and miserable in defeat, dishonour, exile, or assassination. Munir thinks fate is going to treat him better. But then, of course, he's much more of a true believer in scriptural dogma as he has interpreted it. He's saying that unlike others, he's willing to go for broke, even if it risks taking his country 'and half the world' down with him. To understand where he is coming from, I will pick 10 points. First, he's attempting to restore the nuclear blackmail that has vanished after Op Sindoor. It was defied in the post-Uri surgical strikes, challenged in Balakot, and Op Sindoor buried it. From where Munir sits, if his nuclear blackmail is gone, what has he got left? This closes his options in Kashmir. The Indian nuclear doctrine is publicly disclosed and adheres to the no-first-use principle. Pakistan has no such disclosure or commitment. The clearest articulation of the Pakistani nuclear threshold was given in 2002 (during Op Parakram) by its then director general of Strategic Plans Division (DG SPD) Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai. He sent out these thresholds under four heads: Space (significant loss of territory), military (loss of a significant portion of Pakistani forces and degradation), economic (strangulation or blockade threatening economic survival), and political (large-scale internal subversion or destabilisation). While this is sweeping and non-specific, it underlines an important doctrinal point: Pakistan fully sees its nuclear weapons as a loser's option. That's at least a rational view. Munir is now saying: Don't count on us being rational. Second, not only is he reminding India but also the rest of the world that Pakistan holds this destructive power and may be inclined to unleash it, whatever the consequences. Thereby, he is trying to shift the global emphasis from the threat in the subcontinent from cross-border terrorism to the fear of nuclear war. In many India-Pakistan crises since 1987, Pakistan has been the only side to hold out a nuclear threat. Third, Munir is worried India and the US have stopped worrying. He's, therefore, putting the gun to his head. He's taking us back, or at least trying to, to the summer of 1990, when the Pakistanis sent out a threat to the VP Singh government that they would start the war with a nuclear strike. IK Gujral recorded this in his memoir. Munir is now indicating a return to pre-emptive deterrence. In simpler English, it is the return of nuclear blackmail. Fourth, he's acknowledging that Pakistan has been left far behind by India. That's where what he calls a 'crude analogy' of a 'shining Mercedes driving like a Ferrari' versus a 'dump truck filled with gravel' comes in. So, won't you Indians lose more, is the argument. Fifth, we can see the bitter envy play out. Mark the reference to that 'tweet we had put out' with a line from the scriptures on how Allah sent birds to drop stones on enemy war elephants and reduce them to straw, with a picture of Mukesh Ambani. Four decades ago, Pakistan was way ahead of India in economic and industrial development. Today, it is far behind and sliding alarmingly for him. He has no solution to reverse this. He's only thinking of stopping India's march. Sixth, he has further elaborated on his director general of Inter-Services Public Relations (DG ISPR)'s boast to The Economist that, in the next conflict, Pakistan will begin with India's east. Some in India have hastily jumped to think of a collusive attack with Bangladesh. Think harder, especially now that Munir has elaborated on it. The east, where he says 'they keep their most valuable' assets. Now, we know that most of our big economic assets are along the west coast and in the south. What he's talking about isn't economic. What he is hinting at, I'd rather not talk about. Smart people in the establishment would know. Seventh, he knows that the Pahalgam move backfired. Even if there is no resumption of hostilities, the apprehension over Indus waters will remain. He's reassuring his base with the threat of 'firing 10 missiles and getting rid of a dam' that Indians 'build' on the Indus system. He knows no dam can be built overnight, or in his tenure, however long. He thinks he can brag safely right for now. Eighth is just a repetition of what he's been saying lately, beginning with that April 16 speech to an overseas Pakistanis' convention, that Pakistan was the only State founded on the Islamic Kalma after the Prophet's Medina. Therefore, the existence of massive minerals under its soil is preordained. This is the snake oil he has sold to Donald Trump. Ninth, and of the greatest immediate importance to him, he's signalling to his own population that they should know he's fully the boss now. That he hasn't yet taken over the presidency formally doesn't matter. Nor does it mean that he won't do so. Army chiefs always have a tenure, and those wasting away in the line of succession will get impatient at some point. The model that's worked in Pakistan is uniform with the presidency. And the tenth should set us thinking hard, even as we ridicule Munir. He's insecure. In Pakistan, insecurity doesn't just mean losing your job. You can't hand over to any next guy and go home to play golf. However his propaganda packages it, the world has seen pictures of his damaged air bases. A puffed-up bully is often a recent loser. That makes for a very dangerous combination in Pakistan. The final lesson, therefore, is for India: Be alive to not just the possibility, but the likelihood that he will be at our throats again. History tells us that every Pakistani war has been launched on us through one intellectually challenged man's miscalculation. (By special arrangement with ThePrint; podcast version on the author's YouTube show, CutTheClutter) Shekhar Gupta is founder and editor-in-chief, ThePrint. The views expressed are personal.
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First Post
2 days ago
- Politics
- First Post
How India should respond to Pakistan's nuclear sabre-rattling
The Indian language of denial and its grammar should be straightforward: if Pakistan or China aggresses, it will be defeated read more The Pakistani briefing to the world maintains that the principal objective of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability is to deter Indian conventional as well as nuclear aggression. In case deterrence fails, then its aim is to deny India victory in war. But the world remains unconvinced because Pakistan has not adopted the No First Use (NFU) policy. A former director general of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, had more candidly listed four parameters for use of nuclear weapons: STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold) India destroys a large part of Pakistan's military forces/ assets (military threshold) India strangulates Pakistan economically India destabilises Pakistan politically or through internal subversion. This gives Pakistan a large menu of flexibility, a carte blanche to react with the nuclear option as per its determination. Or, to give a practical example, Pakistan would have reached for the nuclear button, under General Kidwai's parameters, had it been subjected by India to a 1993- or the 26/11-type terror attack. To this should be added Pakistan's declared policy of 'Full Spectrum Deterrence', which covers threat perception at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This was in evidence during the Balakot crisis in February 2019, when the Pakistani army spokesperson repeatedly stressed that it was ready to bring into play its 'Full Spectrum Deterrence'. The danger with such a declaration is that it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This kind of bravado is doubly dangerous when two countries lie next to each other. In the other possible confrontations, for instance, between the US and Russia, the US and China or the US and North Korea, the country under nuclear attack would have a few minutes warning of a missile heading its way because of the physical distance between them. Since India and Pakistan have zero distance between them, the luxury of the vital few minutes warning will not be available to them in a nuclear situation. Add to this the fact that there are mobile platforms at play and tactical nuclear weapons, which can be deployed with army units close to the border. The use of either of these would reduce the warning time to seconds, turning this South Asian theatre into an inferno. In May 2017, the US's director of national intelligence, Daniel Coats, released its Worldwide Threat Assessment report. Among other aspects, the report addresses Pakistan's nuclear threat: '(A)dvances in Pakistan's nuclear capabilities could risk further destabilization along the India-Pakistan border…'Pakistan's pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons potentially lowers the threshold for their use…Increasing numbers of firefights along the Line of Control…might exacerbate the risk of unintended escalation between these nuclear-armed neighbours.'' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD This is not all. On an even graver note, it warns, 'Even a small nuclear war between India and Pakistan could trigger a nuclear winter that could send the planet into a mini ice age and starve an estimated 1 billion people.' A billion! Once again, it is about a billion people! WARTIME: The World in Danger. Author: Rajiv Dogra. Rupa Publications. Shift in Strategy Pakistan and India have survived at least five nuclear scares since 1987, giving both sides the misplaced confidence that they will survive the next one as well. This leads to a lessening of political restraints on the militaries of both countries and increases greater nuclear brinksmanship. The attitude that somehow the next crisis, too, shall pass, misses the basic point that on all previous occasions, it was the intervention of powers like the US that brought them back from the brink. The situation is different now. The US is a tired superpower, keen on staying away from other people's squabbles, and other powers like China may have the motivation to watch the situation unfold. Countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, flawed as they are, may not be effective on their own. Therefore, the course of the next India-Pakistan shooting war could be different. A former Pakistani Air Force officer maintains, 'Pakistan, relatively a small country with a deep sense of insecurity, developed nuclear weapons mainly to deter military aggression from India, and therefore nuclear weapons continue to play the central role in Pakistan's military strategy.' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD It could still be argued that in the event of a nuclear attack, there would only be a graduated escalation through limited strikes of tactical nuclear weapons on India's forces. But where is the guarantee that this would be so? Contrarily, the first-strike nation, be it Pakistan or China, might launch a massive first strike. Its aim could comprehensively be to eliminate India's command and control systems, destroy its nuclear retaliatory capability, reduce the conventional offensive capability and strike at important industrial targets and some major population centres. In fact, their strategic calculus could be such that India may not get a second chance. The possible use of sophisticated cyberattacks to cripple a country's command and control system, and disable missile launches, raises serious concern about the reliability of the second strike option. Either of these possibilities would place India in a nightmarish state. Over time, these dreads have been increasing. In March 2015, after Pakistan tested the Shaheen III missile, Pakistan's National (nuclear) Command Authority adviser, Khalid Kidwai, said the 2,750 km capability of the Shaheen III missile is meant to reach India's strategic bases at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. 'The purpose,' he said, 'is to deny India a second-strike capability.' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Pakistan's first-use option has never been put to serious question internally. Rather, many of its political leaders have added their weight to the strategic voices in favour of using the first-strike option. With the army, the fundamentalists and the politicians as well in unanimous mode, there is a triad of powerful voices within Pakistan that could make the decision-making in a war situation readily aggressive. In anticipation, there is recognition in India that a response to first use requires a very effective early warning system and a high degree of efficiency. This is even more necessary when the adversary is as opaque as China or as unpredictable as Pakistan. Rather than move in a cautionary direction, Pakistan has, in recent times, lowered the threshold of nuclear use options. There is also some speculation to suggest that Pakistan's non-deployed, de-mated nuclear arsenal may be reconfigured to be deployed and ready to use. Worryingly, as a Pakistani expert Sadia Tasleem maintains, both its short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and sea-based systems may involve delegated control over warheads, 'The country's ongoing arms buildup, continuing fissile material production, and investment in sea-based second-strike capabilities suggest a shift toward a complex deterrence posture…Pakistan might… move away from the non-deployment of its weapons. Its evolving sea-based capabilities, as well as its short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), may also necessitate a shift from centralized to delegated command and control.' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD This shift in strategy will further complicate the situation. Delegated command and control of tactical weapons means that it is up to a relatively young brigadier to take the decision about lobbing a nuclear shell across the border. What then is the guarantee that the hot blood of an indoctrinated middle-aged army officer will keep flowing with equanimity in a war situation, and that his angry finger will not move impulsively towards the trigger? As two well-regarded Pakistani scholars put it: 'Even the finest diplomacy may not work in the midst of a storm strong enough to knock over the pieces on the South Asian nuclear chessboard. With an emboldened army in Pakistan sooner or later seeking once again to push India to the brink—this time determined to escalate rather than back down if things go badly—staving off nuclear warfare on the subcontinent may be a race against time.' That Pakistan may not back down in the next one may also be due to its assessment that bad generalship had plagued the Indian Army during the Kargil War, and that India's military wisdom had taken over a month to mobilise troops for Operation Parakram. The issue then, for India, or for any other country placed in such a dire situation, is of preservation and the best way of preventing the unthinkable. For that to happen, the resolve of a democratic country must be firm and appear to be so for the adversary. Successful deterrence relies on being able to demonstrate a military threat that is credible and realistic. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The Indian language of denial and its grammar should be straightforward: if Pakistan or China aggresses, it will be defeated. Either of them will not achieve its military or political objectives under any circumstances. Should there be an escalation, the costs will be far greater than any benefit. What this means is a pre-emptive option that sidesteps the NFU question. It may or may not involve the use of nuclear assets, but it clearly aims at striking at the enemy's offensive facilities. The above article is an edited extract from Rajiv Dogra's book 'War Time' (Rupa Publications). The article gains renewed relevance in the wake of Field Marshal Asim Munir's nuclear sabre-rattling in the United States. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
India.com
03-07-2025
- Politics
- India.com
How India's BrahMos Strike On Nur Khan Airbase Brought Pakistan To The Brink
New Delhi: A single missile. Thirty seconds. That is all Pakistan had when India's BrahMos slammed into the Nur Khan Airbase – just minutes from Islamabad. No early warning. No clear warhead signature. No time to guess whether it carried a conventional payload or a nuclear one. Rana Sanaullah Khan, special assistant to Pakistan's Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, went public. He said that 30-second window nearly sparked a nuclear chain reaction. His words were not laced with bravado. They carried the tremor of a nation that found itself facing the unthinkable. "The Pakistani government had just 30-45 seconds to analyse whether the missile has any atomic payload. To make such a decision in just 30 seconds is a dangerous thing," Khan said during a televised interview. When India launched that BrahMos – what Khan mistakenly called 'Harmus' – the Pakistani high command scrambled. Inside Nur Khan, alarms rang. Pilots rushed to cockpits. Radar units lit up. In war rooms, generals debated retaliation. But the warhead was non-nuclear. Delhi was not pressing the red button yet. Still, that moment tore open Islamabad's biggest fear – a precise and rapid Indian strike that could knock out critical nodes before Pakistan had time to retaliate. Nur Khan is not any airbase. It lies inside a dense military ecosystem – adjacent to VIP terminals, near Islamabad's civilian airport and dangerously close to Pakistan's nuclear brain – the Strategic Plans Division. That division does not just manage warheads. It plans for survival. It monitors threats. It guards command centres. A hit this close, even with a conventional weapon, rattled nerves at the very top. Khan, in a recent interview, said U.S. President Donald Trump helped stop it from spiraling. He credits the former him with stepping in, easing tensions and pulling the region back from the edge. India has pushed back on that narrative. Officials say it was Pakistan's own DGMO who reached out first desperate to avoid escalation after the BrahMos strike exposed their air defenses. That night, Indian jets, apart from Nur Khan, targeted other airbases too. Runways were cratered. Refueling assets were disabled. By morning, Islamabad had lost air dominance over key northern sectors. And with each passing hour, Pakistan's retaliatory options narrowed. The Nur Khan base, once RAF Station Chaklala, has long been a high-value asset. It hosts Pakistan's key transport squadrons, refueling aircraft and serves as the main VIP air terminal for military brass and state leaders. More importantly, it is nestled in the shadow of Islamabad's strategic district where the lines between civilian governance and nuclear command blur. The base is also less than a dozen kilometers from what many believe are Pakistan's forward nuclear storage units. According to reports by The New York Times and other Western intelligence sources, Nur Khan base is critical to Pakistan's nuclear deployment network. That is what made the BrahMos impact so dangerous. It was not only a hole in a tarmac. It was a message – a demonstration of India's reach, precision and willingness to target assets deep inside enemy territory. Pakistan, which maintains a policy of ambiguity over its nuclear doctrine, had to read between the lines. Was this a decapitation attempt? A soft warning? Or a trial run for a bigger operation? Khan's admission changes the narrative. For the first time, a sitting Pakistani official has acknowledged how close the country came to misreading India's intent and launching something far more devastating in response. This was a moment where miscalculation could have meant mushroom clouds. India's no-first-use doctrine remains intact. But New Delhi has redefined how conventional superiority can be used for coercive diplomacy. A strike like Nur Khan is a geopolitical signal. As for Trump, Pakistan's Field Marshal Asim Munir has already floated the idea of a Nobel Peace Prize for him. That may be diplomatic theatre. But it also shows how rattled Rawalpindi was and how badly they wanted to de-escalate without looking weak. Today, Nur Khan base still stands. But its scars run deeper than concrete. They live in the brief seconds when Pakistan's leadership stared into the nuclear abyss and waited.
India.com
03-07-2025
- Politics
- India.com
'When Brahmos fell on Noor Khan Airbase, we had only...': Shehbaz Shariff's advisor makes shocking revelation of how scared Pakistan was
'When Brahmos fell on Noor Khan Airbase, we had only...': Shehbaz Shariff's advisor makes shocking revelation of how scared Pakistan was Pakistan Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif's advisor has for the first time revealed details about the night when India fired the Brahmos missile during Operation Sindoor. India attacked Pakistan's Noor Khan airbase with the Brahmos missile, which is just a few kilometers away from the Pakistani Army headquarters in Rawalpindi. The attack on Noor Khan airbase shook Pakistan and became a turning point in this war. What Shehbaz Shariff said? Rana Sanaullah Khan, special advisor to Pakistan Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, revealed that when India attacked Noor Khan airbase with the Brahmos missile, Pakistan had only 30 seconds to decide whether it was a sign of a nuclear attack or not. Rana Sanaullah, while talking to Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir, who is an expert in spreading propaganda, said that 'When India attacked with Brahmos missile and it fell on Noor Khan airbase, then Pakistan's leadership had only 30-40 seconds to find out whether the incoming Brahmos missile had an atomic bomb or not. And in those 30 seconds, deciding that it was not there and deciding that it was (atomic bomb)… you can understand how dangerous it was.' He also mentioned, '….after the attack, it was President Donald Trump who intervened and we thanked him.' India attacked Noorkhan airbase with Brahmos Noor Khan Airbase is located just 10 kilometers away from Pakistan's capital Islamabad and is a very sensitive and strategic location for the Pakistan Air Force. It is not only used for VVIP movements and military transport, but Pakistan's air-tankers and squadrons are also deployed here. Also, this airbase is located very close to Pakistan's nuclear command, that is, this airbase is just a few kilometers away from the headquarters of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and Pakistan's nuclear command center is also located a little distance from here.
