Donald Trump praises Grant Forrest for 'brilliant' win on Trump-owned course
It was the second time Forrest, a 32-year-old Scot, enjoyed a professional title success on home soil, with his victory on the Trump International Golf Links coming almost four years to the day since he won his maiden European Tour title at St. Andrews.
Forrest held a three-shot lead heading into Sunday's final round and maintained control in windy conditions in Aberdeen.
Trump, who recently spent five days in Scotland, playing golf and sealing a major trade deal with the European Union, was among the first to congratulate Forrest on his victory in a FaceTime call.
"I watched it ... he's some player," Trump said in the call, which was shared on X by the European Tour.
"I look forward to playing with him — in fact I will play with him tomorrow (Monday) if he could get on a plane.
"What a round of golf. What three rounds of brilliant golf. It's a great honor you won, thank you very much."
Forrest's advantage was briefly cut to two strokes following Todd Clements' birdie on the opening hole.
But when Forrest birdied the fourth, and Clements carded a triple-bogey at the same hole, the Scot led by five shots.
Forrest, the world No. 294, double-bogeyed the last hole, but by then he had added two more birdies and a dropped shot in a closing 72 to finish with an 8-under-par total.
"It's amazing, just speechless," Forrest said. "I think it is the same week as I won four years ago on the calendar so just amazing, that must say something about this week and being at home.
"I just can't believe it. It's been such a tough year on the golf course. It's just a crazy game that you can go and come out and do this, with what feels out of nowhere.
"It's just that old chestnut that one week can turn things around and it has."
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