Damascus between the Druze, Alawites and Kurds

Arab News

3 days ago

https://arab.news/jaeba
It is true that Bashar Assad left the palace on the evening of Saturday, Dec. 7, and that Ahmad Al-Sharaa entered it the next day without a single shot being fired in the capital. This is a rare occurrence in history. Even so, the road ahead for the new leadership is neither paved nor smooth.
The road to change from Idlib to Damascus was open because most Syrians — as well as regional and global actors — truly wanted change.
But the actual uprooting of the Assad regime was a long and bloody process — perhaps one of the most complex transitions in the region. From this standpoint, we must interpret the current events within this context, rather than as a mere 'moment of victory.'
Optimism, enthusiasm and widespread support did not prevent political unrest: confrontations on the coast with Alawites, the bombing of a Christian church in Damascus and disputes with the Druze of Sweida and with the Syrian Democratic Forces in Raqqa. The crises that have already occurred — and those that may still come — are expected. The domestic consensus to remove Assad means the alternative system will need time to build trust. There is also a troubled regional environment, with actors harmed by the transition who will need time to test the waters, accept the new reality and choose to cooperate.
Amid these local confrontations, two dangerous factions threaten the new order. The first includes actors that are overtly hostile — such as remnants of the old regime, forces in Iran and local gangs like drug cartels.
The domestic consensus to remove Assad means the alternative system will need time to build trust
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
These groups will repeatedly try to create a confrontational climate that escalates over time. They aim to shrink Syria, entangle Damascus in a prolonged battle and encourage the emergence of independent regions.
The second faction comes from within the system — or considers itself part of it — and plays a role in fueling crises. It has its own views on how the country should be governed and how it should engage with the world. Though loyal, this faction is no less dangerous than the hostile one, because it ignites conflicts and deepens divisions. Its threat lies in dragging the Syrian authority into a confrontation with the regional order and inviting foreign powers to invest in a local civil war.
These traps require wisdom in handling so that they do not distract the government from its most difficult task: building a new state that most Syrians are waiting for — one that improves living standards and transitions into a modern nation.
Al-Sharaa has domestic popularity that he must strengthen, lest it erode under the weight of looming challenges — most notably, bread shortages, inflation, low wages and delays in foreign aid. These are challenges unrelated to Iran or the regime's remnants. They are compounded by the need to extinguish growing social strife, which risks becoming a civil war. Those engaged in this strife — whether in the name of freedoms or defending (or opposing) the regime — are stoking tensions among Syria's deeply anxious and mistrustful communities.
The international community wants a civil state that manages a disciplined security and military apparatus. The new Damascus government needs time to organize itself and win over Syria's diverse groups. Let us remember that Hafez Assad, while presenting himself as a protector of minorities, placed Abdul Halim Khaddam and Mustafa Tlass at his right and left.
There are also forces in the region that have failed to establish extremist regimes — and now want Syria to become another Gaza or Afghanistan.
The new Damascus government needs time to organize itself and win over Syria's diverse groups
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
Upon entering the capital, Al-Sharaa immediately announced his openness to all, stressing that his concern is Syrian — not international. He displayed a moderation that surprised many and he has managed his relationships pragmatically, consistent with his promises.
That is why Syria will not follow the Iranian model — which is now nearing its end — nor should it fight on behalf of others, whether against Israel or Iran. Nor should it allow others to bring their wars onto Syrian soil.
Amid these ethnic, sectarian and regional tensions, the road will remain difficult. The government has inherited a devastated country violated by both domestic and foreign forces. Fixing it will require political skill — not brute force — and a sixth sense that can anticipate crises and contain them.