IFP and EFF condemn assassination of parliament representative
The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) have condemned the brutal killing of the IFP's Member of Parliament Khethamabala Petros Sithole, who was allegedly assassinated in Katlehong, Gauteng on Saturday evening.
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The IFP and EFF have condemned the killing of the IFP's Member of Parliament Khethamabala Petros Sithole, who was allegedly assassinated in Katlehong, Gauteng on Saturday evening.
IFP national spokesperson Mkhuleko Hlengwa described the murder of the 68-year-old as shocking and devastating.
"It is with shock, sadness, and utter grief that the IFP announces the untimely passing of Mr Sithole, who was assassinated by unknown assailants. The Honourable KP Sithole was a member of the IFP's National Council and served as the Party's Deputy Chief Whip in Parliament."
While details of his murder are still sketchy at the moment, the EFF in Gauteng through its provincial chairperson, Nkululeko Dunga also voiced its condemnation of the murder.
"The EFF in Gauteng extend our heartfelt condolences to the family, friends, and comrades of the IFP following the tragic and senseless Murder of Hon. Khethamabala Petros 'KP' Sithole MP. "Sithole, who was the IFP Deputy Chief Whip in Parliament, was gunned down in Katlehong on Gauteng's East Rand on Saturday evening. And in the same incident the Provincial Secretary of the IFP Alco Ngobese was shot and sustained injuries, and we wish him a speedy recovery.
"The IFP has classified this tragic incident as an act of assassination which might be politically motivated. Political killings are unacceptable and undermine our democracy. We therefore condemn all acts of political violence and urge all parties to show maximum tolerance and respect for opposing views. Democracy must be built on peace, not violence," Dunga said.
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Hlengwa described Sithole as a hardworking servant of the people.
"We have lost a trusted patriot and a diligent leader of the IFP who joined the IFP in his youth and served in various party structures including being IFP Gauteng provincial chairperson," he said.
Sithole also served as a Councilor in Ekurhuleni and thereafter served a brief stint in the Gauteng Legislature from 2009 to 2010. He was redeployed to the National Assembly in 2010.
"The IFP is poorer today with Jobe's (Sithole) passing and South Africa has lost a good man who served his country par excellence," Hlengwa added.
According to Gauteng police spokesperson, Colonel Dimakatso Nevhuhulwi it is reported that Sithole was killed after a group of unknown men had a meeting at the Buyafuthi Hostel in Katehong on Saturday.
"At about 5.30pm, three unknown men passing by the meeting opened fire on the group. One person was declared dead on scene the while two more people were taken to hospital with gunshot injuries. One of the two injured was treated and discharged while the other one is still in hospital. The motive of the shooting is unknown at this stage, and no one has been arrested," said Nevhuhulwi.
siyabonga.sithole@inl.co.za
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He said Mbulelo Goniwe would testify. 'He was a comrade of the Cradock Four and survived the assassination by the mercy of God,' said Ngcukaitobi. 'Perhaps to remind the country not to forget the story of apartheid and its brutality.' He said the four men were not only leaders of a generation of activists but also teachers, organisers, fathers and husbands. 'One should not analyse this as a political fight with little emphasis on the personal side of the loss,' he said. 'We will ask for recommendations by the judge for reparations,' he said, adding that these should be broad, as the deaths of the four men were a traumatic event for the entire community. He said Deputy Defence Minister Bantu Holomisa, the former chairperson of the Military Council in the Transkei, would also testify. Counsel for some of the former police officers, Jaap Cilliers SC, said this was an emotional inquest and his clients would cooperate as 'fully as possible'. Poor health Referring to the former military commander Van der Westhuizen, Varney said: 'His legal representative has disclosed that he is in poor health. An attempt to take his evidence on commission has been stymied because the SANDF refuses to pay his legal costs.' Van der Westhuizen's attorney Ryan Roos said the SANDF believed his client acted outside the scope of his official duties and therefore refused to fund his legal defence. Although the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court directed that the SANDF decision be reviewed urgently, the Gauteng Division of the High Court dismissed the review as not urgent, meaning it will take months to be heard. Van der Westhuizen's counsel, advocate Marius van Zyl, said his client would deny authorising the killing of the Cradock Four. According to Varney's opening address, on 7 June 1985, Major-General J Frederick Johannes van Rensburg of the State Security Council phoned Van der Westhuizen to discuss Matthew Goniwe. 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Varney said, 'This inquest is probably the very last chance that the families will get to reach a semblance of closure. They deserve nothing less than a full and comprehensive accounting of the past.' DM
