'State Can't Object When Families Agree': SC Grants Bail To Man Jailed For Interfaith Marriage
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Aman Siddiqui had been in jail for nearly six months after being booked under the Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion Act
The Supreme Court of India has granted bail to a man who was arrested under Uttarakhand's anti-conversion law after he married a woman of a different faith with the full consent of both families.
Aman Siddiqui had been in jail for nearly six months after being booked under the Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion Act. He was accused of religious conversion through marriage, even though the marriage was consensual and supported by both families.
In a ruling delivered on 19 May, a Supreme Court bench of Justices BV Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma observed that the state cannot object to the couple's decision to live together as their marriage was voluntary and had the approval of their respective parents, Bar and Bench reported.
'We observe that the respondent – State cannot have any objection to the appellant and his wife residing together inasmuch as they have been married as per the wishes to their respective parents and families. In the circumstances, we find that this is an appropriate case where the relief of bail ought to be granted to the appellant herein," the Court said.
Siddiqui was charged under Sections 3 and 5 of the Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion Act, which prohibit and penalise religious conversion through force, fraud, or inducement. He was also booked under Sections 318(4) and 319 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which relate to cheating and impersonation.
He had initially sought bail from the Uttarakhand High Court, but it was denied. He then approached the Supreme Court, where his lawyer argued that the case was baseless and filed solely due to the interfaith nature of the marriage, which in fact had the consent of both families. The counsel also pointed out that the chargesheet had already been filed and that Siddiqui had spent almost half a year in custody.
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