What is China's ‘Early Harvest' Proposal for Border Talks That Modi Govt Has Now Conceded?

The Wire

16 hours ago

This decision represents a fundamental departure from India's long-standing position that the border dispute must be resolved as a comprehensive package deal, as established in the 2005 Political Parameters and Guiding Principles.
New Delhi: The Modi government's decision to agree to establish an expert group for exploring China's 'early harvest' proposal in the recent India-China Special Representatives talks represents a reversal of India's longstanding position that betrays decades of careful diplomacy and strategic thinking.
This concession – to explore fast-tracking a settlement of the India-China boundary in the Sikkim region – comes at a time when China has been systematically using the border dispute as leverage while offering cosmetic solutions that primarily benefit Beijing's strategic objectives.
What are the origins and evolution of China's 'Early Harvest' proposal?
Even though the 'early harvest' in Sikkim idea had been broached by Beijing with Indian officials earlier, it first surfaced publicly in 2017 when Chinese Ambassador Luo Zhaohui cryptically mentioned it during a think tank event at New Delhi. This was a couple of months before the 2017 Doklam standoff, when Indian soldiers had crossed from Sikkim into Bhutan to stop the Chinese from constructing a road to the sensitive Jhampheri ridge. 'Early harvest' involves exclusively settling the boundary in Sikkim –a proposal which the then foreign minister Sushma Swaraj had described as the Chinese equivalent of saying a 'low-hanging fruit'. This would separate the Sikkim boundary from the three other sectors on the disputed Sino-India border: western, middle and eastern.
Chinese military analyst senior colonel Zhao Xiaozhou later clarified in 2017 that the proposal essentially sought to replace the 1890 Great Britain-China convention with a new agreement signed directly between China and India. 'For China, early harvest means, we want to have a new agreement with India, because the 1890 convention was signed between Great Britain and China,' he explained, adding that China wanted to 'start from the easiest, that is what we call early harvest' in the Sikkim sector. China formally submitted these proposals to external affairs minister S. Jaishankar during his meeting with Wang Yi in Beijing in August 2019.
After the 22nd dialogue of the Special Representatives on the boundary issue between Ajit Doval and Wang Yi in New Delhi in December 2019, the Chinese statement on the talks said the two sides should 'promote early harvest consultations'. There was no mention of such proposals in the statement from the Indian side. New Delhi instead linked the proposal to the simultaneous demarcation of the middle sector in Uttarakhand, in line with the 2005 agreement.
What has been India's historical resistance to the proposal? What are its strategic concerns?
For years, India consistently rejected China's 'early harvest' approach, recognizing it as a strategic trap. In 2019, former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal articulated the core problem:
'China's early harvest proposal violates the 2005 agreement on the guidelines and parameters for resolving the boundary issue as it clearly says that it has to be a package deal. This is the usual Chinese way of walking out of agreements. This early harvest proposal relates to the Sikkim border which is the only one which is settled. So where is the early harvest for India in this? On the contrary, China will seek to settle the tri-junction in its favour through this proposal which is unacceptable. Is China ready to accept tri-junction as per the Indian position?'
Indian officials recognised that the Sikkim proposal was 'not so simple, as any Indian agreement on demarcation will be used by Beijing to settle the boundary with Bhutan with an eye towards the Doklam plateau'. A former Indian Army chief warned that "if India settles Sikkim, where it dominates both Chumbi Valley and Finger Area up in the north, then China will expand its Chumbi Valley area and increase pressure on the Siliguri corridor in West Bengal".
The strategic concern was that settling the Sikkim border would directly impact the India-China-Bhutan trijunction at Batang La, potentially allowing China to extend its reach to the Jhampheri ridge, from where "the entire Siliguri corridor becomes extremely vulnerable to the PLA. The lights of Gangtok are visible from Jhampheri ridge," as one China expert noted.
Why has the Modi government conceded now?
Despite years of principled resistance, the August 19, 2025 MEA statement reveals a dramatic policy reversal.
The Modi government has now agreed to 'Setting up an Expert Group, under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC), to explore Early Harvest in boundary delimitation in the India-China border areas'. In the statement issued after Wang Yi's meeting with Modi, the Chinese side said that 'on the boundary issue, new consensus was reached on… initiating boundary demarcation negotiations in areas where conditions are met'.
This U-turn by the Modi government appears driven by multiple pressure points. Trump's tariff war against India, imposing 50% tariffs on Indian goods and threatening further penalties over Russian oil purchases, has made India more vulnerable to China. The Modi government appears keen to seek friendly ties with China, at Beijing's own terms, despite the obvious strategic risks. Indian officials claim that China has reportedly promised to address India's concerns regarding rare earths, fertilisers and tunnel boring machines. None of these have figured in any of the official statements but these economic carrots, essentially reversing the coercive actions taken by Beijing, have led to a major strategic concession by the Modi government.
What are the strategic risks of this concession?
This decision represents a fundamental departure from India's long-standing position that the border dispute must be resolved as a comprehensive package deal, as established in the 2005 Political Parameters and Guiding Principles. By agreeing to explore 'early harvest' options, the Modi government has legitimised China's piecemeal approach that violates this foundational principle.
The move is particularly dangerous given China's expanding claims against Bhutan, including new territorial demands in the eastern part of the Himalayan kingdom that emerged around 2020. Any resolution of the Sikkim sector boundary without addressing these broader strategic concerns will only embolden China's aggressive posture toward India's Himalayan neighbours, security experts feel.
Moreover, the agreement comes at a time when China has been systematically strengthening its border infrastructure and military capabilities. The PLA has established itself firmly in the Doklam plateau and explored alternative routes to reach the Jhampheri ridge. The PLA's enhanced capabilities, and increasing superiority over India, make any territorial concessions even more strategically problematic.
To conclude, the Modi government's decision to explore China's 'early harvest' proposal represents a dangerous precedent that abandons decades of careful strategic thinking for short-term economic and political relief. By legitimising China's divide-and-conquer approach to the border dispute, the Modi government has weakened India's negotiating position and potentially compromised the strategic interests. There is no 'early harvest' for India in this arrangement, only a reversal of its longstanding policy disguised as diplomatic progress.
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