Letters to The Editor — July 26, 2025
At a time when the global economic architecture is in the throes of stress in the wake of arbitrary, impulsive and imperious salvos of fiats fired by the Trump administration, the comprehensive trade agreement between India and the United Kingdom is fresh air (Front page, 'India, U.K. ink trade deal, extend framework of ties', July 25). This pact should be used as a template for similar pacts with other countries such as the United States as well as the European Union.
Ravi Mathur,
Noida, Uttar Pradesh
Thailand vs Cambodia
It is shocking that there is a flare-up in Southeast Asia, between Thailand and Cambodia. In a world that is weary of conflicts, the earlier this faceoff is resolved the better it is.
R. Sampath,
Chennai
Dealing with China
India should exercise extreme caution in dealing with China. Seemingly peaceful gestures should not lead to a Trojan horse moment for India. China's plan for a dam in Tibet will give it significant leverage in dealing with India. New Delhi must be very alert.
Britto S.,
Sivagangai, Tamil Nadu
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The Print
28 minutes ago
- The Print
Buying Russian oil, misreading Trump—3 points will define India's next energy strategy
While public commentary has focused heavily on Trump, tariffs, and New Delhi's indignation, the more pressing task is to interrogate the rationale behind these choices. That balance is now under pressure from Donald Trump's 50 per cent tariff offensive, aimed selectively at India and leaving little ambiguity about his objectives—and in Trump's world, what he wants, he usually gets. Yet the national debate has taken too many assumptions for granted. It is worth applying a deconstruction approach to India's famous oil bargains with Russia—a decision once hailed as tactical brilliance, but one now risking entanglement in overlapping economic and diplomatic challenges. India's crude oil trade has evolved from a purely economic exchange into both a geopolitical test of strategic autonomy and a measure of the constraints in its energy policy. Over the past three years, India has gone from being a marginal buyer of Russian crude to one of its largest importers, carefully balancing ties with the US, Europe, and shifting global energy markets. To navigate the road ahead, India must revisit three fundamentals: why it embraced Russian oil, how it misread Trump's European recalibration, and where future India–Russia energy engagement should head. Clarity on these three points may well define the next chapter of India's energy strategy. Also read: Trump tariff forces India to shed illusion. Stop conflating status with power 50 shades of discounts Despite close political ties and deep defence cooperation, India and Russia were never bound by energy dependence. Even with India's heavy reliance on imports—currently 88 per cent of its daily crude requirement of 5.5 million barrels—its primary suppliers have traditionally been Gulf countries. The earlier chapter of India capitulating to Trump 1.0's sanctions on Iran and Venezuela is well known; today, however, the challenge is starker. Russia entered India's energy equation only after the geopolitical earthquake of President Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine. That act shattered the European order painstakingly built since the Second World War and crystallised after the Soviet Union's collapse. Central to this upheaval was Putin's weaponisation of energy: Europe's decades-long dependence on cheap Russian oil and gas became a vulnerability. In response, Europe diversified away from Russia, while the G7 imposed a $60 per-barrel price cap on Russian crude in December 2022. The logic was clear: as one of the world's top three oil producers, Russia could not be cut off overnight. The aim was instead to squeeze Moscow's revenues, which were funding its war machine, while keeping prices stable and securing alternative supplies for Europe. India saw opportunity in this upheaval. With vast import needs, it began rerouting Russian oil at supposedly lower prices, rejecting G7 sanctions and arranging direct and indirect deals through intermediaries. Early reports spoke of a 'free on board' discount of 30 per cent, though never confirmed. Brent crude fell from $86.51 in January 2022 to $80.92 in December, peaking briefly at about $90 in June 2023 before sliding again. While some credit India's purchases with stabilising prices, Russian oil for India almost always remained above the $60 price cap. The critical question is whether India ever bought below that threshold. Reports suggest an average discount of only $5 per barrel—hardly transformative—and potentially offset by hidden costs and middlemen's surcharges. Even so, large volumes (peaking at over 2 million barrels per day before dropping to 1.5 million) meant cumulative savings. But if cheap oil was the goal, why not join or informally align with the price cap, securing crude closer to $60 without the complications of shadow fleets and sanctions risks? In July 2025, the EU lowered the cap to about $47 while Brent traded around $65. This offered another opportunity for cheaper imports, yet India stayed outside the framework, maintaining minimal discounts and ultimately seeing one of its companies sanctioned—for 'strategic autonomy.' Government claims of passing benefits to consumers are unconvincing: petrol prices hit Rs 105 per litre in 2025 versus Rs 95 in 2022. Recent relief correlates more with global declines—12 per cent over the past six months—than with Russian discounts. Savings estimates of $25 billion are offset by projections of $9–10 billion in potential losses if imports shift away from Russia, and much of the gain may reflect global oversupply rather than uniquely favourable Russian terms. From a taxpayer's perspective, why not secure far greater savings by pressing Moscow for prices nearer the cap while sustaining high volumes? This would have preserved strategic autonomy while serving economic logic. Instead, India paid more, absorbed sanctions, and missed chances for deeper cost benefits. Now Trump's 50 per cent tariffs on India are unrelated to the EU's cap. His pivot on Ukraine has hardened US demands that India halt Russian oil imports—demands not pressed on others—hurting New Delhi disproportionately. The real question is why Trump would take such a stance toward a strategic partner his administration once called an ally. Also read: Trump is treating diplomacy like a failed casino deal Misreading Trump's re-pivot to Europe When Donald Trump returned to the White House, India was smug. His criticism of Europe, mocking remarks about Denmark and Canada, and public praise for Putin—especially his Oval Office dressing-down of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy—were interpreted in New Delhi as vindication: India stood to benefit from a US policy shift toward Russia. At first, the bilateral climate looked promising. The Trump administration's rhetoric suggested the Indo-Pacific would be his main strategic theatre. Anticipated friction over India's protectionism and trade deficit was being managed, with both sides pursuing a deal. Public displays of camaraderie continued—until 'Operation Sindoor.' That alone, however, was not the turning point. Trump's push to end the war in Ukraine faltered despite carrots for Russia and sticks for Ukraine. In fact, Russian attacks on Ukraine have doubled since Trump took charge in January. Frustrated, he shifted tone, endorsing the Lindsey–Blumenthal bill to sanction countries buying Russian oil, a measure with strong Senate backing. Simultaneously, the April 2 'Liberation Day' tariffs targeted nations with trade deficits with the US, India among them. Trump re-engaged with Europe, supplying Ukraine with weapons and extracting costly commitments: 5 per cent of GDP on defence, a trade deal with 15 per cent tariffs, and pledges of about $600 billion in US investment. Japan followed with similar concessions. Meanwhile, Trump prematurely claimed to have mediated Operation Sindoor, clashing with India's account. The fallout strained personal communication between Modi and Trump—tensions that might have been eased with a symbolic 'thank you' or diplomatic courtesy for facilitating the 'ceasefire.' Also read: India's export basket has no irreplaceables. It's a vulnerability in Trump's power politics What next for India and Russia Now, as India's NSA Ajit Doval visits Moscow in a show of solidarity, the moment calls for more than optics. Three issues must shape discussions with Russia: First — Payments. Confusion surrounds the currency used in the oil trade. The rupee–ruble mechanism has stalled, with billions of rupees stuck in Russian accounts. Russia's war economy leaves little incentive to reinvest in India despite earlier promises. Payments in dirhams have become harder after UAE banks shut Russian accounts under US pressure, and India hardly holds dirham reserves. Yuan payments are strategically risky for India, and gold settlements are not yet viable. Trade experts must directly address these bottlenecks. Second — Discounts. India avoided joining the sanctions regime, yet the discounts it received rarely justified the political and economic risks. With Russian imports already being cut and US crude purchases jumping 51 per cent in days, it is clear the 'discounted' oil was not cheap enough to offset sanctions or tariffs. Russia should now match its discounts to the new $47 price cap for ongoing purchases. Third — Parity with China. China remains Russia's largest energy buyer and reportedly enjoys deeper discounts. India must demand equal treatment for its remaining purchases. The stakes are high: India–US trade totals $212 billion, with $85 billion in Indian exports—40 per cent still exempt from tariffs. Finding workarounds while pursuing overdue structural reforms is essential. Strategic autonomy must be anchored in economic logic, ensuring national interest prevails over symbolic defiance—before multipolarity turns into 'messier-polarity.' Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal. (Edited by Prashant)
Time of India
28 minutes ago
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'Hey Bibi, Stop Lying': Trump YELLS At Netanyahu In Heated Phone Call Over Gaza Starvation
/ Aug 08, 2025, 03:25PM IST Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump had a heated phone call over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The argument followed Netanyahu's claim denying starvation in Gaza, which Trump publicly rejected, insisting children were starving. During the call, Trump reportedly shouted at Netanyahu, demanding the issue not be dismissed as fake news. NBC News revealed the details, citing unnamed senior US officials. Both the White House and Israeli officials declined to comment. The exchange highlights growing tensions between the two leaders amid worsening conditions in Gaza and ongoing debates over humanitarian aid.#Netanyahu #Trump #GazaCrisis #HumanitarianCrisis #Gaza #Israel #USPolitics #BreakingNews #MiddleEast #Conflict
Hindustan Times
28 minutes ago
- Hindustan Times
Trump's Biggest Economic Threat Is Inflation
You can't go wrong assuming President Trump is trying to create a diversion. So it is with last week's kerfuffle over jobs data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics after a round of embarrassing numbers. Unemployment isn't the threat to his grand tariff project. Inflation is the killer, and it may prove to be a silent one. Americans have learned more since last Friday than they ever wanted to about the BLS. Mr. Trump fired the economist who ran this section of the Labor Department, Erika McEntarfer, after BLS released a jobs report purporting to disclose an unseemly drop in manufacturing employment last month. Mr. Trump says the BLS routinely politicizes its data releases to help Democrats. The real problem is that the BLS and other government agencies now routinely struggle to collect any data at all—as my colleague Allysia Finley noted earlier this week. Whatever we know about an economy as dynamic and complex as America's, we learn through surveys and extrapolation. These are hostage first to bureaucrats' sagacity in asking the right questions, and second to households' and businesses' willingness to answer—all of which increasingly are breaking down. Which brings us to inflation. This is the great vulnerability in Mr. Trump's trade ambitions. The only thing he has an unambiguous electoral mandate to do is to reverse the slide in living standards from Biden-era inflation. Yet his tariff policies work, if they work at all, by increasing prices and suppressing consumption. Hence the relief among Mr. Trump's supporters that inflation data so far are subdued. The most recent monthly reading of the consumer price index reported higher-than-desirable inflation year to year, especially the 2.7% increase in prices this June compared with a year ago. But the month-to-month increase, at 0.3%, wasn't so great as to raise alarms. That counts as a win. Part of the explanation is that many of Mr. Trump's biggest tariff threats haven't been implemented (yet). But there's another possibility, which should concern the president: Official inflation data may not capture the consequences of the tariffs. Mr. Trump's first problem is the definition at use. Economists speaking of inflation have prices' rate of change in a given period in mind. Voters care more about the level of prices they must pay. The inflation rate may slow, but households keep feeling the burn up until the moment their wages rise to match the new price level. This is why it's economically correct but politically irrelevant to say that Mr. Trump's tariffs won't prove inflationary because at worst they'll trigger a one-off bump in the price level. A single cost increase still hits voters' wallets. If Mr. Trump hasn't boosted the standard of living (as represented by real wages) before the next election, Republicans will pay. Worse, inflation data are as prone to error as any other economic statistic. The more popular inflation measure, the consumer price index, is based on a basket of goods meant to represent the typical household. But there's no such thing as 'typical' in the real world. Two families that live next door to each other can have wildly varying experiences of inflation based on what they normally buy. The neighbor who loves coffee or needs a new car in the next year will feel the sting of protectionism more. Complicating matters, the CPI isn't the end-all-be-all of inflation data. There are other measures. The Federal Reserve prefers the personal consumption expenditure index. The PCE will tend to understate any inflationary consequences of Mr. Trump's tariffs, economist Mickey Levy tells me, because this measure adapts to households' substitutions as their preferred products become more expensive. This statistic might still show muted inflation but mask households' sense that they're worse off since they can't afford the brands they'd normally buy. A much less heralded inflation measure could prove the most consequential for Mr. Trump's trade politics: the producer price index. This captures prices for the components and materials businesses use, many of which are imports hit hard by his tariffs. Key to the president's claim that someone other than consumers will pay for the tariffs is the assumption that businesses will eat the additional costs. But if escalating producer prices stymie new investment, voters will notice soon enough as wage growth stalls. By the way, Mr. Trump may get little warning in the data before he's hit political disaster because the PPI series is prone to the same survey problems as most other government statistics. It's enough to make you suspect the single most important data point about trade has been in front of our eyes the whole time—that for decades successive administrations of varying ideologies tried to reduce trade barriers. Mr. Trump's supporters present this as an elite conspiracy, but maybe, just maybe, it's a signal that free trade actually delivered economic gains for many households. The president has chosen to upset that consensus. Unfortunately for him, he probably won't get clear economic data until the midterm election results.
