‘Be very realistic': Defence expert on the new world order – and Indonesia's rise

The Age

28-05-2025

It's hard to overstate Hugh White's standing on issues related to Australia's national security. An emeritus professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University, White is the author of The China Choice (2012) and How to Defend Australia (2019). He was principal author of Australia's 2000 Defence White Paper, and since then has borne witness to the astonishing rise of China and the biggest shift in geopolitical power in more than 80 years.
Since the end of World War II, Australia has basked in the security blanket of our large and powerful friend, the United States. Is that era now over? Yes it is, and not just because of Donald Trump. It is because we are living through a truly fundamental and historic shift in the ­pattern of world power. We have been able to rely on America for so long because it has been by far the strongest country in the world, and stronger by a huge margin than any country in Asia. But that is not true any more. We live in a multipolar world where several countries have great power – China of course, but also India and, before long, Indonesia, too. America no longer has the overwhelming power to keep our region stable and Australia safe.
So, are we clinging to an alliance with the US now greatly weakened? Yes. We still think America can protect us from China today, just as it did when its ­economy was 20 times the size of China's. In fact, we're now depending on America more and more to keep China in check as it becomes less and less able to do so.
Back in February, three Chinese warships entered the Tasman Sea for the first time and conducted live-fire drills. Do you see this as a message from the Chinese government about the might and reach of its navy, now the world's biggest? It certainly was a big message from Beijing! I think the Chinese wanted to remind us that they are now a great power with real maritime reach. The Western Pacific is not an American lake any more.
Our leaders were low-key in their reaction and response. Did they get this right? Yes, they were right not to make a bigger fuss than they did. The Chinese naval deployment was legal under international law, and posed no threat to Australia. But it was a sign of the changing strategic realities that we'd be ­foolish to ignore.
With the election of Donald Trump, the United States is showing signs that it's no longer serious about protecting the Western Pacific …
Trump is turbocharging the underlying shift in economic and military power away from America. He is an isolationist who wants America to step back from global leadership, and is happy to accommodate the ambitions of China and Russia.
It's bigger than Trump now, isn't it, with American voters' support for America First, for isolationism and for rejecting the old idea of US global leadership? Absolutely. America's policy elite – what Trump calls the 'Washington Swamp' – is still in love with the idea of US primacy. But US voters agree with Trump. They do not want to carry the costs and risks of global leadership, including the risk of nuclear war, when in ­today's multipolar world they can remain ­perfectly secure as the dominant power in their own western hemisphere.
Were you surprised when Trump didn't even know what AUKUS was?
Not at all. AUKUS is not Trump's idea of a good deal. He would love the idea of us ­sending America a lot of money, but he won't like the idea of them sending us any of their precious nuclear subs in return. And, more broadly, he'd rather America became less ­entangled with allies like Australia, rather than more entangled.
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So could we regard AUKUS as the perfect symbol of our failure to respond to a changed world? With the rise of powers like China, India and Indonesia, we are living through one of the biggest shifts in international ­strategic setting in our history. For the first time since European settlement, Asia can no longer be dominated by outside powers like America. But AUKUS pretends this is not ­happening. It is all about locking in US support by backing America all the way against China. That is why Washington calls it a ­'strategic marriage' between America and Australia. Our leaders want this because they do not believe Australia can make its own way in Asia. But they are wrong about that. Instead of clinging to America through AUKUS, they should be equipping Australia to make its own way in an Asia no longer dominated and made safe for us by US power.
The keystone of AUKUS is the plan to buy eight nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). But these are 30 years off. Won't we need this deterrence far sooner? That's right. Even if trying to deter China's challenge made sense, AUKUS would not help. If the subs are ever delivered, which I doubt, they would arrive far too late and in numbers too small to make a difference. Though the first sub is supposed to arrive in the mid-2030s, we would not have an operationally ­viable nuclear submarine force until 2050 at the earliest. That is far too late to make any difference to the contest that is under way with China right now.
'China will face other strong powers to balance and limit its power, including Indonesia, Japan and Russia.'
The only way that China could be deterred is if US forces in the Western Pacific were ­massively increased, but the opposite is happening, right? Exactly. The reality is that for all Joe Biden's tough talk, successive US administrations have allowed America's military strength in Asia to be eclipsed by the remarkable growth of China's air and naval forces. Even noted 'China hawks' in Washington now acknowledge that America cannot win a war with China over Taiwan any more. That makes nonsense of all the talk of deterring China.
What would the Pacific region – and our strategic position – look like without a ­reasonably benevolent and dependable United States? Many people fear that if America steps back from leadership in Asia, the whole region would be oppressed by an all-powerful China. But that will not happen. In today's multipolar world, China will face other strong powers to balance and limit its power, including Indonesia, Japan and Russia. Australia will sit on the boundary between Chinese and Indian spheres of influence, and if we are smart, we will keep a balance between them so that ­neither becomes too dominant.
We will be put into a horrible spot if China invades Taiwan and the US decides to go to war to protect it. Even if we don't join the war, wouldn't the defence infrastructure in northern Australia make us a target? Australia today is hosting US combat forces on our soil for the first time since World War II, and those forces are plainly directed at China. In a war over Taiwan, they would be an ­obvious target. This is a big issue which the government really needs to explain frankly.
Even if a military conflict is avoided, could any future Australian government be under pressure by an all-powerful China to introduce things like unlimited investment in Australia and immigration? Like all great powers, China will throw its weight around. We must learn to manage that as best we can, as middle-size powers have ­always had to do. Working with neighbouring countries will be key to that. And, as the last resort, we will need to be able to resist military pressure independently. That is a big challenge, but not impossible. And anyway, we have no choice because those big tides of ­history mean there is no way we can keep sheltering behind US power.
Are we much more exposed than, say, Europe, which has the European Union and NATO to defend itself? Like us, the Europeans can no longer rely on America, but they can use the EU and NATO as foundations for a strong European strategic identity. We have nothing like that in Asia, so we will be much more on our own, and will have to build new strategic connections with our neighbours from a much lower base.
You've written that in the future, it will no longer be militarily impossible for China to attack Australia directly. And not just China, but other major regional powers, such as Indonesia. China poses no direct military threat to Australia today unless we join America in a US-China war. But China, like other great powers, will be more able to attack Australia directly in future when the US is no longer here to protect us. The chances of them doing so are still low, but we do have to think ­carefully about how we could defend ourselves independently. We have never really done that before, and it is time we did.
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We have a new defence agreement with Indonesia but despite this, in November last year Indonesia and Russia had their first-ever bilateral naval exercise together in the Java Sea. How do we interpret this? We need to be very realistic about Indonesia. If we play our cards right, it can be a useful partner, but it will not be a close ally. It will always remain 'non-aligned', and will never side with America against China or Russia. We need to accept that, and perhaps learn from it.
It's clear that Indonesia doesn't see Russia or China as the threats we do. Is that right? Absolutely. Indonesians have a very different view of the world from Australia's. They are used to making their way without allies. They do not divide the world into friends and enemies but assess all countries as both potential problems and potential opportunities, and aim to make the best of them.
During the election campaign, our drastically altered national security picture ­barely received a mention by both sides of politics, except for some talk about ­increased defence spending. Isn't it time for our political leaders to be frank with the Australian people about our changed security position in the world? This is a real problem. Both major parties say that we are facing our gravest strategic ­dangers since World War II, but neither side is willing to explain why that is, or do anything serious about it. They talk about more defence spending but cannot say what our forces must be able to do and what capabilities they need. We will not begin to adapt effectively to this truly historic shift in Australia's place in the world until our leaders have the courage to acknowledge that the old era of alliance ­dependence is over, and explain how we can make our way in Asia by ourselves. Because like it or not, that is what we have to do.