
General YouTube: Germany's newest military chief is a warlord of his own Ukraine-cheering fantasyland
But this time is different: Recent changes at the German Ministry of Defense matter, if in a disturbing way. Berlin's energetic, ambitious, popular, and resolutely narrow-minded minister of defense Boris Pistorius has just made some high-level personnel moves.
By far the single most politically significant of Pistorius' new appointments is that of Major-General Christian Freuding as the new 'Heeresinspekteur,' the head the land forces (in German: Heer), that is, the army in the strict sense of the term. This is a position of major influence because of the structure of Germany's military and current rearmament plans, both with a key role for the army. Formally, Freuding has not (yet) scored the highest possible military rank. That would be the 'Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr,' responsible for all four current service branches (army, navy, air force, and the new cyber and information units).
But, in reality, Freuding may well already have more political influence than any other German officer. This is due to two factors: Freuding clearly is a favorite of Pistorius. Indeed, his predecessor, General Alfons Mais, was not. Ironically, Mais was no less Russophobic than the worst of them. His bizarre, simplistic, and stereotyped views of Russia as a country that doesn't care about its casualties are now most welcome in Germany (again). But Mais also could be 'inconvenient': Instead of meekly waiting for the politicians to get debt-driven rearmament into economy-draining overdrive, this soldier had a habit of complaining about the wait and making demands.
That is one reason Mais is out and Freuding is in. Freuding is a driven as well as rapidly advancing careerist who already served as adjutant to Ursula von der Leyen in those good old days when she was still only devastating the German political landscape. He clearly knows how not to antagonize but please his superiors.
One way in which Freuding pleases Pistorius – and virtually the whole German political and mainstream media establishment – is that he is a perfect hardliner with respect to Russia in general and, in particular, when it comes to the West's proxy war against the latter via Ukraine. That has also made him a perfect fit to lead both a new, centralized Defense Ministry planning and coordination body established in 2023 and, at the same time, a special office busy, in essence, with pumping arms into Ukraine.
Yet Freuding is not just any die-hard bellicist. He also serves as a dis/information warrior in a class of his own. That's why German mainstream media call him a 'social-media star' and 'the YouTube General' who went 'viral.' Apart from Freuding's presence on traditional TV, there are his frequent appearances on the German military's YouTube channel which score hundreds of thousands of views, occasionally even a million.
What seems to have made the often wide-eyed – quite literally – general so popular is a combination of overly optimistic (polite expression) assessments of the Ukrainian and Western position in the Ukraine War, a certain boyish (also polite expression) but – it seems – infectious enthusiasm for arrows and tactical signs on maps, and, last but not least, a relentless insistence to fight this war, in effect, through to the last Ukrainian. And who knows, maybe even beyond that.
In the fall of 2022, after Ukraine recaptured some territories at unsustainable cost to men and materiel, Freuding went wild, enthusing about 'incredible successes' and 'euphoria.' Euphoria indeed.
Last summer, when Ukraine started its predictably self-devastating offensive into Russia's Kursk Region, Freuding replicated every single daft Kiev propaganda point, including the alleged 'psychological effect' of invading 'core Russian territory.' Incidentally, the excitable general seems to have a traditional German blind spot for just how big Russia is: In reality, the area temporarily seized by Kiev's forces was miniscule – never more than one hundredth of a percent of Russian territory.
Freuding also touted this minuscule and doomed incursion as a great 'Mutmacher' (untranslatable, roughly: motivation boost) for the Ukrainian home front. We all know how that Kamikaze operation actually ended. By now, Kiev even finds it financially and politically difficult to accept the corpses of its fallen soldiers when delivered back from Russia: Every single one should trigger major compensation to their families and is testimony to a reckless and lost gamble.
When, a month ago, Ukraine launched its criminal (as in the war crime of perfidy) Spiderweb attack on Russian nuclear bombers from within Russia, Freuding detected 'impressive success,' most likely simply following – deliberately or not – initial Ukrainian exaggerations. In reality, the attack did far less military harm than Kiev claimed at first, as even Western mainstream outlets have admitted. Politically, of course, it was devastating – but for Ukraine, whose leadership scored a fleeting PR stunt but provoked a massive Russian response.
Freuding has been prolific. Examples of his bizarrely wrongheaded analyses and flatly failed predictions could be multiplied ad infinitum. But you get the gist: One thing his promotion shows is that Germany is once again a country where realism won't get you far in a military career. But wishful thinking wrapped in tactical jargon and scrawled on big maps will. As a German and a historian, I wished I had not seen that pattern before.
Freuding's other forte, his enthusiasm for fighting to the last Ukrainian is equally well attested. In his own misguided and euphemistic terms, Freuding is a top representative of those Western friends from hell who have pretended that feeding ever more Ukrainians into this meatgrinder of a proxy war would 'improve Kiev's negotiating position.'
Obviously and – again – utterly predictably, the opposite has happened: Ukraine's position is weaker than ever and constantly deteriorating, all at the cost of massive losses. By now, Ukrainian officials and the Western mainstream media have been compelled to admit that 'Ukraine has lost around 40% of its working-age population due to the war' and is facing a 'deep demographic crisis.' And that is an understatement. Yet Freuding sticks to his 'strategy' – if that is the word – of playing for time.
It is also important to see Freuding's implausible but apparently (for now) unstoppable rise in a broader context: Bellicist German mainstream media, such as the news magazine Spiegel, now admit that the US is gradually retreating from the proxy war it provoked, abandoning both its Ukrainian proxies and European vassals. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, meanwhile, oddly combines an obstinate and somewhat delusional urge to keep fighting Russia – for now indirectly – with the realistic, if very late, insight that Ukraine may be reaching its limits.
Wadephul's response to this self-imposed absurdity is simple: Germany must do even more for Ukraine. Never mind that the German military has already handed over, for instance, a quarter of its own 12 Patriot air defense systems. After all, there also is the option of buying new ones in the US and shipping them directly to Ukraine, at Berlin's expense, of course.
To justify such measures, the German government, with Chancellor Merz in the lead, has dialed up its already hyperventilating war scare rhetoric again. Until recently, the key dogma of the bellicist party line was the unfounded speculation, sold as virtual certainty, that Russia would be ready and willing to attack within a few years from now. Initially, the head of the German military, General Christian Breuer, had started fetishizing the year 2029 into the sum of all hysterical fears.
Yet that is no longer good – really, bad – enough. With support from Germany's trusty intelligence services – the same ones that helped the US fake a pretext to launch a devastating war of aggression against Iraq in 2003 and that can't find out who blew up the Nord Stream pipelines – Merz has updated the national panic attack: Now, he has informed his people, we must no longer fear that the Russians are coming because – drum roll – they are already here!
Merz, in short, has opined that the definition of 'war' is a major philosophical challenge, that Russia is already attacking Germany in multiple sneaky ways, and that hence, so the clear implication, the two countries are already at war. Not much to lose, then, if we escalate even further: that seems to be the message.
This is the stage on which Major-General Freuding has now been called upon to play an even larger role. He is, in a way, the right man for the job and for the moment. Only that the moment is one of officially sanctioned hysteria and delusion, and the job will consist of pretending that Ukraine can still, if not win, somehow improve its situation, while feeding more arms and money to it so that more of its people and territory can be lost.
Freuding, in sum, may be quite mad, but his whole career shows that he is a team player. His madness, at this point, is that of the whole German establishment. He is a good fit for a very bad set of ideas and policies. How ironic. And how German, too, in a way.
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And Kiev, in the meantime, comes out as the clear short-term beneficiary of Trump's announcement. We can expect the usual statements from Moscow rejecting the pressure – that sanctions don't scare Russia. And it's true that US-Russia trade is already near zero. There are no billion-dollar contracts left to speak of. Most economic ties were severed back in the Biden era. Washington has already imposed sweeping sanctions on Russian businesses and the financial sector. So if nothing changes over the next 50 days, the US will likely continue expanding military aid to Ukraine – but on a pragmatic basis. In doing so, Washington can channel European funding to keep its own defense industry running at full speed. Trump needs to save face. He once vowed to end the conflict in a single day – but that hasn't happened. Russia isn't backing down, isn't agreeing to a ceasefire with Ukraine, and isn't halting its offensive. There's nothing Trump can point to and sell as even a partial fulfillment of that campaign promise. So now he's under pressure to act. He's signaling to Moscow that he expects some kind of reciprocal move – and he's trying to extract it through a mix of diplomatic pressure and economic threats. What exactly Trump discussed with the Russian president remains unclear. But it's likely that Russia's core position was laid out: Full control over the territories now enshrined in its constitution. Russia simply cannot walk away from those claims. It's even possible that Trump's 50-day deadline is meant as a tacit acknowledgment of that reality – a window for Russia to consolidate its hold before talks resume. That would be his version of compromise. Trump often opens negotiations with bold, hardline offers – the kind you 'can't refuse', as American political lore puts it – only to walk them back later and land somewhere in the middle. That's his style, drawn straight from the world of business deals: Apply pressure first, then strike a bargain. Of course, these latest announcements – especially the pledge to send weapons – will only increase criticism of Trump within Russia. Still, this isn't the harshest stance he could have taken. It's a tough message, but one that still leaves room for maneuver. I wouldn't say we're standing at the brink of a new escalation. Trump hasn't endorsed the sanctions bill currently under discussion in Congress. Instead, he's talking about imposing 100% tariffs by executive order – just as he's done in the past. In doing so, he's clearly distancing himself from that legislation. There are no immediate sanctions coming. The 50-day timeline he mentioned is just the latest in a series of deadlines he's floated before. On the one hand, Trump wants to avoid sliding back into the kind of confrontation with Russia that defined the Biden era. On the other, he doesn't want to see Ukraine defeated – nor is he willing to accept a Russian ceasefire on Moscow's terms, since that could be spun as a US loss, and by extension, a personal failure. He keeps repeating that this is 'Biden's war' – but the longer it drags on, the more it becomes his own. As for the Patriots, it's Europe that will be footing the bill. Trump didn't promise any new funding from the US budget. What remains to be seen is how many systems and missiles the US defense industry can actually produce – and how many European countries are willing to buy. From Moscow's perspective, this is still the US arming Ukraine. Washington is also continuing to share intelligence and support logistics. No one in the Kremlin is going to say, 'Thank you, Grandpa Trump – now you're just a vendor'. That's not how this will be seen. The scale of this conflict is such that no single move – not by the US, not by Russia, not by anyone – can produce a sudden breakthrough. The only person who could do that is Vladimir Zelensky – by surrendering. There's no weapon system that could fundamentally change the course of this war, short of nuclear arms. And the only other game-changer would be direct involvement by the US or NATO – but if they'd wanted that, they would've intervened long ago. As for Trump's tariff threats against Russia and its trading partners – that's really just kicking the can down the road for another 50 days. Classic Trump. From Russia's standpoint, we're not shipping anything to the US anyway. As for our trading partners – yes, we're talking about China and India. But this move would only add to the contradictions in Trump's chaotic tariff diplomacy, where every issue is approached through economic threats. I don't think it's going to work. I don't see how Trump thinks he can pressure India. China – maybe. But Beijing is already staring down a whole slew of tariff threats. One more won't make things easier – just worse. If anything, it will reinforce the idea that the US sees China as vulnerable to pressure. And that's not a message China will take lightly. If this is all Trump had to say about Ukraine today, then the hype was definitely overblown. Most of Lindsey Graham's alarmist fantasies remain just that – fantasies. A 500% sanctions package makes little practical sense. As for Europe, it looks like they'll keep picking up the tab – again and again. What they thought was free cheese turned out to be a trap. The only true beneficiary here is the US defense industry. Ukraine, meanwhile, is left to fight until the last Ukrainian – a fate they seem to have chosen for themselves. But 50 days is a long time. A lot can change – on the battlefield, in Washington, and in NATO capitals. What matters most, though, is that none of this has any real impact on our own determination. At least, that's how I see it. Trump has given Russia 50 days to complete the job: To fully liberate our four regions, take Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk – and ideally, Kiev. After that, he's promised to get truly angry and hit back with 100% tariffs on our key oil buyers – India and China. That's a serious threat. So now we have 50 days to finish what we've left unfinished over the past 25 years. This is precisely the kind of moment captured in the old Russian saying: 'We take a long time to harness the horses, but we ride fast'. Given the circumstances, I believe any weapons can be used, against any targets. We have 50 days to win.


Russia Today
3 hours ago
- Russia Today
Germany seeking 2,000km-range US missile launchers
Germany has asked to purchase Typhon medium-range missile launchers from the US amid tensions with Russia over Ukraine, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has said. Typhon deployments would have been banned under the now-defunct 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Pistorius confirmed on Monday that Berlin had sent Washington a formal request to buy the Typhon system, which can fire Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-6 multi-role missiles. The Typhon has an operational range of around 2,000km and could reach targets far beyond Moscow if fired from German territory. The system would fill a capability gap until European countries produce their own long-range missiles, which could take between seven to ten years, Pistorius said. However, he acknowledged uncertainty over whether the US remains committed to deploying long-range missiles to Germany from 2026, under a plan first announced in 2024 by the administration of former President Joe Biden. 'I am very confident that last year's agreement is still valid, but we are still waiting for a final decision,' the minister said. The announcement of the long-range missile deployment drew a sharp rebuke from Moscow, which warned that it would consider itself 'free' from a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of similar missiles. Potential deployment of Typhon launchers and other long-range assets bears certain parallels to the highly contentious decision by NATO to deploy Pershing II nuclear-capable missiles with a range of more than 2,000km in West Germany in the 1980s. The move sparked massive protests across Europe and a new spiral of tensions between the Soviet Union and the US, ultimately leading to a détente and the signing of the INF Treaty. Typhon launcher deployments would have been banned under the INF Treaty, in which the Soviet Union and the US agreed to eliminate all ground-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500km. The pact collapsed in 2019 when Washington withdrew, citing Russian violations. Russia has denied the claims, accusing the US of developing the banned missiles. President Vladimir Putin has warned that the collapse of the INF will significantly erode the global security framework.