Egypt, Greece FMs discuss bilateral ties, Israel-Iran developments, Libya situation - Foreign Affairs
Minister of Foreign Affairs Badr Abdelatty and his Greek counterpart, Georgios Gerapetritis, discussed in a phone call enhancing bilateral relations between the two countries and exchanged views on the latest regional developments, especially the Israel-Iran war and the situation in Libya.
During the call, FM Abdelatty praised the historic ties between Egypt and Greece and the momentum in bilateral relations across various fields, a statement by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs read.
He added that this long-lasting cooperation culminated in elevating relations to a strategic partnership last May during the Greek president's visit to Egypt.
He also expressed Egypt's aspiration to advance bilateral ties to broader horizons, especially given the close relationship between the two presidents and peoples.
The call comes two days after President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis had a phone conversation to discuss escalation in the region, enhancing bilateral relations, and regional issues of mutual concern.
Israel-Iran war
Moreover, both foreign ministers welcomed the ceasefire agreement between Iran and Israel announced by the US president on Tuesday.
They also stressed the importance of both sides adhering to the agreement to contain the recent regional escalation and pave the way for political and diplomatic solutions.
The US and Israel are still in the assessment phase of the damage inflicted upon Iranian nuclear sites resulting from the 12-day war between Israel and Iran.
On Wednesday, Israel's army said it was "still early" to assess the damage caused to Iran's nuclear programme.
However, US intelligence services reportedly concluded that the American strikes had set the Iranian nuclear programme back by just a few months.
Libya
The statement indicated that both ministers also exchanged views on the situation in Libya.
FM Abdelatty emphasized the importance of preserving security and stability in all Libyan territories, safeguarding state institutions, and respecting Libya's unity and territorial integrity.
He also stressed the need to hold simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections and dismantle armed militias to help restore security and stability in the country.
On Tuesday, Lieutenant General Ahmed Khalifa, the chief of staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, met with visiting Lieutenant General Saddam Khalifa Haftar, the chief of staff of the Libyan Army's Ground Forces, and his accompanying delegation to discuss deepening military cooperation.
During their meeting, they discussed several issues of mutual interest and explored ways to strengthen cooperation between the armed forces of both countries in various military and security fields.
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Al-Ahram Weekly
2 hours ago
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Russia-China balancing act - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
Russia and China have always kept an eye on Iran's relations with Israel and the US. This explains their quick response to the war Israel launched on Iran on 13 June and the US strike on Iran's key nuclear sites in Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz on 22 June. Moscow and Beijing's concerns heightened as they watched Tel Aviv and Washington exploiting the conflict to overthrow the Iranian regime and reshape the Middle East to serve their own interests. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping strongly condemned the strikes on Iran and called for a political and diplomatic resolution to the conflict. They also denounced direct US involvement in targeting Iran's nuclear facilities. On the eve of the attack on Fordow, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev stated, 'now we can say it outright, the future production of nuclear weapons will continue,' threatening that 'a number of countries are ready to directly supply Iran with their own nuclear warheads.' On 22 June, Russia's foreign minister warned that global chaos would ensue if countries were permitted to interpret the right to self-defence under the UN Charter in any manner they choose. China announced that the US strike on Iranian reactors could 'exacerbate tensions in the Middle East'. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that in striking the Iranian reactors the US has seriously violated the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. In coordination with Moscow and Pakistan, China also prepared a draft resolution condemning the US attack on Iran, which was circulated to members of the UN Security Council. Russia and China had opposed attempts to bring about regime change in Iran and called for the implementation of international agreements and resolutions related to managing the Iranian nuclear programme. The two countries believe the use of force could undermine regional peace and risk escalating tensions, potentially affecting the global economy and the interests of the US and other international and regional powers who enjoy strategic presence in the Middle East. Moscow and Beijing repeatedly warned of the dangers of targeting Iran's nuclear power plants, cautioning that such actions could result in an environmental and human disaster comparable to those of Chernobyl and Hiroshima. Putin received Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi in the Kremlin alongside Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov and Igor Kostyukov, the head of Russia's GRU military intelligence agency. 'The absolutely unprovoked aggression against Iran has no basis and no justification,' Putin told Araqchi, adding that he wanted to speak about ways to calm the crisis. 'For our part, we are making efforts to assist the Iranian people.' Putin asserted that Russia maintains a partnership with Iran and offers support in light of the recent escalation with Israel, but not militarily. Similarly, China reaffirmed the importance of its strategic relationship with Tehran and rejected Israeli aggression but has not provided Iran with material support beyond continuing regular trade relations, refraining from directly supplying weapons to Iran to avoid US sanctions. Both, Russia and China, shared a consensus regarding the war on Iran. They released a joint proposal on 19 June following a phone call between Putin and his Chinese counterpart. The proposal called for a ceasefire, an end to the war, and increased efforts to de-escalate the situation — a responsibility, they said, that lies with the international community, particularly with the major powers that hold significant influence over both sides of the conflict, in an implicit reference to the US. The proposal stressed that the use of force was not the right approach to resolve international disputes. For their part, Russia and China presented mediation as a solution to end the war on Iran. China said it was willing to support mediation efforts or contribute to a multilateral process aimed at halting the conflict. On 14 June the Russian foreign minister said Moscow was prepared to continue working towards resolving issues related to the Iranian nuclear programme. However, Israel did not respond to Chinese or Russian mediation efforts, particularly in the light of Beijing's support for the Palestinian cause and Moscow's condemnation of the attack on Iran. Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated on 17 June: 'At the moment, we see an unwillingness on the part of Israel, at the very least, to engage in any kind of mediation or to enter the peace path at all.' China and Russia considered multiple factors on which bases they calculated their stance on the war. First, the Israeli war on Iran should not be viewed as a bilateral conflict. Rather, it had to do with international dynamics. The US has hoped to dismantle Russian and Chinese regional alliances, which explains the two countries' determination to contain US moves in the Middle East and Africa, as well as neutralise its role in Asia. Second, while Russia and China condemn the US targeting of Iranian nuclear reactors, they fear supplying weapons to Iran at this stage could encourage Tehran to prolong the war with Israel. This could negatively impact Russian and Chinese interests in the region. Moreover, Moscow and Beijing believe that direct military support for Iran could accelerate the US involvement in a direct war on Iran, thereby intensifying regional escalation. In addition, the continuation of the Israeli war on Iran could drive energy prices to skyrocket. As China is heavily dependent on foreign energy supplies, this would lead to a rise in its energy import bill and, consequently, higher domestic energy prices. Additionally, any Russian intervention in support of Tehran could prompt the US and European powers to impose further sanctions on Russia's energy sector. China and Russia are not currently seeking to escalate tensions with the US. Beijing wants to resolve the issue of the tariffs the Trump administration imposed on China's exports to the US, while Moscow wants to neutralise Washington's role in the Ukrainian crisis. Beijing and Moscow are carefully calculating their stances on the war on Iran because direct involvement in the conflict could risk drawing them into a direct confrontation with the US. * A version of this article appears in print in the 26 June, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Al-Ahram Weekly
2 hours ago
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Watching the destruction - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
On Sunday this week, hours after US President Donald Trump had announced that the US had joined Israel in its attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities, Ahmed, an attendant at a traditional coffee shop in Downtown Cairo, was keeping an eye on the breaking news as it appeared on the Arab satellite channel that the TV in the café was tuned to. While serving a coffee to one of his customers, Ahmed said in a loud voice Allahu Akbar, Aho Kida – 'God is great; Come on' – when he saw an announcement that the Iranian Parliament had agreed to block the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for the strikes the US military had conducted against Iran in the early hours of Sunday morning nine days after the Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities and individuals began on 13 June. Ahmed, in his early 30s with limited chances of education that did not go beyond the high school phase, said he did not know much about the Strait of Hormuz or how Iran could block it or for that matter how this would impact the region, especially Egypt. He said that he only knew one thing – that 'Iran has been giving Israel a hard time and is not lying down in front of the Israeli and [now] the American strikes without reacting.' According to customers having drinks in the café, there has been a sense of vindication with every image of the destruction caused in Israel by the Iranian missile strikes in retaliation for the 'Israeli war on Arabs and Muslims.' 'For two years now, we have been seeing Israeli brutality against the Palestinians in Gaza. Every day we have been seeing Palestinians killed and maimed while the world has not done anything to stop it. Now we see Israel suffering the same horror and the same destruction,' said Anwar, a lawyer in his early 40s. While agreeing that it is hard to compare the level of destruction that Israel has inflicted during its genocidal war on Gaza since 7 October 2023 to the destruction that the Iranian retaliatory military sorties have brought to Israel, Anwar said that it 'is not about the levels but about the pain'. 'The Israelis are now feeling the pain' that they have been inflicting on the Palestinians. 'They are fearing for their lives' in the same way as the Palestinians. The seven customers sipping their coffee in the café that afternoon were born well after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in March 1979. None of them had much knowledge of the Egyptian wars with Israel over the Israeli aggression against and occupation of Egyptian and Arab territories. However, they said that they can all see what they called the 'Israeli hatred for Arabs and Muslims' demonstrated in the repeated attacks on Palestinians in Gaza. Their knowledge is mostly gained through TV and social media. Khaled, a salesman in his late 20s, put down his coffee and reached out to his smartphone to review items on his social media feed. He showed videos that were coming out of different Arab countries mocking Israel, the Israeli Army, and the Israeli Iron Dome defence system. He then showed 'a widely shared' video of Israeli targets coming under Iranian missile attacks with audio from popular Egyptian soccer commentators. He said that he had watched it repeatedly and that it had allowed him to see Lebanese, Tunisians, and Qataris making videos using audio from Egyptian dramas, including music from the well-known TV soap opera Raafat Al-Haggan that depicts an embedded Egyptian spy in Israel and quotes like 'tears in daring eyes' (domoua' fi oyoune wakeha). However, Khaled's favourite videos are those that depict long queues of Israeli men and women trying to find an exit out of Israel either on a boat across the Mediterranean to Cyprus or across the Egyptian borders where they either choose to stay in a Red Sea resort or move on through Egyptian airports to Cyprus or some other third destination. 'It is so ironic. They wanted to displace the Palestinians out of Gaza, but it is they who are being displaced now,' he said. He referred to press stories that he had read on X on the Israeli government's attempts to block the exodus. 'They are rushing out. It is not their land. They don't want to hold onto it,' he said. PUBLIC OPINION: Other social media sites have less-trending stories including quotes from interviews with Arab politicians and intellectuals. They include material about the 'irrevocable imperialist intentions' of Israel and the US towards the Arab and Muslim countries, images of the torture that Iraqis underwent at the hands of US soldiers at the infamous Abou Ghraib Prison after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, also 'on the same unfounded claims' of developing weapons of mass destruction, and stories of the killing of Afghan civilians during US airstrikes on weddings in Afghanistan, under the claim that these events were 'terror cells.' There are many other references to American and Israeli violations of international law and the international law of human rights. According to a European diplomat in his fourth and final year in Cairo, it was never hard to sense that Egyptian public opinion is never neutral about Israel. 'When I first arrived in Cairo, I often heard Israeli diplomats complain about their isolation despite decades of normalised relations,' the diplomat said. He added that when he compared the sentiments of Egyptians to those of Jordanians during the years he served in Amman between 2015 and 2019, he thought that despite the fact that the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty came 15 years after the Egyptian-Israeli one 'the sentiments were similar.' 'In Amman, I thought it was about the fact that there is a segment of society that has Palestinian origins, but in Cairo I was not sure about the reason, especially as the majority of the population was born after the end of the last war with Israel in 1973,' he said. In October 2023, this diplomat was 'perplexed' by the level of public rejoicing that dominated in Cairo, and as he 'learned in some other Arab capitals,' including in the Arab Gulf, 'which has never been at war with Israel,' over the 7 October Al-Aqsa Flood attack launched by Hamas. He said that he was also 'surprised' at the wide popularity of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and the sadness that came with the assassination of Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in September last year. Today, this and other foreign diplomats in Cairo said that it was hard to see any serious prospects for Israeli integration into the Middle East. The 'massive' and 'surprising' military 'victories' that Israel has been making under the government of Likud Party leader and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have only led to more resentment of Israeli in Cairo like in other Arab capitals. In the words of another European diplomat who served in Israel at an earlier point of her career, 'Israelis always wonder about their perception in the region, and when I came here [three years ago] I told Israeli friends that unfortunately Israel is seen as the enemy.' 'Israel has been making considerable progress in its peaceful relations with the governments of the region, but in most Arab countries the people do not like Israel,' she said. For many Cairo-based foreign diplomats familiar with Arab-Israeli relations and Arab-Iranian relations or Arab-Turkish relations, the Israeli strikes on Iran and the Iranian retaliatory strikes on Israel and the subsequent US strikes on Iran would not have been of such great importance to Arab public opinion, aside from in countries that have large Shia populations, had it not been close to the two-year Israeli War on Gaza. Today, these diplomats argue that with the Israeli-Iran War, the situation is no longer just about Palestinians but is also about Muslims. Since its creation in 1948, Israel has not engaged in such open fighting with any country outside its immediate Arab surroundings. Its military attacks against Iran have changed this equation, even for populations that do not traditionally have much sympathy with Iran. According to the same diplomats, there is no telling how sentiments will flow in the case of a prolonged Israeli-Iranian confrontation, which would unfold in parallel with the Israeli War on Gaza and a possible Israeli annexation of the West Bank. If this confrontation were to expand with retaliatory Iranian attacks on US targets in the Arab Gulf countries, the diplomats argued, it would be hard to predict the impact of such an escalation on the image of Israel in the region. * A version of this article appears in print in the 26 June, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Al-Ahram Weekly
2 hours ago
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Prisoner's dilemma in the Israel-Iran escalation - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
The US' role in Israel's war against Iran can be understood in terms of game theory. In the wake of US President Donald Trump's announcement of a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, several pressing questions have emerged regarding the nature of the agreement and on whether the ceasefire can hold between two enemies after years of a 'hidden' conflict that escalated into an air war that included 12 days of mutual strikes. There is also the question of the US role, particularly following the US strikes on three Iranian nuclear sites. The situation is growing more complex by the day, as it becomes evident that all the actors involved are facing profound political and military dilemmas. Achieving a zero-sum outcome or a decisive resolution seems highly unlikely, given the intertwined interests, competing priorities, and looming risks of the powers concerned. These dynamics recall one of the most iconic concepts in game theory, the prisoner's dilemma. This illustrates how two rational actors, in the absence of mutual trust, may make decisions that lead to suboptimal outcomes for both. Applying this framework to the US-Iran situation, we see a similar mistrust. Washington doubts that Tehran will de-escalate or halt its provocations, while Iran suspects the US will never withdraw its support for Israel. Both therefore lean towards escalation or threats thereof, even though temporary cooperation such as a ceasefire could avert more severe consequences. This fundamental paradox hinders the emergence of a balanced political resolution. Within this framework, it is essential to dissect the underlying rationale behind Trump's decision to enter the conflict between Israel and Iran. This move appears to be driven by a complex fusion of political ambition, strategic calculation, and domestic constraints. Trump, ever conscious of his historical legacy, likely seeks to be remembered as a transformative leader who took a history-shaping decision like former US president Harry Truman's decision to end World War II in the Asia-Pacific by using the atomic bomb against Japan. Trump's own record is filled with symbolic yet controversial moves, such as the relocation of the US Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem in 2018, which he often indicates as a defining moment of political courage and defiance of global pressure. While the embassy move generated political capital with key constituencies and incurred no immediate military cost, it also promoted long-term regional instability with potential economic and security repercussions. Along with tracing the US role throughout the conflict, Trump's decision to offer a two-week window to Iran may stem from multiple intersecting calculations. The most prominent of them is the potential for strategic deception. The deadline could be a calculated bluff aimed at catching Iran off guard with a swift military strike. Trump's reputation for unpredictability may be part of the strategy to maximise the psychological impact of the strike and minimise Iranian preparedness. Yet, following the initial strikes on Iranian targets, it is now clear that the US under Trump's direction has entered a war with Iran, a conflict that even he admits could escalate further. Three major unknowns now dominate the landscape. First, how will Iran respond? While Tehran may seek a strong counterattack to restore deterrence, its capacity to do so may be constrained. Second, have the US and Israeli strikes crippled Iran's nuclear ambitions or inadvertently accelerated them? There is now a genuine risk that Iran may conclude it needs nuclear weapons more than ever. Third, is this the end of the conflict or just the beginning? Even if its enrichment facilities are destroyed, Iran's nuclear expertise cannot be bombed out of existence, indicating that the underlying conflict is far from resolved. Given these complexities, the US strikes on Iran can be seen as a calculated escalation that is expected but measured. The choice of a limited strike strategy targeting major nuclear facilities such as Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow falls within the constitutional powers of the US president to launch short-term operations. This avoids triggering a formal declaration of war, which is the exclusive domain of the US Congress. Trump thus prefer a 'middle way' a significant, yet limited action designed to send a message without dragging the US into a broader regional war, at least not for now. TURNING POINT: In this regard, the US strikes on Iran represent a fundamental turning point in its political doctrines in terms of weakening the Iranian nuclear programme, as they demonstrated the US willingness to change course regarding its decades-long policy of not striking Iran. As a result of the US desire to withdraw from the Middle East, Tehran gained many victories and enabled it to believe that it would be able to expand wherever it wanted. Strategically, the strikes mark a shift in US policy driven by two key considerations, Firstly, there is an attempt to balance internal divisions within the 'America First' (MAGA) Movement in the US, which urges caution and is wary of being drawn back into the Middle East just as the US had been reducing its military footprint. A forceful Iranian response could push the US towards deeper military entanglements. It could also entail enormous operational risks and financial burdens. Moreover, Trump's explicit disagreement with CIA Director Tulsi Gabbard on Iran's nuclear programme, even though she was appointed by Trump himself, reflects deeper fractures within the national security establishment in the US. Critics from this camp argue that escalating on behalf of Israel compromises US interests, while others advocate for a decisive military strike on Iran and strongly support backing for Israel, viewing military escalation as necessary for regional deterrence. However, this second path contradicts broader US national security doctrines that increasingly prioritise China as the primary threat. Any large-scale military commitment in the Middle East would divert resources from the Indo-Pacific theatre, thereby undermining America's strategic pivot towards countering Chinese influence. Secondly, the strikes served as a test of Iran's willingness to return to the negotiations on its nuclear programme under pressure. Should Iran accept American conditions and return to the talks from a weakened position, Washington would achieve a strategic win, though one that may not align with Israeli objectives. Conversely, if Iran retaliates by attacking US interests further or its allies, it could justify a full-scale US war effort, potentially triggering Congressional authorisation. It could spark a full-scale war with a superpower, risking catastrophic consequences for Iran ranging from military collapse to a prolonged period of chaos like post-invasion Iraq or Afghanistan. On the other hand, restraint and the acceptance of a ceasefire without retaliation would amount to strategic defeat, a shattered nuclear programme, an exhausted military, and a dramatic loss of regional influence, weakening Iran's bargaining power to lift sanctions. IRAN'S RESPONSE: As expected, there has been a limited Iranian response when it launched several missiles at the US Al-Udeid base in Qatar without leading to any injuries or loss of life. Iran needed such a response to the US strikes in an attempt to demonstrate responsiveness to the Iranian streets and hardliners within the political system who are demanding a more forceful response. Despite indications that this Iranian response was not only limited, but was also fully coordinated with the US and Qatar, what happened threatens to provoke further US strikes and a greater escalation, which may push Iran to carry out more of its previous threats against targets in the region. This means that Iran will likely not be able to insist that this 'pre-planned and pre-announced strike' will not lead to Trump responding by another larger strike on Iran or giving the green light for a fatal strike on Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, let alone further large-scale attacks by Israel, which would also prolong the conflict. In terms of its maximum pressure strategy, this would involve closing the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 per cent of the world's oil supply passes. This scenario would cause significant disruption to global energy markets, potentially leading to a sharp rise in oil prices, with the price of a barrel of oil expected to reach $130. This would have widespread global economic repercussions, particularly for oil-importing countries and emerging market economies. It would have a direct impact on the US, but Iran's closing of the Strait of Hormuz remains an unlikely option, given the negative consequences it would have for Tehran itself. Such a measure would not yield any significant strategic benefit and could even prompt harsh retaliatory responses and expose it to international pressure, particularly from China, the largest importer of Iranian oil, as well as ships using alternative routes via the UAE and Oman, reducing the effectiveness of the threat. More importantly, most of the daily consumer goods Iran relies on also pass through the strait, meaning that Iran would be the first to suffer from its closure. Complete control of the strait also seems unlikely, given that most of its waters fall under Omani sovereignty, and its width, which ranges between 35 and 60 nautical miles, will make it difficult for Iran to establish complete control over it or permanently disrupt it The limited US strikes against Iran appear to be a calculated effort to balance political pressures against the risk of broader war. Trump sought to act decisively without igniting a full-scale conflict, while sending a strong message about preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet, the situation has now entered an unpredictable phase, where all options are on the table. * A version of this article appears in print in the 26 June, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
