China's Political Calendar as a Guide to Leadership Succession

The Diplomat

2 days ago

Discussion about personnel issues within Chinese politics has been rampant of late. In Japan, the media has been reporting on President Xi Jinping's supposed health issues and has even suggested that he may step down 2027, with Ding Xuexiang, a member of the Standing Committee, as his successor. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has meanwhile been rocked by leadership instability over the past few years, accompanied by rumors of a rift between Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Zhang Youxia, his number two.
Ultimately, it is impossible for outside observers to confirm these rumors. Many rely on media outlets and YouTube pundits to come up with what is, after all, mere speculation. There are other sources, however. For instance, we can gain some insight into what is currently happening by consulting China's political calendar.
The most important years ahead for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are 2027, when the 21st Party Congress convenes, 2032, when the 22nd Party Congress convenes, and 2035, the year Xi himself has set to achieve 'socialist modernization.' The white paper on 'National Security in a New Era,' released in May 2025, outlines construction plans for Chinese national security over the next decade and has made 2035 the target for completion for the national security system, further underscoring the importance of that year. Another, somewhat less important year is 2029, which will mark the 80th anniversary of the founding of the communist nation. Born in 1953, Xi will be 74 in 2027, 79 in 2032, and 82 in 2035.
At present, Xi's administration is in the third year of its third term and will enter its fourth year this autumn. With speculation swirling about his health, Xi has yet to name a successor, and so most expect him to embark on a fourth term in 2027. That term would end in 2032, but given that his administration has emphasized 2035 as a key milestone, there is reason to believe that he plans to remain in power through that year. In 2035, Xi will be 82, the age at which Mao Zedong died, making it entirely possible that he will remain in office into the mid-2030s. However, by his fifth term beginning in 2032, he will surely need to have a clear successor in place. That means that even if the individual is not one of the top seven (members of the Politburo Standing Committee) during Xi's fourth term, a successor is likely to at least be selected from the current 24 members of the Politburo Standing Committee and brought in beginning in 2027. Of course, there is always the possibility that this won't happen until sometime after 2027, but that has not stopped predictions in China that Xi will in fact soon begin the task of choosing who will follow him. In fact, Xi's succession is one of the biggest concerns in Chinese politics, and the recent speculation about his health and his grip on power will surely intensify as 2027 approaches. The Chinese public naturally has a strong interest in the transition of power.
In considering this transition of power, it's worth noting that apart from Ding Xuexiang (born 1962), all of the seven Standing Committee members were born in the 1950s, and will thus be in their mid-70s by the time Xi's fourth term ends in 2032. Even Ding Xuexiang will be 70 by then. The fact that he is the youngest of the top seven is one of the main reasons why he is often mentioned as a possible successor to Xi Jinping.
Nor are any of the current 24-member Politburo particularly young, with the youngest four born in 1964. It is worth noting here that Chinese born in the late 1960s would have been university students during the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre in 1989. Looking elsewhere, Zhou Zuyi, Secretary of the Fujian Provincial Communist Party Committee, was born in 1965, with all other provincial and municipal secretaries having been born before 1964.
Thus, since Xi Jinping came to power, the CCP leadership has aged rapidly. This can be seen as reflecting the aging of Chinese society itself, but one might also conclude that Xi's administration has an aversion to people born in the late 1960s, who would have come of age at a time when Western culture was having a strong influence on Chinese society. There is even speculation that this generation may be bypassed entirely in the succession process. To counter that, we might note that some deputy provincial and municipal secretaries were born in the late 1960s, with Xiong Maoping a prime example, having been appointed deputy secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Communist Party Committee in July 2025. Yet many officials born in the late 1960s have not moved up the party ranks, and increasingly the focus is now on the growing number of appointments of deputy secretaries who were born in the 1970s. The list includes Zhuge Yujie (Hubei Province), Shi Guanghui (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), Zhu Zhongming (Shanghai), Yang Jinbai (Hainan Province), Liu Xiaotao (Jiangsu Province), Guo Ningning (Fujian Province), and Lu Dongliang (Shanxi Province). Some of these figures are expected to be made members of the Politburo or even Standing Committee by 2027.
In the meantime, the PLA's leadership is even older, with Xi's childhood friend and ally, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of CCP, born in 1950. Zhang is three years older than Xi, and will turn 77 in 2027. Having made the unusual decision to stay on at the age of 72 in 2022, many expect him to retire in 2027. Who will be his successor? This is an immediate concern for the PLA, where a number of high-ranking officials have been appointed, only to then be purged. That turnover has left it unclear if a successor will be determined by 2027. Its personnel issues notwithstanding, the PLA has been able to maintain its expansionist path under its top two leaders, Xi and Zhang, despite rumors about their health. Still, the instability within the military leadership shows how difficult it will be for the Central Committee of CCP to identify a successor for Xi.
Time is the great equalizer. Moving forward, the most significant challenge for Chinese politics will be in the realm of personnel. For outside observers, insight may well come from monitoring developments in the context of the political calendar discussed here.
KAWASHIMA Shin is a professor at the University of Tokyo.