ANC succession battle — the pros and cons of the top candidates vying for Ramaphosa's job
While it is unclear who will take over from President Cyril Ramaphosa as leader of the ANC, their ability to win votes will be extremely important. It may be constructive to examine what five of the most likely candidates would bring to the electorate.
As our politics becomes more competitive than ever before, the identity of the leader of each party has become more important.
One of President Cyril Ramaphosa's great strengths when he became leader of the ANC was that he was more popular than the party. The ANC itself said that he played a major role in helping it win the 2019 election (this was hugely contested at the time, and the then secretary-general, Ace Magashule, was forced to publicly disavow his comment that Ramaphosa had not played an important role).
Ramaphosa's deteriorating popularity among voters, partly due to his inaction against corruption, and the Phala Phala scandal, might well have played a role in the ANC's dramatic decline last year.
This shows how important the vote-winning ability of a new ANC leader will be.
While it is not clear who will contest the position at the ANC's electoral conference in 2027, there is plenty of well-informed speculation that candidates could include Deputy President Paul Mashatile, International Relations Minister Ronald Lamola, Police Minister Senzo Mchunu, Electricity and Energy Minister Kgosientsho Ramokgopa and the ANC secretary-general, Fikile Mbalula.
Paul Mashatile
There is little evidence that Mashatile has broad support among the electorate.
His apparent inability to communicate a distinct message during his time as Deputy President suggests he is finding it difficult to create space in which to move.
This could be a function of the position he holds. Deputy presidents are often subject to intense scrutiny, and people look for evidence of their ambition for the top job, which could be why he has not, so far, articulated a particular vision.
Mashatile's public speeches in English are often stilted. His answers to parliamentary questions are, frankly, boring. He does not say anything new, and his delivery comes across as wooden.
As a result of having no apparent message, the narrative around him is dominated by claims that he has benefited from fishy financial deals.
He has failed to properly and publicly condemn the violence used by his security officers when they assaulted the occupants of a vehicle on the N1 highway.
It is difficult to imagine him crafting a coherent message as the leader of the ANC. On the election trail he probably won't provide much help to the party.
His position as Deputy President means he doesn't have responsibility for any particular portfolio. However, for the contenders Lamola, Ramokgopa and Mchunu, what happens on their watch reflects on their public images.
Ronald Lamola
The minister of international relations and cooperation is a high-profile position — but it is overshadowed by the President. In some instances, for example, SA's genocide case against Israel, Lamola has been able to take the lead. However, in the hardest and most high-profile issue, dealing with the Trump administration, Ramaphosa has taken over.
What Lamola does have, almost uniquely in the ANC, is the ability to connect with younger voters. His age (41) makes him one of the youngest leaders in the party.
He is relatively unscathed by the scandals that have surrounded so many people in the party.
That said, if he were to undergo more scrutiny, he would have to answer questions about how his law firm failed to notice the massive corruption at the National Lotteries Commission, when it was tasked with investigating it.
Kgosientsho Ramokgopa
The public perception of Ramokgopa is entirely linked to load shedding.
He is an excellent communicator and has ensured that he, the government and Eskom have controlled the narrative whenever load shedding is instituted.
He is associated with the successes in dealing with load shedding — and also the failures.
He will also appeal to voters who want a technocratic face for the ANC.
He can give the impression to black professionals that he is one of them, that he speaks their language and can get things done.
Sipho Mchunu
Mchunu appeals to a slightly different constituency.
Crucially for him and the ANC, he could win back voters in KwaZulu-Natal.
This province voted for the ANC when former president Jacob Zuma was its leader, then appeared to move in the direction of the ANC and the IFP when Ramaphosa took over, only for large numbers to vote for Zuma's uMkhonto Wesizwe party in the last elections.
Mchunu may well be able to develop a crucial constituency in this province for the ANC, where he was once its provincial secretary.
Nationally, it would be a huge card in his favour if he were seen to be leading a successful effort to reduce violent crime.
However, the problem of SA's crime is so large and is so intertwined with aspects of our politics that Mchunu is unlikely to be able to make much difference.
Fikile Mbalula
Mbalula, of course, is not in government. It is his position as secretary-general of the party that might give him the edge in any internal ANC race.
In the past, the position of secretary-general has been shaped by the personality occupying it. Gwede Mantashe imbued the office with huge authority, while Kgalema Motlanthe had more of a quiet legitimacy.
Lately, Mbalula has appeared to be trying to portray more of a sober appearance than in previous years.
However, it is unlikely that voters have forgotten what happened when he was transport minister and how he was responsible for so many missteps.
As previously pointed out, Mbalula has a history of running his mouth off. People are unlikely to have forgotten how he tweeted that he had 'Just landed in Ukraine', or that he had taken Prasa into administration with no legal authority to do so, or that he used such vulgar language when talking to taxi drivers that the SA Council of Churches was moved to to make a public comment.
Or that he was found by a Public Protector to have received a paid holiday from a sporting goods chain while minister of sport.
These are the consequences of his long history in the public eye. It is unlikely that he can change the way the public views him.
While it would be entirely rational to assume that ANC delegates would have the 2029 elections in mind when they vote for the position of ANC leader, history shows that sometimes internal dynamics are more important.
And the ANC appears to have done virtually nothing to win back votes since the polls last year.
This suggests that the electability of candidates will not be the most important factor in the ANC's leadership election. DM
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