Shiite Coordination Framework cracks wide open ahead of Iraq 2025 Vote

Shafaq News

30-04-2025

Shafaq News/ Six months ahead of Iraq's scheduled parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025, the Shiite Coordination Framework (CF), once unified under a common platform, is showing visible cracks. Despite previous electoral successes, internal disagreements, ambitions, and strategic recalculations have led its main factions to prepare to contest the elections separately — a move that reflects both political pragmatism and deep-seated rivalries.
Framework's Position after 2021
In the October 2021 elections, the Shiite Coordination Framework — a coalition of major Shiite forces — managed to recover politically after an initially poor showing. While the Sadrist Movement emerged as the largest Shiite bloc with 73 seats, the Framework — after judicial interventions and post-election alliances — ultimately secured a dominant role in shaping the government, particularly following Muqtada al-Sadr's withdrawal from the political process.
Major Framework components, including the State of Law Coalition led by Nouri al-Maliki, the Fatah Alliance led by Hadi al-Amiri, and other smaller Shiite parties, consolidated enough influence to form a governing alliance. Their combined strength, supported by allied independents, gave them considerable leverage in parliamentary votes, despite not having initially won a majority at the polls.
A Shifting Electoral Strategy in 2025
Now, as the November 2025 elections approach, the dynamics inside the Framework have shifted dramatically. Rather than contesting under a single electoral umbrella, the Framework forces plan to participate through multiple separate lists — a strategy driven by a mixture of financial disputes, political positioning, and efforts to maximize overall seat gains.
A senior source told Shafaq News that the recent withdrawal of the Iraq Hawks Movement (Harakat Suqoor al-Iraq), led by Qasim al-Daraji, from Al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition was primarily due to funding disagreements.
According to the source, the movement had expected financial backing from Al-Maliki himself, which ultimately failed to materialize, prompting the split.
This rift is symptomatic of a broader trend: within the Shiite house (al-beit al-Shi'i), electoral preparations are now focused on establishing distinct lists to allow each faction to measure its true electoral weight and negotiate from a position of strength after the polls.
New Electoral Lineups
The emerging electoral map within the Framework includes:
-The State of Law Coalition: Led by Nouri al-Maliki, this list will encompass the Daawa Party (headed by Al-Maliki), the Bashair Movement (headed by Yasser al-Maliki), and the Al-Nahj Al-watani Party (headed by Ahmad Al-Rabiee)
-Al-Furatain List: Headed by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, it will include the Sanad Bloc led by Labor and Social Affairs Minister Ahmed al-Asadi and the Ataa Movement led by Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) chief Faleh al-Fayyad.
-Victory Alliance (Nasr): Led by former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in cooperation with Ammar al-Hakim's Wisdom Movement (Al-Hikma) and several independent political actors.
-Asaib Ahl al-Haq: The powerful armed and political faction led by Qais al-Khazali is preparing to run on a separate list, although discussions are ongoing about potential alignments with other minor forces.
According to Shafaq sources, this strategy reflects an attempt to avoid the intra-list competition and fragmentation that plagued previous elections under unified banners.
Collapse of the "Qarar" Alliance
Further complicating matters is the unraveling of the Qarar Alliance (Decision), an attempted unification project led by Al-Sudani and Hadi al-Amiri of the Fatah Alliance. Initially envisioned as a comprehensive front to contest the elections jointly, the alliance faltered due to differences between the two leaders, reportedly over the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and disagreements regarding the stalled PMF law in Parliament.
Negotiations with Ahmed al-Asadi, leader of the Sanad Bloc, also broke down, further scattering the once-projected alliance into separate electoral trajectories.
Motivations Behind the Division
According to observers, several factors underlie the decision by Framework forces to splinter into multiple electoral lists:
-Maximizing Seats: By contesting separately, the Framework factions hope to widen their overall parliamentary footprint. Fragmented lists could appeal to different Shiite constituencies and reduce vote wastage under Iraq's semi-open list electoral system.
-Internal Power-Balancing: Running separately allows each faction to assess its real political strength in terms of votes and seats, thus reshaping the post-election negotiations based on actual popular support rather than presumptive power-sharing formulas.
-Flexibility in Coalition Building: A post-election merger of winning Shiite lists into a broader governing alliance would provide more leverage during cabinet formation talks. As one Framework source put it, 'Forming alliances after results allows each party to know its weight and public base.'
Risks and Uncertainties
However, the division strategy is not without risks. Competing lists could split the Shiite vote in several constituencies, potentially benefiting non-Framework parties or independent candidates, especially in Baghdad and southern provinces. Additionally, coordination failures could leave some Framework parties underperforming, weakening the Shiite bloc's ability to secure a comfortable parliamentary majority.
Moreover, the Framework's historical rival, the Sadrist Movement (currently the Patriotic Shiite Movement), while currently boycotting political life, remains a wildcard. A sudden return by Al-Sadr or an alliance of independents and smaller parties could disrupt the Framework's plans.