CARE's Closure Signals a Deeper Crisis in Afghan Resettlement Policy
At the end of July, the U.S. State Department's Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) – not to be confused with the humanitarian agency of the same name – officially shut down.
The State Department's CARE office was established after the 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan to serve as a central point of coordination for relocation cases, liaising with federal agencies, veteran advocates, and NGOs. Its closure marks the loss of a trusted federal lifeline that had developed cultural and operational expertise in supporting Afghan allies.
CARE's closure has both domestic and foreign policy implications. It is a warning sign: a symptom of a fragile resettlement system that continues to rely on underfunded, short-term solutions to meet long-term moral and strategic obligations. If the U.S. government fails to change course, CARE's end will not be an isolated event, but the beginning of a broader unraveling in the Afghan resettlement system and foreign allies' trust in the United States.
The Unique Value of CARE
Created in the wake of the chaotic 2021 withdrawal, CARE quickly became a central player in the Afghan resettlement landscape. It was never intended to replace the work of permanent agencies like the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human Services, or the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. But as federal systems struggled to meet demand, CARE assumed an essential coordination role.
Under the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts Authorization Act of 2024, which was bundled into the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, CARE was tasked with coordinating all aspects of relocating and resettling eligible Afghan allies, including working across federal agencies to align support services. This reliance on a single, short-term office is a sign of a deeper policy failure: the federal government's overreliance on small, often underfunded organizations to execute long-term responsibilities tied to wartime commitments.
CARE supported Afghan families in ways many permanent federally contracted agencies could not. CARE employed roughly 200 domestic employees in January 2025, including contractors, primarily managing logistical case coordination for evacuated Afghans. During its term of operation, CARE facilitated the resettlement of approximately 118,000 Afghan evacuees, and its closure threatened the future relocation prospects of up to 300,000 pending cases. CARE also continued to provide support after resettlement, through Afghan Support Centers that helped link new arrivals to critical services and assist with immigration paperwork.
Crucially, it also built trust, which cannot be retroactively rebuilt.
Gaps Left Behind
Although the CARE Authorization Act envisioned the office operating through 2027, shifting priorities and funding decisions led to its early shutdown. Now, the gaps left behind are substantial, and CARE's closure creates a cascading set of risks. The shutdown of CARE will affect nearly 300,000 Afghans in need of assistance in the U.S. and abroad.
Additionally, as of July 29, 2025, the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) backlog remains staggering: 178,000 Afghans have Chief of Mission (COM) approval – including 34,000 principal applicants and 144,000 family members – while tens of thousands more await a COM decision. Since September 2021, only 77,323 SIVs have been issued, and 45,000 applicants remain at the COM stage awaiting a decision.
For many families, CARE was the link that turned bureaucratic approval into a real pathway to safety. One applicant told the Washington Post that the end of CARE's operations has put her family's hopes of finding safety in the U.S. at serious risk. The Taliban targeted her family directly because her husband, who was killed by the Taliban in 2021, was a former member of the Afghan military who fought alongside American forces. Although the family had qualified for the SIV program and was cleared for a visa interview in a third country, those plans are now in limbo without CARE's logistical support.
'We're in this situation because of the United States,' she said. 'We need them to get us out.'
Federal Policy and Grassroots Advocacy
Federal policy has compounded these challenges. The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has not significantly expanded capacity to accommodate the long tail of Afghan resettlement needs. Many evacuees remain in legal limbo, with temporary humanitarian parole statuses and no clear path to permanent protection.
The Afghan Adjustment Act, which is intended to provide that path, has been reintroduced and stalled in Congress repeatedly, most recently for the third time since its first introduction in August 2022. This iteration comes with bipartisan support: in the House of Representatives led by Representatives Jason Crow (D-CO) and Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-IA) , and in the Senate by many Senators such as Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Chris Coons (D-DE), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and more. With the bill effectively stalled for the last three years, legislative inaction has effectively pushed long-term responsibility onto ad hoc and short-term mechanisms like CARE, entities never designed to carry this burden alone. Now even CARE is gone.
The consequences of this inaction were under scrutiny during a July 24 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, when Representative Julie Johnson of Texas questioned Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Allison Hooker on the State Department's lack of commitment to Afghan allies and the implications of CARE's closure.
At the same time, the Moral Compass Federation, a small advocacy coalition focused on veterans and moral injury, met with Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of South and Central Asia for Afghanistan and Pakistan Mary Bischoping. (Bischoping has reportedly been moved out of that role, though her next post remains unclear.) While the readout of the meeting suggested a focus on the psychological toll of the withdrawal, the concrete policy outcomes remain unclear.
It's important to note, however, that the government's abandonment of Afghan allies has created a compounding moral injury not only for Afghan families but also for U.S. veterans. The collapse of the State Department's CARE is not only a loss of services, but it is also a visible symbol of institutional neglect that deepens the psychological toll on both Afghan survivors and the veterans who fought to protect them.
Many veterans who risked their lives alongside Afghan interpreters and partners are outraged that the U.S. government is failing to uphold its promises to those very individuals. While the federal response has stalled, grassroots groups are taking action.
AfghanEvac is an organization helping Afghans evacuate and resettle safely. Today, it is pushing for resettlement pathways to remain open, while also fighting to protect the legal status of Afghan allies already in the United States. This summer, Shawn VanDiver, president and board chairman of AfghanEvac, launched the 'Battle Buddies' program, in which veterans volunteer to accompany Afghan allies to high-stakes immigration appointments.
In Plymouth, Massachusetts, Jessica Bradley Rushing from AfghanEvac joined Senator Earl Blumenthal and Representative Bill Keating to advocate for Zia, a COM-approved SIV applicant with humanitarian parole, who was detained by ICE.
Advocacy efforts have also grown for Mohammod Habibi, an American citizen whom the Taliban have imprisoned for three years. A press conference was held on August 9, calling for his immediate release.
These cases demonstrate the enduring danger to wartime allies and the need for coordinated, federally supported actions, which CARE previously provided from the State Department.
'The United States made a promise, not a suggestion,' VanDiver said in a statement. 'That promise was made in uniform, in embassies, in war zones, and in law. The allies in question were invited, recruited, and trusted us. Now we're detaining them, stranding them, or trying to send them back.
'This isn't a policy debate. It's a coordinated rollback of America's word.'
Foreign Policy Ripples
CARE's closure goes beyond Afghan resettlement and raises questions about U.S. foreign policy and its credibility. The 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan already raised criticism about the U.S. commitment to its allies. For U.S. allies and partners across the Asia-Pacific, the unraveling of Afghan resettlement infrastructure raises pressing questions about the reliability of U.S. commitments.
CARE's collapse and the larger failure to establish a durable system for supporting at-risk Afghan partners risk reinforcing a perception that the United States lacks staying power after conflict ends. This is especially troubling amid rising scrutiny of a potential U.S. commitment gap in the Indo-Pacific, where partners like Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea are reassessing Washington's long-term reliability and follow-through on security promises despite weak attempts to deepen strategic engagement.
These countries are similarly watching how Washington follows through and treats its Afghan allies, particularly those who directly supported U.S. missions. If the U.S. government appears unable, or unwilling, to protect the people who put themselves at risk on its behalf, that sends a chilling message to future partners: U.S. protection may be temporary, conditional, and/or easily withdrawn.
CARE's shutdown is therefore not only a crisis for Afghan survivors. It is also a test case for U.S. strategic credibility in a region where long-term alliances depend on consistency and follow-through, rather than simple talk.
Key Action Steps
The shutdown of CARE in the State Department should prompt federal and state agencies to reassess how resettlement policy is implemented on the ground by the government – and how its shortcomings reflect on the U.S. globally.
One urgent priority is securing dedicated funding for culturally specific survivor services. Organizations working with Afghan women and trauma survivors must be meaningfully supported, not through short-term grants alone, but with sustained, long-term investment.
In addition, the federal government must reevaluate its service delivery models. Small and temporary measures cannot continue to serve as stopgaps for deeper structural failures in resettlement policy. These are not just domestic administrative choices – they carry foreign policy consequences. When the U.S. fails to fulfill promises to wartime partners, it undermines its credibility with current and future allies around the world.
Finally, immediate support is needed for the communities directly affected by CARE's closure. Former clients require continuity of care, including clear referral pathways, case management transitions, and transparent public communication about where they can now turn for assistance.
CARE's closure is not the end of the struggle to resettle Afghan allies in the United States, but it does mark a turning point. Without stronger government partnerships and reliable funding streams, more organizations will follow. Each one that disappears leaves behind a service void that disproportionately impacts the most vulnerable, including women, children, and survivors of violence.
August 15 marked four years since the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban. Yet, since the suspension of the relocation and resettlement operations, 250,000 potentially eligible Afghan allies are still in limbo.
Afghan resettlement is not a short-term project. It requires long-term infrastructure, clear policy direction, and the recognition that responsibility for wartime allies does not end at the point of evacuation.
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