Opinion: China Plays Games Of Sabotage As India Shuns Old Equations For Good
India trashing the joint statement drafted at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) exposes the tragedy of the China-dominated bloc — a forum meant to fight terrorism, now compromised by China and its terror-breeding ally Pakistan. This, however, is just the tip of the iceberg– as much more is simmering between India and China right now– from Xi Jinping skipping the BRICS Summit, Chinese economic sabotage, Beijing's backing of Pakistan's military against India, and tense negotiations on the new rules of engagement are unfolding behind the scenes. This is less about restoration of ties, and more about redirection.
As Defence Minister Rajnath Singh flipped through the pages, he put down his pen and refused to sign, resulting in the absence of a joint statement from the SCO. This move shreds China's cover for Pakistan's terror-sponsoring regime as China seeks to corner India diplomatically, economically and militarily— all at once. The proposed joint statement gave it all away — it made direct references to incidents in Balochistan but skipped the Pahalgam terror attack— a brazen attempt to cover up Pakistan's hand in terror.
The SCO was started to address the security concerns of the region, founded by China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India joined in 2017, and today the organisation has 10 members, including Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus. Its anti-terror committee, RATS, is headquartered in Uzbekistan, while its secretariat operates from Beijing.
While the SCO is largely meant to focus on terrorism, separatism and extremism, in recent years, it has become a vehicle for China to play out its larger geopolitical agenda against the West, extend its influence with Russia and other post-soviet members, and shield Pakistan from global scrutiny— especially by suppressing references to Pakistani terrorism.
India's defence minister highlighted the role of Pakistan-based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in terror attacks and said that there should be no room for double standards in the SCO. This is not the first time that India has rejected a joint statement at the SCO as in 2023, it rejected references to China's Belt and Road Initiative and opposed a BRICS currency basket plan proposed by China.
While China is the dominant player in this grouping, India has actively opposed China's designs to turn the SCO into a personal fiefdom. By exposing the double standards, India maintains a crucial position in the SCO, souring China's attempts to align it fully with its own agenda. This is ultimately a diplomatic failure of the Chinese for whom the SCO is a flagship organisation to elevate China's stature as opposed to the West. When India dissents internally, it shows the contradictions of the forum, and the limitations of Chinese leadership and diplomacy.
Turning to Brazil, where the BRICS Summit is set for next month, reports say Xi Jinping will skip the summit for the first time since he took office 12 years ago. The likely reason is that Brazil has invited Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a state dinner following the BRICS summit.
According to a report by the South China Morning Post or SCMP, Beijing's decision came because Xi could have been 'perceived as a supporting actor" at the summit. Officially China has told Brazil that there are scheduling issues as Beijing is more focused on the SCO summit which may be as late as September.
But there is a lot going on between India and China behind the scenes which may explain this clash of egos. Post-Galwan relations between India and China froze until a mild thaw in 2024, when PM Modi met Chinese President Xi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia. Since then, discussions on disengagement and de-escalation at the border, and normalisation of economic relations are on.
This is a period of extensive and exhaustive negotiations between the two nations. China has weaponised its economic heft, with control on supply of strategic goods like rare earth magnets, specialty fertilisers, tunnel boring machines, and so on.
China is leveraging its dominance in rare earths to achieve its political goals not just with the US but also with other nations like Japan, South Korea and India. It has restricted exports of magnets like Samarium which is crucial in defence production. This compromises capabilities to produce automobiles, especially electric vehicles, defence equipment, wind turbines and other electronics
Recently, India decided to suspend a pact with Japan where it supplied neodymium to Tokyo, in light of the global crunch caused by Chinese export restrictions. India, with the fifth largest rare-earth reserves globally, is making a push for indigenous mining and production which can be a strategic game changer in the long run. It is calling for investments and has issued production-linked incentive schemes to sweeten deals. It is also collaborating with foreign nations like Australia and the larger Quad to extract rare earths, diversifying supply nations.
China is afraid that India's recent showing at the recent G7 summit will lead to a joint effort against China's rare earth dominance. China is rattled by India calling it out globally for being an unreliable partner even as negotiations are on. This Chinese insecurity has reportedly even come up in discussions. Beijing is essentially threatened by New Delhi's Aatmanirbhar Bharat plans and is pulling strings to scuttle it.
Recently, reports have emerged of China holding up exports of specialty fertiliser used in fruit production, which may hurt Indian agriculture. A similar non-tariff barrier was seen with tunnel boarding machines— built by a German firm in China, bought and paid for by India, but delivery to India held up by Chinese authorities.
Such tactics are being used across sectors to deter companies from moving to India. China wants India to reopen its doors to Chinese investment and resume direct flights. These are essential for sustaining economic linkages, but India has remained cautious, especially given Beijing's opaque policies and supply chain manipulation.
China is also eager to showcase the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage as a gesture of goodwill, highlighting supposed efforts to boost people-to-people ties. But this should not fool anyone: at the same time, China continues to support Pakistan militarily against India and shields its terror wielding hand in every global forum, including the UN.
Chinese missiles, drones and fighter jets were used extensively by Pakistan during India's Operation Sindoor. Moreover, a recent interview by defence minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Asif, confirmed– China has been sharing intelligence against India with Islamabad.
This is China using every trick in the book from diplomatic to economic and military to contain India, scuttle its self-reliance push, and stall its arrival as a great power on the world stage: an inevitability it fails to digest. And yet dialogue continues with new terms of engagement being negotiated.
Rather than returning to old equations as the Chinese hope, India is preparing for a future where China cannot easily undermine Indian interests. India is simply unrelenting on all counts, navigating through the Chinese challenge diplomatically with certainty and precision, and prioritising its military goals and economic ambitions above all.
While the question of preparedness throws up a significant challenge for India's leadership, indications are that the pivot to self-reliance is a strategic shift that China cannot stop. And that explains Chinese frustration in backroom talks.
About the Author
Shubhangi Sharma
Shubhangi Sharma is News Editor - Special Projects at News18. She covers foreign affairs and geopolitics, and also keeps a close watch on the national pulse of India.
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First Published:
June 30, 2025, 13:39 IST
News opinion Opinion: China Plays Games Of Sabotage As India Shuns Old Equations For Good
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