The impact of Climate Change on food security in South Africa
A loss in food productivity is making food more xpensive
Image: Tracey Adams/Independent Newspapers
As climate change continues to wreak havoc on South Africa's agricultural landscape, the future of food security hangs in the balance. With predictions indicating a potential 50% decline in agricultural production by 2050, the spectre of hunger looms ever larger for the 18 million households, or roughly 21% of the population, who are currently grappling with food insecurity.
Recent studies forecast a 25% increase in maize yield variability due to shifting weather patterns, including reduced rainfall and soaring temperatures. As the staple food source for many low-income households, maize is already feeling the pinch, with prices climbing by 30% in recent years, exacerbated by the impacts of climate change on agricultural productivity.
According to Roscoe van Wyk, a research fellow at Stellenbosch Business School, the agricultural sector must be restructured to effectively address these challenges. He argues that integrating enterprise development with climate adaptation strategies is crucial to ensuring that more people have access to adequate, affordable, and nutritious food.
'Growing the agricultural sector should be a key economic priority, particularly if we are to achieve the National Development Plan (NDP) goals of an integrated and inclusive rural economy and the creation of one million new jobs in agriculture by 2030,' van Wyk stresses.
Historical data indicates that agricultural productivity growth significantly reduces poverty, demonstrating that growth in this sector is often two to three times more effective than in others, such as mining or manufacturing. This is especially pertinent as rising food prices disproportionately affect low-income households that spend a considerable portion of their income on basic necessities.
Van Wyk's research highlights a stark correlation: a mere 1% increase in food prices can diminish household welfare by over 20%, subsequently limiting access to essential services like healthcare and education. The progress made in reducing poverty levels since South Africa's transition to democracy is now reversing, a trend further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic and intensifying climate impacts.
'Climate change is manifesting itself not only through decreasing rainfall and higher temperatures but also through extreme weather events, leading to floods and prolonged droughts,' van Wyk elaborates. These conditions wreak havoc on crop and livestock health, thereby disrupting the agricultural supply chain and driving prices upward.
Compounding the problem, crop production has failed to keep pace with population growth over the last two decades. As the population continues to grow, the prospects for alleviating food insecurity diminish further. Van Wyk insists that simply maintaining current agriculture levels will not suffice; improvements in productivity are essential to meet the needs of a burgeoning population while contending with climate challenges.
The link between food security and the agricultural value chain is profound, particularly in rural areas where poverty is most entrenched. Enhancing support for both large-scale commercial and small-scale subsistence farming can create a pathway out of poverty for many. 'By empowering individuals to feed themselves, whether through gainful employment or viable farming, we can address the inequality gap and combat unemployment,' he claims.
Van Wyk advocates for a transformative approach to support small-scale farmers by merging enterprise development with sustainability. He argues that as these farmers often lack the resources for advanced agricultural technologies, financial backing must be coupled with education on climate adaptability and sustainable farming practices.
Moreover, he emphasises the importance of practical implementation of existing policies, as well as incentivising established farmers to mentor emerging counterparts. This cooperative model can pave the way for scaled-up production and increased employment opportunities as South Africa navigates an uncertain agricultural future.
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According to the Act, the Minister may, after consulting the relevant sectors and with the advice of the Commission for Employment Equity (CEE), for the purpose of ensuring the equitable representation of suitably qualified people from the designated groups at all occupational levels in the workforce, by notice in the Government Gazette set numerical targets for any national economic sector identified in terms of subsection (1). Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. 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Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Next Stay Close ✕ Neasa on Wednesday said the urgency of this interdict stemmed from concerns voiced by the associations about the potential for these regulations to inflict irreparable harm on both public and private sectors. Neasa and Sakeliga argue that the minister's plan risks the allocation of resources ineffectively in a futile attempt to meet what they describe as 'impossible' compliance requirements. Under the proposed framework, companies would be required to categorise themselves into one of 18 economic sectors and adjust their workforce composition according to a series of demographic quotas. These quotas, referred to as 'numerical sectoral targets,' highlight a drastic shift in hiring practices, where businesses are instructed to limit appointments or promotions of employees from so-called over-represented groups, which includes many white male staff members. The end goal of these targets is to ensure that every single designated business (50 or more employees) in South Africa, regardless of industry, has a workforce that is representative of the racial and gender demographic composition of the country. The 2025 CEE Annual Report shows that at Top Management, the White population representation at 61.1% is approximately eight times their Economically Active Population (EAP), and the Indian population representation at 11.9% is more than four times their EAP at the Top Management level. In contrast, said the report, the African population representation is at 18.0%, which is approximately four times below their EAP, and the Coloured population representation at 6.2% is below their EAP at this occupational level. The CEE Report concludes that the lack of equitable representation at the Top Management level does not bode well for the future sustainable economic growth of the country and the representation of the demographic population distribution in the workplace in terms of population groups, gender, and disability. The Report said that at the Senior Management level, the picture remains appalling for the Africans, with the White and Indian Population representation remaining significantly higher than their EAP. However, critics of the regulations, including Neasa and Sakeliga, maintain that the measures contravene established constitutional rights and impose unachievable demands on employers. The economic repercussions, they argue, could be dire, potentially leading to significant job losses and overwhelming legal uncertainties that would disrupt business operations across the board. "The regulations and the Employment Equity Act (as amended in 2023) establish unlawful, unconstitutional, and impossible demands. Their consequence would be severe financial harm to businesses and extensive social harm through economic disruption, increased unemployment, and legal uncertanty," Neasa said. "We informed the minister that, in addition to our urgent application against the 2025 administrative regulations and sectoral targets, we also intend to challenge the Employment Equity Act on additional grounds."
