Asean should shift to strategic firmness to realise 'centrality' concept

New Straits Times

2 days ago

ON May 26, 2025, Malaysia's Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, in his role as Asean Chair, announced that he had reached out to US President Donald Trump to propose a summit at the bloc level between the United States and Asean ( Association of Southeast Asian Nations).
This initiative comes in response to Washington's recent implementation of a 15 per cent tariff on electronics and a 10 per cent levy on agricultural exports from Southeast Asia, measures that are expected to reduce Asean's collective gross domestic product (GDP) growth by up to 0.7 percentage points in 2025.
Such unilateral restrictions challenge the principles of multilateralism and undermine Asean's central role in shaping economic, regional, and strategic agendas.
This essay argues that as the 46th Asean Summit concluded, the bloc should abandon a deferential stance and instead leverage its economic strength, institutional unity, and commitment to a rules-based order to negotiate with strategic firmness and mutual respect.
Asean's foundational concept of "centrality" positions the bloc as a key forum for regional dialogue and crisis management. However, this centrality relies on the ability to influence outcomes.
If member states allow internal divisions to hinder decisive action, Asean risks relinquishing authority to other actors, especially China, which has strengthened its regional influence through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
To maintain its negotiating leverage, Asean should avoid a conciliatory approach that relies on piecemeal requests and lobbying for exemptions.
Instead, it should adopt a unified stance that emphasises legal remedies, utilises the World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement, and highlights the disproportionate impact on small and medium-sized enterprises across member states.
Confronting these challenges requires a two-pronged strategy.
First, Asean must advocate for a formal Asean Special Summit, allowing all the heads of government to present synchronised data on tariff impacts, propose practical solutions such as tariff quotas and rates, and reaffirm their commitment to mutual market access.
This approach leverages Asean's combined market of 680 million consumers and a total GDP of US$4 trillion to compel US recognition of the bloc as an indispensable partner.
If Asean falters, it should authorise the appointment of a Secretariat in coordination with national trade ministries to file a consolidated complaint with the WTO.
The bloc must accelerate market integration under the Asean Economic Community framework by reducing non-tariff barriers, harmonising standards, and promoting regional value in higher-value industries.
Additionally, diversifying export markets through engagement with the European Union, India, and Japan will help mitigate dependence on the US market.
Strengthening financial safety nets, such as the expanding Chiang Mai Multilateralisation Initiative and exploring Asean sovereign bond issuance, will bolster resilience against external shocks.
By adopting these measures, Asean will demonstrate that centrality is not a passive status but an active choice to lead principled, secure engagement and shape its economic future.
Integrating recommendations with concluding reflections, Asean's next steps must strategically combine assertiveness with pragmatic adaptation.
This involves demanding a US Special Summit framed by data-driven analysis, invoking WTO mechanisms when necessary, and fostering deeper economic cooperation.
Asean should focus on rolling back punitive tariffs while simultaneously deepening intra-regional integration, diversifying external partnerships, and reinforcing financial contingency arrangements.
By doing so, the bloc can transform its centrality from mere aspiration into operational strength, safeguarding its regional relevance and advancing a stable, rules-based Indo-Pacific order.