Why do we pretend SCO still works? China runs it, shields Pakistan, sidelines India
Singh's remarks on the importance of countering terrorist technologies, including the use of drones for cross-border smuggling of weapons and drugs, and his warning that traditional borders are no longer sufficient to guard against threats in an interconnected world, appeared to fall on deaf ears among the 10-member group, led by Beijing. His reminder of the joint statement on 'Countering Radicalisation leading to Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism', issued during India's Chairmanship of the SCO, also failed to evoke any positive response or change of heart.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's Defence Ministers' meeting, held in Qingdao last week, ended without adopting a joint statement. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh refused to sign the communique, as it made no mention of the Pahalgam terror attack, nor included any condemnation of Pakistan, the country from where the attack was sponsored.
Also read: SCO is not an anti-Western club. India's presence is a guarantee against it
India's blind spot at SCO
India should perhaps have anticipated the outcome of the SCO meeting, considering recent developments and its own positioning in UN bodies. After the heinous Pahalgam attack by the 'Resistance Front', a proxy of the UN-designated terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) — in which, as the Defence Minister mentioned, victims were profiled based on religious identity and shot, China offered diplomatic support to Pakistan. It neither condemned the attack in 'Srinagar city, the summer capital of Indian-controlled Kashmir' (as China referred to it), nor acknowledged India's position, instead calling for an 'impartial probe'.
The initial report from Xinhua ended with a terse line: 'A guerilla war has been going on between militants and Indian troops stationed in the region since 1989.' After India's 'pause' in military action against terror bases in Pakistan, China was among the first to praise Pakistan's so-called peace efforts. In a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart Ishaq Dar, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi described Pakistan as an 'iron-clad friend', and reaffirmed support for its 'sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national independence.'
In this background, it was likely futile to expect the China-led SCO to condemn Pakistan for its role in terror attacks on India.
India should have also taken note of Iran's presence at the SCO meeting, considering Tehran is not happy with New Delhi's position on the Iran-Israel conflict. In June this year, India distanced itself from an SCO statement condemning Israel's 'aggressive actions against civilian targets [in Iran], including energy and transport infrastructure, which have resulted in civilian casualties, [and] are a gross violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.' India had communicated its concerns to Tehran and other SCO members but did not participate in the discussions or consent to the statement.
Although Iran became a member of the SCO during India's Chairmanship in 2023, China's economic engagement in Chabahar and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) gives Beijing greater leverage with SCO members.
Also read: PM Modi didn't skip SCO due to US influence. India has its own independent agenda
An alternative to SCO
India must now seriously reconsider its involvement in the SCO, where China's writ runs large, Russia's interests are protected, Pakistan's terror networks are never condemned, and India's legitimate interests and concerns are consistently ignored. Even when India was admitted to the SCO at Russia's insistence, China ensured that Pakistan joined simultaneously, serving as a counterweight to India.
Founded in 1996, the Shanghai Five began as a forum for political and economic dialogue among select Eurasian countries, especially China and Russia. One could argue that China, uncomfortable being seen as a mere Asian power, expanded the SCO to include newly independent post-Soviet states to broaden its geopolitical reach.
There is no denying that a new and resurgent Russia may want to regain its strategic footprints in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and other former Soviet territories. India and Russia could independently explore the creation of an alternative economic platform, comprising Central Asian countries, Afghanistan and Iran, with BIMSTEC and IBSA as observers, to tap into energy and mineral resources and a counter-terrorism network.
Meanwhile, India should suspend border talks with China and demand political representation from Tibet, which remains under Chinese occupation. Given the Dalai Lama's recent statements that his successor will be chosen through traditional religious norms, China has no role in the spiritual or political future of Tibet. The Tibetan people, many of whom live in exile in India, cannot remain displaced indefinitely and must return to their cultural homeland.
If China continues referring to Kashmir as 'India-controlled Kashmir,' there is no reason India should not assertively refer to Tibet as 'China-controlled Tibet.' Furthermore, if the conflict in Kashmir is described as a guerilla war since 1989, then the ongoing struggles in Balochistan and Xinjiang, which were forcibly annexed by Pakistan in 1948 and by China in 1949, can also be termed guerilla wars for liberation.
There are also reports of a China-Pakistan tie-up to form a new South Asian regional bloc to replace SAARC. If that materialises, India must launch its own alternative to SCO, one that is more inclusive and economically credible, and offers genuine cooperation on terrorism.
Seshadri Chari is the former editor of 'Organiser'. He tweets @seshadrichari. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)
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