Why Australia Intends to Recognize Palestine
On Monday, the Australian government followed the United Kingdom, France and Canada in signaling their intent to recognize a Palestinian state. This marked a significant journey that Canberra has taken over the past almost two years, from initially fully supporting Israel's right to defend itself through to increasing frustration and dismay at Israel's action, sanctions placed on Israeli officials Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, and finally to recognizing a Palestinian state.
Australia has always supported a two-state solution to the dispute over the land that is now Israel and the Palestinian territories. Australia's long hope has been that Israel and the Palestinian Authority (which Australia has diplomatic relations with) could come to a peaceful negotiated settlement to live next to each other, followed by Australian recognition of Palestine in addition to Israel.
But, this now looks impossible, and so Australia has shifted its policy.
Australia, along with its international partners, now need to find a pressure point to change Israel's behavior. Australia no longer sees Israel's actions as merely a matter of defense, but instead a brutal offence that has created an unnecessary humanitarian crisis in Gaza, a crisis that needs to end as soon as possible. The hope is that an isolated Israel will understand this. Although with continued support from the U.S, Israel may not feel this pressure too intensely.
There is a delicate balance here that Australia has to find. This policy shift is a signal that Australia recognizes that Israel's ongoing response to the events of October 7 has been disproportionate, not just creating a humanitarian crisis, but violating international law in its failure to protect civilians – including humanitarian aid workers and media. Australia has worked with its close international partners like the U.K., Canada and France to find the best diplomatic course forward to end this crisis.
Yet, it also must be acknowledged that Hamas wanted this response from Israel. Hamas cared so little for the people of the Gaza Strip that they were willing to provoke Israel into creating a humanitarian crisis. Australia risks being seen as rewarding this tactic. It also potentially creates an incentive for other extremist organizations throughout the world seeking to advance their cause. A sudden, radical action can be highly successful in dramatically altering political conditions, regardless of the human cost.
In all three of Hamas' objectives, it has been highly successful. The provocation of Israel worked, the fault lines between the U.S. and the rest of the West may widen (although this issue is just one of a number of current factors), and social cohesion within Western countries has been weakened. The pressure to 'choose a side,' and the intensity of belief are tearing at the social fabric.
Australia, in particular, has seen a horrific increase in antisemitic attacks, including last month when the door to a synagogue in Melbourne was set on fire, while on the same night, a group of pro-Palestinian protesters stormed an Israeli restaurant. Australia has created special envoys to combat both antisemitism and Islamophobia, but a recent series of recommendations by the special envoy on combating antisemitism includes a number of overreaching or unworkable solutions. The government is still considering its options.
Prior to the formal announcements of Australia's intent to recognize a Palestinian state, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese spoke to his Israeli counterpart, Benjamin Netanyahu, to inform him of the decision. Albanese subsequently told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) that Netanyahu was 'in denial' about the consequences for innocent Palestinians of the continued war within Gaza. Relations between the two countries will now require a change of government in Israel to mend.
For Australia, the recognition of a Palestinian state is a gambit of its own. It is a change in policy less designed to pave the international conditions for a functional Palestinian state, and more designed in concert with its allies to shift Israel's behavior. Even if successful, the path toward a Palestinian state will remain highly complex. The policy shift may therefore be more about changing domestic conditions in Australia: Hoping that an end to the conflict, and an alleviation of the humanitarian crisis, can ease the passions on the streets in Australia that both Hamas and Israel have aroused.
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