Why Is the US Punishing India – But Not China – for Buying Russian Oil?

The Diplomat

13 hours ago

When Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine on February 22, 2022, the world was confronted not only with a brutal war of aggression but also with a dramatic reshaping of global oil flows. As Washington and its allies implemented sweeping sanctions aimed at crippling Moscow's war chest, two Asian economic powerhouses – India and China – emerged as vital lifelines for Russia's energy exports. What happened next has become one of the more puzzling episodes in recent U.S. foreign policy: the Trump administration has sharply penalized India for its expanding purchases of Russian crude – culminating in a 50 percent tariff on select exports – while allowing China – an even greater consumer of that very oil – to escape similar direct punishment.
The disparity is so marked that it demands examination. It cannot be explained by reference to oil volumes alone, nor is it a simple matter of how international law is applied. Instead, it reflects a confluence of cold political calculation, relative economic leverage, and the subtle but consequential difference between how U.S. policymakers view India and China. What makes this story more complex still is the Trump administration's belief – one that shapes much of its strategic posture – that China might play a decisive role in brokering an end to the Ukraine war.
India's post-invasion pivot to Russian oil has been extraordinary in scale and speed. Before the war, Russian crude accounted for less than 2 percent of India's oil imports. A year later, Russia was supplying nearly 40 percent, an all-time high that persisted into 2025. In absolute terms, India imported 88 million metric tonnes of Russian crude in fiscal year 2025, out of a total of 245 million tonnes – more than 1.7 million barrels per day, a 20-fold increase in just three years. Indian refiners, taking advantage of steep wartime discounts, adapted their facilities to handle this influx. Much of the oil was not only used domestically but refined into gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel for export around the world – including to Western markets that officially barred the purchase of Russian-origin oil.
China's role in Moscow's energy survival is even larger, if less conspicuous. By the middle of 2025, Chinese refiners were buying almost half of all Russian crude exports, while also absorbing vast quantities of coal, gas, and refined products. In many months, Beijing accounted for nearly 40 percent of all Russian fossil fuel export revenue. Yet China's purchases were often conducted out of the spotlight – channeled through intermediaries, mixed with other cargoes, and announced far less openly than India's.
For Washington, the decision to target India and not China begins with the question of leverage. India, for all its growing assertiveness on the world stage, remains deeply dependent on Western markets, technology, and investment. The United States is one of its largest export destinations and a key source of high-tech collaboration. U.S. policymakers thus believe they can pressure India economically without risking the kind of systemic disruption that would follow a direct confrontation with China.
China, in contrast, presents a different challenge. Years of trade wars, tech sanctions, and geopolitical disputes have left China-U.S. relations brittle, but they have also revealed the depth of mutual interdependence. A major U.S. tariff offensive tied to China's oil imports from Russia would almost certainly provoke retaliation on a scale that could shatter global supply chains, trigger inflationary shocks, and damage the U.S. economy in ways that would be politically costly. Moreover, China's highly opaque energy trade makes it harder to target with precision, allowing it to deflect public blame in a way India – whose oil dealings are overt and well-documented – cannot.
The 'profiteering' narrative has also placed New Delhi in Washington's crosshairs. U.S. officials have accused Indian refiners of exploiting discounted Russian crude not just to fuel their own economy, but to re-export refined products to the very countries enforcing sanctions against Russia. In 2023, India exported over $86 billion in refined oil products, prompting U.S. frustration that a strategic partner was simultaneously benefiting from Western alignment and undermining its sanctions at the same time. China engages in similar activity, but shrouds it in far greater discretion, thus avoiding the same public rebuke.
Beneath these debates over sanctions and trade lies a still more controversial rationale for Washington's restraint toward China: the belief that Beijing could help bring the Ukraine conflict to a negotiated close. U.S. President Donald Trump has long cast himself as the figure uniquely capable of securing a 'deal' that ends the war. In his calculus, President Xi Jinping is not simply Russia's most important partner; he is a potential kingmaker whose tacit support could lend legitimacy to any settlement between Kyiv and Moscow. Chinese leaders have been careful to encourage this perception, offering vaguely worded proposals for peace, presenting themselves as neutral conveners at major diplomatic forums, and signaling – without making concrete moves – that they favor dialogue.
It is here that the divergence in U.S. treatment of India and China deepens. For Trump's team, India has little real sway over Putin, making it a safe target for punitive measures that reinforce the credibility of U.S. sanctions policy. China, by contrast, is seen as too important to alienate while a putative negotiating track remains open. The possibility – however slim – that Beijing might someday pressure Moscow toward compromise serves as an argument for strategic patience, not confrontation.
Yet this is where the policy veers into dangerous illusion. The expectation that China will act as an honest peace broker is, in reality, inconsistent with Beijing's own interests. A drawn-out war serves China well. It distracts U.S. and European strategic focus from the Indo-Pacific, allowing Beijing more room to assert itself regionally. It locks Russia into a position of economic dependence, forcing Moscow to sell oil, gas, and other resources at deep discounts, bolstering China's energy security. And it erodes Western unity and leadership by fueling fatigue, economic pressures, and political division within NATO and the EU.
Officially, Beijing may call for negotiations and profess neutrality, but in practice it has done little to pressure Putin toward a settlement – and has, in many ways, expanded its support for Russia through trade, joint projects, and diplomatic cover. The longer the war continues, the more China can present itself to the Global South as a counterweight to the West while tightening its grip on a sanction-strangled Russia.
This makes the Trump administration's calculation – that indulgence now could yield Chinese cooperation later – not just overly optimistic but strategically self-defeating. It hands Beijing leverage over a European security crisis that the United States and its allies ought to control, and it gives Xi every reason to prolong the very conflict Washington hopes to resolve.
The result is a sanctions regime that is uneven in application and riddled with conflicting priorities. By targeting India so forcefully, the U.S. risks alienating one of its most important emerging partners – at precisely the moment when India's cooperation on technology, defense, and regional security is most needed. By sparing China, Washington sends a message that large-scale violations of the sanctions regime will be tolerated if the violator is too important – or too feared – to punish, reinforcing the cynical perception that U.S. policy is dictated less by principle than by power calculus.
If there is one lesson to draw, it is that sanctions and tariffs alone cannot compel compliance when geopolitical interests run this deep. Realism demands acknowledging that China's posture toward the Ukraine war is shaped by self-interest – and that self-interest points toward prolonging the conflict, not resolving it on Western terms. Continuing to hope otherwise will only weaken Washington's position, undermine its credibility with partners, and hand Beijing another opening to exploit the West's divisions.
For U.S. policy to be effective, it must abandon wishful thinking and confront the truth of this balance. India's energy choices present a legitimate challenge to the sanctions regime, but the long-term strategic threat lies in China's ability to evade pressure while shaping the conflict's trajectory to its advantage. Until Washington recognizes this and acts accordingly, its approach to both India and China will remain reactive, inconsistent, and vulnerable to manipulation from the very powers it seeks to influence.