Pakistani Pilgrims Face Hardship In Mecca: Broken Suitcases, Inedible Food And Neglect
Making statements in the National Assembly, Shagufta Jumani and Shahida Rehmani from the Pakistan People's Party exposed the claims being made by Sharif government of ensuring a smooth and seamless Haj pilgrimage for all Pakistanis.
"The food being served to the Haj pilgrims from our country is inedible and same throughout the day. Which companies have been allotted these contracts and on whose recommendations? The people at the helm of affairs have completely destroyed the system. I sincerely appeal to you in the name of God to have mercy on the Haj pilgrims," said Jumani.
Rehmani too highlighted the gross official negligence, severely criticising the government machinery.
"Seven people from my family are undertaking the pilgrimage this time. They are facing major health issues due to the food that is being served. The suitcases given to them broke at the airport, even before they began their journey to Mecca. Things are in such bad shape and there is nobody to take care of Pakistanis in Mecca. They have been put in faraway locations and there is nobody to look after them, " said Rehmani.
Last month, the Haj organisers had called on PM Sharif to ensure improved coordination with the Saudi authorities this time.
Saudi Arabia allocated Pakistan 179,210 Haj slots this year which was evenly divided between government and private schemes. However, only 14,000 private applications were successful, leaving thousands unable to complete their spiritual journey.
A few weeks ago, Saudi Arabia's Interior Ministry had also issued a strong warning to Islamabad, stating that strict penalties will be imposed on Pakistani citizens found violating Haj permit regulations this year.
The warning came at a time when Pakistan formally commenced its Haj flight operations with the first batch of 442 pilgrims departing from Islamabad to Madina under the Makkah Route Initiative.
The Saudi ministry stated that penalties up to SR20,000 will be applicable till June 10 on any Pakistani performing or attempting to perform Haj without a valid permit. The penalty includes all types of visa holders, including those entering and staying in Mecca.
Moreover, a fine of up to SR100,000 will be imposed on anyone who applies for a visit visa on behalf of individuals attempting to perform Haj without a permit, or anyone who facilitates their entry or stay in the restricted areas, adding that the fines may multiply based on the number of individuals involved.
It also made it clear to Pakistan that a penalty of SR100,000 will be imposed on those individuals who transport, shelter, or assist visit visa holders in accessing the holy sites, which includes concealment of their presence or providing accommodation in any form in hotels, shelters, private homes, or Haj-designated housing, warning that any and all illegal infiltrators, including residents and overstayers, who are caught attempting to perform Haj without a permit will be instantly arrested, deported and banned from entering in Saudi Arabia for at least 10 years.
Saudi Arabia's strict warning to Pakistan is a result of an alarming number of beggars, illegal visitors, and citizens travelling for Haj without permits, every year.
The Kingdom has deported at least 4,700 Pakistani beggars in the past three years, urging Islamabad to put the names and passports of these deported individuals on its no-flier list.
"Their ever-increasing population is tarnishing the country's image abroad," admitted Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif.
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