Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray Are Back on a War Footing
But in the background lurks a potentially more explosive dynamic: the escalating rivalry between Ethiopia's federal government and Eritrea, which united in the war against Tigray in 2020-2022 but fell out over the peace deal that ended it. More than two years later, tensions between the two are spiking over Ethiopia's quest to end its status as the world's most-populous landlocked country.
Last year Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed explored gaining sea access through the breakaway Somali republic of Somaliland, but backtracked after a fierce backlash from Mogadishu. Now he appears to have settled on reclaiming Eritrea's port at Assab, part of the Red Sea coastline Ethiopia lost when Eritrea seceded in 1993—a loss Abiy has termed a 'historical mistake.'
Tigray is sandwiched between the rival powers. Its vice president, Gen Tsadkan Gebretensae, has warned that 'war seems inevitable' and that Tigray risks 'becoming a battlefield for Asmara and Addis Ababa.' Former envoys to the Horn of Africa for the U.S. and the European Union describe the tensions in Tigray as 'dry tinder waiting for a match that could ignite an interstate war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.' Meanwhile, Debretsion's rivals allege his TPLF faction has made contact with Eritrean intelligence—allegations it strongly denies.
To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter.
Debretsion and Getachew, Tigray's two key political players, have long had an uneasy relationship. The roots of the current crisis in Tigray, however, date back to the peace deal with Addis Ababa that Getachew signed on behalf of the TPLF in November 2022 in Pretoria, South Africa. In doing so, Debretsion argues, he unilaterally caved in to the federal government's conditions. 'The other side pushed,' Debretsion said in an interview in February. 'We expected this. But there should have been a collective decision' before Getachew agreed to the final deal, he added.
For their part, Getachew's allies say Tigray had little leverage during the negotiations, which took place against the backdrop of fierce fighting and huge battlefield reversals. 'Maybe the war should have ended sooner,' said one. Debretsion insists he's now committed to the peace deal, despite seeing it as flawed, but he adds that there are also 'differences' among the TPLF leadership regarding 'its execution.'
Nearly two and a half years after the Pretoria agreement silenced the guns, most of its key parts have not been implemented. Eritrean troops and forces from the Amhara region still occupy some 40 percent of Tigray's districts. This has blocked the return of almost 1 million displaced people, who languish in squalid camps. Ethiopia's military was supposed to take control of Tigray's international borders, but the federal government's presence amounts to little more than a few policemen outside the region's three airports. Efforts to hold perpetrators of war crimes accountable have made little headway. Fresh regional elections are yet to be held. And Tigray is still not represented in Ethiopia's federal parliament. It limps on in a state of limbo, unable to access donor funds crucial for its reconstruction.
The situation has badly destabilized the region. Debretsion's TPLF faction, which controls the party apparatus, blames it on the incompetence of Getachew's interim administration. Competition is also heating up to control Tigray's lucrative gold deposits and state companies. In August, the TPLF held a congress that expelled Getachew and several members of his Cabinet from the party. Debretsion says they must step down from their positions in the regional government. Getachew's allies maintain the congress was illegal.
Things reached a boiling point in early March when Getachew tried to fire three top TPLF generals, who he accused of plotting a 'coup.' Debretsion's TPLF faction then took over several districts across Tigray, including the major city of Adigrat. They also seized the mayor's office and radio station in Mekelle, Tigray's capital. These military movements sparked panic among residents, who rushed to withdraw cash from banks. Air tickets to Addis Ababa sold out.
'Everyone is concerned about war,' said Tesfasellassie Medhin, the Catholic bishop of Adigrat. 'The people do not want more destruction.'
The showdown had been brewing for weeks, but its climax came quickly. Apart from a few isolated clashes, it was largely bloodless. Getachew appealed to the federal government to intervene, which could have sparked an armed confrontation and risked sucking in Eritrea, whose leader—long-ruling President Isaias Afwerki—feels he has unfinished business in Tigray. But Abiy declined to do so.
Getachew is now on his way out, and Debretsion's faction wants to replace him with Tadesse Werede, the head of Tigray's regional armed forces and another regional vice president. On Wednesday, however, Abiy appeared to block his nomination, announcing he would instead consider public proposals for Tigray's new leader. The TPLF blasted his statement as 'unacceptable,' accusing Abiy's government of engaging in 'provocative, hostile and destabilizing activities that threaten the survival of the deeply wounded people of Tigray' and 'attempting to unilaterally determine' the region's leadership.
Meanwhile, tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia linger. Abiy has staked his legacy on regaining sea access. Ethiopia's landlocked status currently eats up $1.6 billion a year in port fees to Djibouti, which handles 90 percent of Ethiopia's trade. Gaining access to the sea would not only save scarce foreign currency but could boost economic growth by 25 percent to 30 percent, according to Abiy.
The Ethiopian prime minister is unlikely to drop the issue, although he insists he is committed to resolving it peacefully. 'Ethiopia has no intention to invade Eritrea to gain Red Sea access,' Abiy told parliament last week. 'Our desire is to talk about it under the principle of give and take, in a mutually beneficial manner, and according to commercial law.'
But the warning signs are there. In February, Eritrea ordered a nationwide military mobilization. Its reclusive regime has ruled out giving up Assab port under any circumstances, with its information minister last week describing Ethiopia's maritime ambitions as 'misguided and outdated.' According to Western diplomats who spoke off the record, Eritrea is also trying to destabilize Abiy's government by assisting rebels in Ethiopia's Amhara region, where an insurgency is escalating. On March 21, Ethiopia's military claimed it had killed 300 fighters in two days of fighting. The day before, it claimed that a top Tigrayan general had 'encouraged and coordinated' attacks by Amhara rebels, which the TPLF denies.
Meanwhile, if Debretsion's TPLF faction does take control of Tigray's regional government, it may feel emboldened to prepare a military strike to reclaim control of western Tigray. This fertile area was seized by Amhara forces during the Tigray war. Its status was supposed to be resolved constitutionally, according to the Pretoria peace agreement. The failure to do so is the main reason for Tigray's ongoing displacement crisis. An offensive could reignite an internationalized conflict involving Eritrean forces.
Ethiopia has also been moving tanks, troops and military equipment to its border with Eritrea in the arid Afar region. And its state media is making loud claims over Assab. The deployments are small in scale and might be a show of force, calculated to put pressure on Eritrea, as Abiy can ill afford to stretch his forces any thinner. In addition to Amhara, the federal government is battling an entrenched insurgency in Oromia, Ethiopia's biggest region. That makes the timing bad for a conflict with Eritrea. Yet diplomats fear the consequences of any miscalculation on either side, similar to the skirmishes that inadvertently escalated the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998-2000.
An interstate war would be devastating for the Horn of Africa, a region already struggling with internal conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, said Ahmed Soliman at Chatham House. 'Abiy has at least opened the door for some kind of accommodation,' said Soliman. 'There is a possibility to de-escalate.'
Hopefully, for Tigray's and the broader region's sake, Abiy will seize it.
Fred Harter is a freelance journalist based in Addis Ababa whose work has appeared in The Guardian, The Times of London, The Independent, VOA and the New Humanitarian. He has covered Ethiopia since March 2021 and traveled extensively in every region affected by the 2020-2022 conflict.
The post Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray Are Back on a War Footing appeared first on World Politics Review.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Fox News
16 minutes ago
- Fox News
EU preparing 19th round of Russia sanctions as Zelenskyy meets Trump
The European Union is preparing a new round of sanctions against Russia in retaliation for its ongoing conflict in Ukraine, signaling continued resolve as the war drags past its three-and-a-half-year announcement of the upcoming sanctions package, the 19th such round, comes as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets with President Donald Trump at the White House to discuss prospects for ending the war. Zelenskyy, who will be flanked by key European leaders during his visit, has consistently endorsed coordinated Western sanctions as a vital tool against Russia's economic war HEADS INTO CRUCIAL TRUMP MEETING AS US WEIGHS SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR KYIV"As long as the bloodshed in Ukraine continues, Europe will maintain diplomatic and, in particular, economic pressure on Russia. We will continue to strengthen sanctions," European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said Sunday during a joint press conference with Zelenskyy."This package will be forthcoming in early September. We know that sanctions are effective. We have already put Russia's immobilized assets to work for the benefit of Ukraine, and we will continue to put pressure on Russia's war economy to bring President Putin to the negotiation table," she thanked von der Leyen for the additional sanction measures, adding that "sanctions show we are serious."EUROPEAN LEADERS WILL JOIN TRUMP-ZELENSKYY MEETING, SIGNALING SOLIDARITY WITH UKRAINEFollowing waves of coordinated Western sanctions over its war in Ukraine, Russia has become the world's most sanctioned nation—more economically isolated than any country in modern 2024, Russia was the primary target of U.S. financial sanctions, with 1,706 Russian persons placed on the Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. In addition, Russia drove the bulk of U.S. sanctions activity, making up 70% of new names added to the Treasury's EU's most recent package, which was announced in July, targeted Russia's energy revenues, banking sector, military industrial base, and tightened loopholes for sanctions this round, the EU also blacklisted 444 vessels tied to the Kremlin's so-called "ghost ships" — a covert network of tankers that transport Russian oil around the world in defiance of G7 price caps and EU sanctions. The measure also imposed sanctions on more than 2,500 people.
Yahoo
33 minutes ago
- Yahoo
What to know about Crimea, the Black Sea peninsula seized by Russia from Ukraine over a decade ago
What to know about Crimea, the Black Sea peninsula seized by Russia from Ukraine over a decade ago Russia's illegal seizure of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in March 2014 was quick and bloodless, and it sent Moscow's relations with the West into a downward spiral unseen since the Cold War. It also paved the way for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, during which Moscow illegally annexed more land from its neighbor. A look at the diamond-shaped peninsula in the Black Sea, coveted by both Russia and Ukraine for its naval bases and beaches: How did Russia seize Crimea? In 2013-14, a massive popular uprising gripped Ukraine for weeks, eventually forcing pro-Moscow President Victor Yanukovych from office. Amid the turmoil, Russian President Vladimir Putin pounced, sending armed troops without insignia to overrun Crimea. Putin later called a referendum in Crimea to join Russia that Ukraine and the West dismissed as illegal. Russia's relations with the West plummeted to new lows. The United States, the European Union and other countries imposed sanctions on Moscow and its officials. Moscow's illegal annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014, was recognized only by countries such as North Korea and Sudan. In Russia, it touched off a wave of patriotism, and 'Krym nash!' — 'Crimea is ours!' — became a rallying cry. The move sent Putin's popularity soaring. His approval rating, which had declined to 65% in January 2014, shot to 86% in June, according to the Levada Center, an independent Russian pollster. Putin has called the peninsula 'a sacred place' and has prosecuted those who publicly argue it is part of Ukraine — particularly the Crimean Tatars, who strongly opposed the annexation. What happened after the annexation? After the annexation, fighting broke out in eastern Ukraine between pro-Kremlin militias and Kyiv's forces. Moscow threw its weight behind the insurgents, even though it denied supporting them with troops and weapons. There was abundant evidence to the contrary, including a Dutch court's finding that a Russia-supplied air defense system shot down a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet over eastern Ukraine in July 2014, killing all 298 people aboard. Russian hard-liners later criticized Putin for failing to capture all of Ukraine that year, arguing it was easily possible at a time when the government in Kyiv was in disarray and its military in shambles. The fighting in eastern Ukraine continued, on and off, until February 2022, when Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Why is Crimea important? Crimea's unique location makes it a strategically important asset, and Russia has spent centuries fighting for it. The peninsula was home to Turkic-speaking Tatars when the Russian empire first annexed it in the 18th century. It briefly regained independence two centuries later before being swallowed by the Soviet Union. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954, when both were part of the USSR, to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the unification of Moscow and Kyiv. In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the peninsula became part of newly independent Ukraine. Russia kept a foot in the door, however: Its Black Sea Fleet had a base in the city of Sevastopol, and Crimea — as part of Ukraine — continued to host it. By the time Russia annexed it in 2014, it had been within Ukraine for 60 years and was part of the country's identity. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has vowed to retake it and said Russia 'won't be able to steal' the peninsula. For either side, possession of Crimea is key to control over activities in the Black Sea — a critical corridor for the world's grain, among other goods. What role does Crimea play in Russia's war in Ukraine? Ahead of its full-scale invasion, Moscow deployed troops and weapons to Crimea, allowing Russian forces to quickly seize large parts of southern Ukraine early in the war. A top Russian military official later said that securing a land corridor from Russia to Crimea by holding the occupied parts of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions was among the key goals of what the Kremlin called its 'special military operation' in Ukraine. Before the invasion, Zelenskyy focused on diplomatic efforts to get Crimea back, but after Russian troops poured across the border, Kyiv began publicly contemplating retaking the peninsula by force. The peninsula soon became a battleground, with Ukraine launching drone attacks and bombing it to try to dislodge Moscow's hold on the territory. The attacks targeted the Russian Black Sea Fleet there, as well as ammunition depots, air fields and Putin's prized asset — the Kerch Bridge linking Crimea to Russia, which was struck in October 2022, in July 2023 and in June 2025. How does Crimea factor into peace efforts? Putin listed Ukraine's recognition of Crimea as part of Russia among Moscow's demands for peace in 2024. Those also include Ukraine ceding the four regions illegally annexed by Russia in 2022, dropping its bid to join NATO, keeping the country's nonnuclear status, restricting its military force and protecting the interests of the Russian-speaking population. Kyiv has rejected ceding any territory. Russia currently holds roughly 20% of Ukrainian land, including Crimea, so any deal that freezes the lines more or less where they are would benefit Moscow. The Associated Press
The Hill
2 hours ago
- The Hill
Trump's trade ‘deals' are economically self-defeating and a geopolitical failure
To President Trump's supporters, the one-sided trade 'deals' negotiated with the United Kingdom, Japan and most recently the European Union may seem like victories. They may seem like a vindication of the president's supposed street-savvy negotiating style. In reality, they are self-defeating in their economics and harmful to America's alliances. Under the trade arrangement concluded at the end of July, the EU will scrap tariffs on U.S. imports and commit to large-scale purchases on American energy and defense systems, as well further U.S. investment. In exchange, the EU gets a U.S. tariff of 15 percent, vastly exceeding average tariff rates across the industrialized world in the post-war era. At the risk of stating the obvious, the three 'deals' are not trade agreements in any meaningful sense. They lack the legal weight that foreign trade agreements carry. Nor do they entail a liberalization of trade — rather, they ratify America's imposition of new tariff barriers against some of its closest allies, while also extracting concessions from these nations under threat of even higher tariffs. Because tariffs are effectively taxes on Americans, the U.S. economy and consumers are the first and foremost losers of these new 'deals,' especially in sectors where imports from the three partner economies serve as inputs into U.S. economic activity. The BMW plant in Spartanburg, S.C., to cite just one example, uses a lot of EU-made components; barring special, yet-unannounced carve-outs, its production has just become less competitive. Jobs will be lost, just as they were lost in the aftermath of Trump's first-term steel and aluminum tariffs across industries that rely on those metals. The geopolitical ramifications are even more pernicious. 'It's about security, it's about Ukraine,' the EU Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic said to justify the European concessions back in July, not anticipating that the deal would have little impact on the administration's planned rapprochement with Russia, on full display in Alaska on Friday. American alliances since 1945 have been sustained by a perception of the U.S. as a fundamentally different kind of global superpower, one that was neither predatory nor seeking domination for its own sake. While Russia and China may have had control over their clients or over nations that they subjugated by brute force, the U.S. had real friends — at least until now. Europeans, the Japanese, or the Koreans have generally hoped for our leadership, comfortable in the knowledge that our decisions will be informed, at the very least, by a basic sense of decency. That sense is being shaken to the core. Trump is transforming a rules-based, voluntary system of international cooperation, imperfect as it was, into a system of quasi-colonial extortion. The MAGA camp might derive a sense of satisfaction from humiliating 'free-riding' U.S. allies, but the resulting arrangements are not sustainable. Canada and Mexico have learned that even a proper free trade agreement negotiated with a Trump administration and ratified by Congress offers little protection against new arbitrary tariffs. It will soon dawn on voters in Japan, the U.K. and the EU — if it hasn't already — that their country's trade deals are both hopelessly unbalanced and subject to change by Washington at a moment's notice. Even if the deals hold in the short term, they are bound the produce a political backlash, which will make the prospect of working together with the U.S. on matters of mutual interest far less likely. There was a reason why the Japanese government postponed the announcement of its trade deal with the U.S. until after its recent upper house parliamentary election, from which it has emerged badly bruised. Similarly, the European Commission will have a hard time selling its deal with Trump to member states — whose cooperation is essential if the promises of hundreds of billions in U.S.-bound investment and purchases of American goods are ever going to materialize. For decades, there have been voices in European politics decrying America's real or imaginary domination of the old continent. Today, they have a real, tangible grievance they can hold on to: The EU is essentially promising a large transfers of wealth to the U.S., in the form of future military and energy purchases as well as outbound investment, while acquiescing to being subjected to a trade policy that would have been essentially unthinkable a few months ago. If the Trump administration were purposefully trying to peel the EU, the U.K. and Japan away from America's system of alliances, it would be hard-pressed to find a more surefire method than these deals. They put to rest a benevolent vision of America that has underpinned our soft power worldwide for 80 years.
