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Won't take up any official post after retirement from CJI post: Khanna
After the conclusion of the ceremonial bench proceedings, the CJI met journalists in the apex court premises and said, I will not accept any post-retirement post...perhaps will do something with law
Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna on Tuesday said though he wasn't going to accept any post-retirement official assignments, he would continue his innings in law.
Justice Khanna, who was elevated to the top court in January 18, 2029, was appointed as the CJI on November 11, 2024 and would be demitting office on Tuesday.
After the conclusion of the ceremonial bench proceedings, the CJI met journalists in the apex court premises and said, I will not accept any post-retirement post ... .perhaps will do something with law.
Many former apex court judges begin their innings in arbitration post judgeship.
I will have a third innings and will do something related to law, the CJI said.
Responding to a query related to the cash discovery controversy involving high court judge Justice Yashwant Vermam, he said, Judicial thinking has to be decisive and adjudicatory.
He added, We see plus and minus points and decide the issue, then rationally we weigh various factors that help us to make a right decision.
The CJI dealt with the cash row controversy following a news report, prompting him to take several steps, including a preliminary inquiry by Delhi High Court Chief Justice D K Upadhyaya, judicial work being taken away from Justice Varma in the Delhi High Court, and later his transfer to the Allahabad High Court sans judicial work.
After the in-house inquiry panel indicted the judge, the CJI nudged him to resign and later wrote to President Droupadi Murmu and Prime Minister Narendra Modi after Justice Varma refused to tender resignation.
On May 10, CJI-designate Justice B R Gavai also said no to any post-retirement assignments.
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