$8m loss sparks Football Australia 'right sizing'
Interim chief executive Heather Garriock has warned Football Australia will have to undergo a "right sizing" after posting a $8.55 million loss at its annual general meeting that will poke at the sore points from the game's unbundling.
Close to five years since A-Leagues split from FA to run their own competition under the umbrella of the Australian Professional Leagues, the picture is increasingly bleak for both of the sport's major bodies.
A-League club distributions were down to just $530,000 this season, while FA's deficit came on revenues of $124 million.
The 22nd Annual General Meeting (AGM) of Football Australia Limited was held at (3:00pm AEST) on Friday, 23 May 2025 at Football Australia's offices, in Sydney and via videoconference.The AGM coincided with the release of the Football Australia 2024 Annual Report.📰 More… pic.twitter.com/lmM7ibFBas
— Football Australia (@FootballAUS) May 23, 2025
FA were reluctant to divulge the breakdown of their sizeable loss, but a big part is understood to be $12 million owed to them by the APL.
The APL are also believed to have grievances with FA over their financial arrangements but regardless of who owes who what, Garriock said the two factions enjoy a relationship that has never been more positive.
Garriock's comments came after an AGM in Sydney on Friday - that was closed off to the media - which signalled the re-election of Anter Isaac as chair.
"The relationship with APL and Football Australia as it stands at the moment is the best it's been and we need to build on that," Garriock said.
"By us having a strong A-League is only going to benefit our national teams and the investment in our national teams are at a record high ... In terms of us cutting any national teams, absolutely not.
"We're investing heavily, and we continue to invest in our grassroots.
"We need to focus internally, and that's what we're doing.
"Anter spoke about the revenues and how we can make up that money. I think it's about right sizing the business, and that's what I'm here to do."
Isaac said FA was "rekindling" its relationship with the APL but would not "write off any amounts" of monies owed.
"We have zero concerns about the commercial relationships that we have with APL," he said.
"Our relationship with APL is probably characterised in two ways. There's the commercial relationship and then there's the strategic relationship - on both counts, it's very strong."
The elephant in the room remains whether Garriock has an appetite to take on the role of chief executive permanently.
The former Matilda diplomatically tiptoed around the issue of replacing James Johnson, who quit earlier this month and was announced as having taken a role in Canada overnight.
"I've been given a mandate from the board in this interim period, and I'm fully focused on the interim period, and I haven't thought beyond that," she said.
Garriock said the next Matildas coach would be announced in June with Joe Montemurro seemingly sewn up as the man to lead the side into next year's Women's Asian Cup.
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