Trump tariffs on Russia's oil buyers bring economic, political risks
With a Friday deadline for Russia to agree to peace in Ukraine or have its oil customers face secondary tariffs, Trump has found a novel, but risky, use for his favorite trade tool.
The administration took a step toward punishing Moscow's customers on Wednesday, imposing an additional 25% tariff on goods from India over its imports of Russian oil, marking the first financial penalty aimed at Russia in Trump's second term.
No order has been signed for China, the top Russian oil importer, but a White House official said on Wednesday secondary measures that Trump has threatened against countries buying the petroleum were expected on Friday.
These are the latest in a string of Trump's tariff threats on non-trade issues such as pressing Denmark to give the U.S. control of Greenland, attempting to stop fentanyl deliveries from Mexico and Canada, and penalizing Brazil over what he described as a 'witch hunt' against former President Jair Bolsonaro.
While secondary tariffs could inflict pain on the Russian economy - severing a top source of funding for Russian President Vladimir Putin's war effort - they also carry costs for Trump.
Oil prices will likely rise, creating political problems for him before next year's U.S. midterm congressional elections. The tariffs would also complicate the administration's efforts to secure trade deals with China and India.
For his part, Putin has signaled that Russia is prepared to weather any new economic hardship imposed by the U.S. and its allies.
There is 'close to zero chance' Putin will agree to a ceasefire due to Trump's threats of tariffs and sanctions on Russia, said Eugene Rumer, a former U.S. intelligence analyst for Russia who directs the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Russia and Eurasia Program.
'Theoretically if you cut off Indian and Chinese purchases of oil that would be a very heavy blow to the Russian economy and to the war effort. But that isn't going to happen,' he said, adding that the Chinese have signaled they will keep buying Russia's oil.
The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Russia reintroduces ban on petrol exports till year end
The Russian embassy in Washington did not immediately respond.
New costs for Russia
Secondary tariffs would hurt Russia, the world's second leading oil exporter. The West has pressured Russia since late 2022 with a price cap on its oil exports, intended to erode Russia's ability to fund the war.
That cap has piled costs on Russia as it forced it to reroute oil exports from Europe to India and China, which have been able to import huge amounts of it at discounted prices. But the cap also kept oil flowing to global markets.
In an early sign that Putin hopes to avoid the tariffs, the White House said that Putin and Trump could meet as soon as next week, following a meeting between U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and the Russian leader on Wednesday.
But some analysts are skeptical that Moscow is ready to stop the war.
Brett Bruen, former foreign policy adviser for former President Barack Obama now head of the Global Situation Room consultancy, cautioned that Putin has found ways to evade sanctions and other economic penalties. And even if tariffs and sanctions cut into Russia's revenues, Putin is not under much domestic pressure.
Secondary tariffs, Bruen said, could start to cause some economic pain. 'But the question is whether that really changes Putin's behavior.'
The tariffs could also create new problems for the Trump administration as it pursues sweeping trade deals, especially with India and China.
Kimberly Donovan, a former U.S. Treasury official, said the tariffs could hamper the U.S. bilateral and trade relationships with India and China.
'You've got two major oil importers that can kind of dig in their heels and push back, knowing what the U.S. needs out of them,' said Donovan, now director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative in the Atlantic Council's GeoEconomics Center.
China has demonstrated leverage over the U.S. by cutting off mineral exports and new tariffs would upset a delicate balance negotiated since May to restart those flows critical to a host of U.S. industries. India has leverage over generic pharmaceutical exports and precursor chemicals to the U.S.
Both countries say that oil purchases are a sovereign matter and contend that they are playing by the previous rules, namely the price cap on Russian crude.
Russian roulette
Secondary tariffs would raise the cost of imports into the United States of products from Russia's customers, giving them an incentive to buy their oil elsewhere. Squeezing the shipments risks spiking fuel prices and inflation around the world that could pose political difficulties for Trump.
The month after Moscow's February 2022 invasion, fears of disruptions from Russia pushed international crude prices close to $130 per barrel, not far from their all-time high of $147. If India were to stop buying 1.7 million barrels per day of Russian crude, about 2% of global supply, world prices would jump from the current $66, analysts said.
JP Morgan analysts said this month it was 'impossible' to sanction Russian oil without triggering a price jump. Any perceived disruptions to Russian shipments could propel Brent oil prices into the $80s or higher. Despite Trump's statements that U.S. producers would step in, it would be unable to quickly ramp up, they said.
Russia could retaliate, including closing the CPC Pipeline from Kazakhstan, which could create a global supply crisis.
Western oil firms Exxon , Chevron, Shell , ENI and TotalEnergies ship up to 1 million barrels per day via CPC, which has total capacity of 1.7 million bpd.
Cullen Hendrix, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, said energy shocks are never welcome, especially not amidst a softening housing market and weak job growth. A key question is whether Trump can frame any economic pain as necessary to force Russia to negotiate.
'Of all his tariff gambits, this is the one that could resonate best with voters, at least in principle,' said Hendrix. 'It's also one with massive downside risks.'
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Express Tribune
3 hours ago
- Express Tribune
The race to rule AI
In the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, the world watched as the United States and the Soviet Union competed in the 'space race.' As both hurled rockets, satellites, and spacecraft into the upper atmosphere, each launch showcased more than technological prowess. The race to the moon became a test of geopolitical will, a symbol of which superpower would define the future. When Neil Armstrong planted the American flag on the lunar surface, the 'giant leap' he reflected on was not just for humanity, but a step that cemented the technology-powered hegemony the United States would enjoy for decades. Today, against the backdrop of another great-power rivalry, a similar contest is unfolding. The stage this time is not just the vacuum of space, but the invisible architecture of algorithms and the chips that power them. Artificial intelligence is the new frontier, and once again, two superpowers are vying for dominance. But unlike the space race, this competition is not bound by the heavens. It reaches into every industry, every household, and every corner of human life. The stakes are no longer whose flag hangs on the moon but who controls the digital nervous system of the planet. AI is no longer a distant promise. It is here, transforming economies, redefining power, and reshaping societies. Yet as the technology accelerates, so too does the contest over who sets its rules and who benefits from its capabilities. At the heart of this struggle stand two competing visions — one put forward by the United States, the other by China — that reveal not only differing strategic priorities but also fundamentally divergent philosophies on how the next world order is to be structured. Last month, the White House released America's AI Action Plan, a document that frames AI development as a high-stakes race in which 'whoever has the largest AI ecosystem will set global AI standards and reap broad economic and military benefits.' The language is blunt: the US must 'achieve and maintain unquestioned and unchallenged global technological dominance.' This is not simply about innovation; it is about securing and entrenching American power. To that end, the American plan rests on three pillars: accelerating AI innovation, building American AI infrastructure and leading in international AI diplomacy and security, with the last pillar designed explicitly to 'counter Chinese influence in international governance bodies.' The plan promotes an 'AI alliance' composed of the US and select partners, to which Washington will export its full AI technology stack: hardware, models, software, applications and standards. Crucially, this comes with a defensive edge: stringent export controls to prevent 'foreign adversaries' from accessing advanced computing, enhanced location-verification of chips and coordinated global enforcement to keep high-end AI resources out of the hands of rivals. In other words, Washington's AI diplomacy is about building a gated community, one in which entry is granted on US terms. The US openly links this to national security, implying that AI superiority must be preserved not as a shared global asset but as a strategic advantage for America and its allies. Beijing, by contrast, has spent the past two years articulating a vision for AI governance that is overtly multilateral and inclusive, with an emphasis on participation from the Global South. Premier Li Qiang, speaking at the 2025 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) held in Shanghai from July 26 to 28, called AI 'an international public good that benefits humanity.' He stressed that 'only by working together can we fully realise the potential of AI while ensuring its safe, reliable, controllable, and equitable development.' Li underscored the urgency of creating a truly global framework for governance, stating, 'there is an urgent need to foster further consensus on how to strike a balance between development and security.' He warned that without broad cooperation, AI risks becoming 'an exclusive game for a few countries and companies.' China's Action Plan on Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence frames AI as a tool for 'serving the people, respecting sovereignty, fairness and inclusiveness, and open cooperation.' The plan advocates reducing technical barriers, promoting technology transfer, and developing open-source communities to foster a diverse and accessible innovation ecosystem. It goes further by explicitly committing to support 'countries, especially those in the Global South' in building their AI capabilities in line with their own national conditions. The most concrete manifestation of this philosophy is China's proposal for a global AI cooperation organisation. The body would aim to align governance rules, technical standards, and development strategies, while respecting policy differences between nations. Beijing presents this not as an ideological bloc but as a pragmatic platform: a means for countries to undertake joint technical research, share open-source technologies, and strengthen their own AI innovation ecosystems. As Li explained, 'China is willing to share its AI development experience and technological products to help countries around the world — especially those in the Global South — to strengthen their capacity building.' He further proposed 'greater cooperation on innovation to achieve more groundbreaking results,' pledging that China 'will be more open in sharing open-source technology and products.' The Global South is central to this vision. Chinese officials position the cooperation body as a way to bridge the 'digital and intelligence divide,' ensuring developing nations benefit equally from AI's economic and social potential. For countries outside the US orbit, many already drawn into China's Belt and Road networks, this is an attractive proposition: access to AI technologies, capacity-building support and a seat at the governance table without having to choose sides in a zero-sum competition. This is not to say China's approach is entirely altruistic. Extending AI cooperation deepens Beijing's global influence, especially in regions where Western technology and capital have been limited or conditional. By positioning itself as the champion of multilateralism, China counters the US narrative that it should be isolated from key technological flows. In effect, China's inclusive rhetoric also functions as strategic outreach to counter Washington's exclusionary alliance-building. Still, the differences in tone and substance between the two plans are striking. The US blueprint treats AI as a high ground to be seized and defended. The Chinese plan treats it as a commons to be cultivated. These divergent philosophies carry profound implications for the structure of the emerging AI order. If Washington's approach prevails, the world could see the consolidation of closed technology blocs: one led by the US and populated by its security partners, another orbiting around China and those willing to defy American export controls. Innovation might accelerate within each bloc, but the gaps between them — in capabilities, standards, and access — would widen. The very idea of global governance would fragment into parallel systems, mirroring Cold War-era divides. If Beijing's approach gains traction, there could be greater cross-border sharing of AI resources, especially between advanced economies and the developing world. This could help narrow the AI divide and create more interoperable global standards, though it would also require trust in China's commitment to openness and in its own governance norms. Given that China's domestic AI environment is subject to extensive state oversight and censorship, some countries may remain cautious about whether its version of 'openness' aligns with their values. For the Global South, the stakes are especially high. Under the US plan, access to cutting-edge AI may be contingent on political alignment, limiting the ability of non-aligned nations to leverage AI for their own development. Under the Chinese plan, access might be easier, but the terms could be shaped by Beijing's strategic priorities and its own vision for digital sovereignty. The choice facing much of the world, then, is not simply between 'free' and 'restricted' AI, but between different models of technological interdependence: one based on selective exclusivity, the other on conditional inclusivity. Both are political, both are strategic and both will shape how AI transforms the global economy.
Express Tribune
3 hours ago
- Express Tribune
Pakistan Navy's deterrence: neutralising India's signaling
In May 2025, India and Pakistan fought a brief, but intense conflict triggered by a terror attack in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir. India's response, code-named Operation Sindoor, involved unprecedented air and missile strikes deep inside Pakistan. The four-day clash (May 7–10) saw both sides pushing new boundaries with drones, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles, yet carefully avoiding full-scale war. Notably, while the Indian Navy surged its western fleet into the Arabian Sea, no naval battles occurred; the deployments were signal rather than direct engagement. After a ceasefire was brokered by the US on May 10, Indian officials were quick to boast. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh warned that any future 'evil' act by Pakistan would 'face the firepower and ire of the Indian Navy,' stressing that India had 'paused' Operation Sindoor 'on our own terms' and that its forces 'had not even started showing their might'. This aggressive maritime signaling, essentially a threat that next time India would unleash naval power, was meant to project dominance. Pakistan, however, read these signals very differently. Islamabad's civil and military leadership dismissed India's chest-thumping and highlighted that Pakistan's armed forces, including its Navy, had held their own. In a post-conflict briefing, Pakistan's Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations noted that only a 'small portion' of Pakistan's capability was used in the fight, and that the Pakistan Navy had effectively kept the Indian Navy at bay during the hostilities. Naval officers displayed maps and slides to media, explaining how Pakistan's fleet protected its waters and deterred India from any seaborne misadventure. Indeed, despite India's deployment of an aircraft carrier group and other warships, they never engaged Pakistan's coast or ports, underscoring that India's maritime muscle-flexing was neutralized by Pakistan's own posture and the inherent risks of escalation. Pakistan Navy's quiet deterrence ensured that India's much-touted naval power remained a bluff that was never called in battle. Asymmetric Strength of the Pakistan Navy Despite being smaller in size, the Pakistan Navy wields a mix of capabilities that make it a formidable deterrent force in the Arabian Sea. History offers a powerful reminder: during the 1971 war, Pakistan's diesel-electric submarine PNS Hangor prowled the Indian Ocean and detected an Indian task force led by the frigate INS Khukri. In a daring attack, the lone sub fired a homing torpedo that struck and sank INS Khukri, the first warship ever lost to a submarine in the region. This feat shocked India and forced its navy on the defensive for the remainder of that war. The Hangor's victory, achieved despite Pakistan's naval inferiority, has become legend, a single submarine's remarkable courage altering the course of battle. The lesson endures: any major Indian warship venturing into Pakistan's domain could face a similarly fateful encounter with one of Pakistan's 'silent service' vessels. Today, Pakistan's submarine fleet remains the ace of its arsenal. The Navy operates modern Agosta- 90B (Khalid-class) diesel-electric submarines, equipped with Air-Independent Propulsion for extended stealth endurance. These subs carry heavyweight torpedoes and Exocet SM39 anti-ship missiles, enabling them to strike surface targets without warning. In a conflict, Pakistan's subs would likely lie in wait along India's approach routes, unseen hunters in the depths. Even India's largest units, such as aircraft carriers, would be vulnerable; a carrier strike group is inherently exposed in the confined North Arabian Sea, where Pakistan's coastal radars and short response times favor the defender. Former Pakistani strategic planners have noted that India's 7,500 km coastline and numerous high-value naval assets are a target-rich environment from a sea-denial perspective. In plainer terms, India has far more to lose at sea, large warships, oil tankers, port infrastructure, all of which present lucrative targets for Pakistan's undersea and coastal forces. Pakistan's Navy demonstrated its growing indigenous firepower with tests like the Harbah naval cruise missile, shown here launching from fast-attack craft PNS Himmat. Harbah is a dual-purpose anti-ship and land-attack missile with a range of up to 280 km, significantly extending Pakistan's striking reach. (Source: DefenseNews) In addition to subs, Pakistan has invested in high-tech asymmetric weapons to counter India's naval might. One major leap has been the development of indigenous cruise missiles. In 2018, the Navy test-fired the Harbah cruise missile from the Azmat-class FAC PNS Himmat, dramatically hitting a target ship over the horizon. Harbah, a variant of the Babur missile family, is a surface-to-surface weapon with both anti-ship and land-attack capability. Defense analysts called Harbah, a step up for the Pakistan Navy, noting it out-ranges and outperforms older systems like the Harpoon and C-802. The test's success once again demonstrated the credible firepower of the Pakistan Navy and the high level of indigenization achieved by its defense industry. In Navy Chief Adm. Zafar Abbasi's words, such strides reflect the resolve to ensure seaward defense of Pakistan and safeguard national maritime interests at all costs. Harbah NG Anti-Ship Missile. (Source: Pakistan has also deployed shore-based anti-ship missiles (often kept shrouded in secrecy) that further complicate an adversary's plans. A Babur coastal-defense variant (Zarb) was tested in 2017, giving Pakistan a land-based missile to target ships approaching its ports. Combined with modern frigates now entering service, like the new Chinese-built Type 054A/P frigates equipped with long- range LY-80 (HQ-16) surface-to-air missiles, the Navy is steadily improving its area denial envelope. Pakistan cannot match India ship-for-ship, but it does not need to. Instead, its strategy focuses on denying the Arabian Sea to hostile incursions. Fast attack craft with cruise missiles, coastal batteries, and lurking submarines create layered threats that would make any Indian naval offensive a dangerous gamble. Mass is not decisive in these waters, Pakistan's naval doctrine focuses on sea denial and coastal defense, seeking to restore deterrence equilibrium despite a smaller fleet. In fact, the Pakistan Navy may surprise a numerically superior adversary by the creativity and lethality of its responses. The Indian Navy, for all its size, would have to respect these asymmetries. To illustrate, consider what an Indian task force would face if it tried to approach Karachi or Gwadar in a future clash. Long-range anti-ship missiles could rain down without the launch platform ever coming into the Indian fleet's radar. Diesel submarines could pick off a destroyer or even a carrier, just as Hangor did in 1971, sowing panic and paralysis. Swarms of smaller missile boats and drones could harass and confuse the invaders. Meanwhile, Pakistan's coastline bristles with defenses; any warship venturing too near risks being targeted from land. India's vaunted blue-water navy would effectively be chained by the invisible perimeter Pakistan has set up. Thus, the quiet deployment of these capabilities deters India from even attempting a naval adventure. As one retired Pakistani general observed, India's heavy dependence on the maritime domain (for power projection and energy imports) is a strategic vulnerability Pakistan can exploit. Simply put, the cost of a naval war would be unbearably high for New Delhi, a reality that Pakistan's Navy leverages to keep the peace. Pakistan's sea-based second strike Perhaps the most profound aspect of Pakistan's maritime deterrence, and one often overlooked in India's saber-rattling, is the introduction of a sea-based nuclear capability. Pakistan has quietly but steadily worked to complete its nuclear triad, and the Navy is integral to this effort. In January 2017, Pakistan successfully tested the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) from an underwater platform. This stealthy missile, with a 450 km range, was specifically designed to carry a nuclear warhead. The Babur-3 test was hailed by Islamabad as achieving a credible second-strike capability, in other words, the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons from the sea, even if the country's land-based nukes were taken out. The plan now coming to fruition is to arm Pakistan's diesel-electric subs with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, which are far harder for an enemy to detect or preempt. By dispersing nuclear assets under the ocean surface, Pakistan closes off any enemy hopes of a disarming first strike. A Pakistan Navy Khalid-class submarine at a 2024 maritime exhibition. These Agosta-90B subs, now upgraded with air-independent propulsion and modern weaponry, are reportedly capable of launching the Babur-3 nuclear- capable cruise missile. Indian criticism of Pakistan's SLCM The Indian critiques of Pakistan's Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) highlight supposed vulnerabilities, such as limited missile range, detection risks from Indian surveillance, and alleged operational constraints. However, these assessments overlook critical strategic and operational dimensions. Firstly, the introduction of the Babur-3 fundamentally complicates India's deterrence calculus, regardless of its stated operational range. Even a modest sea-based nuclear capability introduces significant uncertainty for adversarial planning, compelling India to expend considerable resources toward continuous maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare efforts without guaranteed success. Secondly, Indian analyses underestimate Pakistan Navy's operational ingenuity and experience, particularly its demonstrated capability for stealth and strategic surprise, evident from historical incidents like the successful evasion and engagement by Pakistani submarines in past Indo-Pak crises. Thirdly, Indian assertions about detection capabilities and confinement of Pakistani submarines overlook modern submarine operational doctrines, which leverage mobility, stealth, and deception, raising serious doubts about India's claimed ability to confine Pakistani submarines to territorial waters effectively. Lastly, while challenges in command, control, and communication exist universally in submarine- based deterrence, Pakistan's investments in secure communication infrastructure, redundancy, and procedural controls significantly mitigate the risks associated with nuclear command delegation. Thus, contrary to Indian claims, the Babur-3 substantially enhances Pakistan's strategic depth, providing a credible and resilient second-strike capability vital for regional stability. Today, Pakistan's Naval Strategic Force Command is believed to be operational, overseeing these sea-based nuclear forces. At least one of the Agosta-90B subs (PNS Khalid) has undergone upgrades in Turkey, rejoining service with the ability to fire Babur-3 missiles. This development significantly strengthens Pakistan's credible second-strike capability, enhancing strategic stability by reinforcing deterrence against potential aggression. If India were ever to contemplate a naval preemptive strike, such as an attempt to neutralize Pakistan's naval assets or blockade its ports, it must contend with Pakistan's robust capability to mount an effective conventional retaliation at sea, independent of its nuclear deterrent. Pakistan's maritime forces are fully prepared to respond decisively through conventional means, significantly raising the strategic costs for India and diminishing any potential gains from such aggression. Such a scenario is the worst nightmare of any military planner, effectively deterring India from entertaining fantasies of an easy, one-sided naval war. Moreover, the introduction of nuclear weapons at sea blurs the line between conventional and nuclear domains in a crisis. India's military thinkers sometimes speak of fighting a limited war under the nuclear overhang, implying they can carefully calibrate strikes (even at sea) without crossing Pakistan's red lines. But Pakistan firmly rejects the idea that the Indian Ocean is a safe sanctuary for limited aggression. Any attack on critical Pakistani targets, be it a coastal city, naval base, or strategic economic node like Gwadar port, would be judged by its effect, not the domain it came from. A missile fired from an Indian warship that devastates a Pakistani port could very well be seen as strategic escalation, regardless of whether that missile was conventional. The risk of miscalculation is immense. India has deployed supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles on multiple platforms, including warships and coastal batteries, and even integrated them into its Strategic Forces Command. Pakistan regards the BrahMos as a dual-capable system (able to carry nuclear or conventional warheads) and thus inherently destabilizing. During the 2025 conflict, Indian media claimed that up to 15 BrahMos missiles were launched at Pakistani targets. Islamabad viewed that as a menacing signal, because when such high-speed missiles are in play, radar operators and decision-makers cannot know if the incoming warhead is conventional or nuclear. In the fog of war, a navy launching a volley of BrahMos could trigger Pakistan's worst-case assumptions, forcing its hand toward escalation. This is why Pakistan persistently warns that any Indian naval attack would be playing with fire. There is no neat geography of war where India can contain escalation at sea. Pakistan's leadership has signaled that its nuclear thresholds are not fixed lines on a map, they depend on the nature of the attack and the targets. An attack on a Pakistani Navy submarine base or a strike intended to choke Pakistan's economy would be interpreted as an existential threat. Under its doctrine of Full Spectrum Deterrence, Pakistan reserves the option to respond with tactical or strategic nuclear weapons if its survival is at stake. The presence of nuclear-armed submarines simply reinforces this stance by adding an element of uncertainty for the aggressor. The end result is sobering: even India's most hawkish planners must realize that attempting a decisive blow at sea could ignite a nuclear confrontation, an outcome no rational actor wants. In effect, Pakistan's sea-based nukes serve as the ultimate quiet backstop, guaranteeing that a naval conflict would never remain 'limited' for long. Dire consequences of a misadventure at sea India's talk of launching an 'air and sea' offensive next time might be intended to cow Islamabad, but a closer look reveals that such a gambit would carry dire consequences for India itself, strategic, economic, and political. Pakistan's robust naval deterrence ensures that a maritime misadventure would be a high-risk, high-cost proposition. Indian leaders contemplating pre-emptive action at sea should consider the following outcomes: The Indian Navy would face the genuine possibility of losing capital warships in combat. A single Pakistani submarine or missile salvo could cripple or sink a multi-billion-dollar vessel, for example, an aircraft carrier like INS Vikrant or Vikramaditya. Such a loss would not only decimate India's naval prestige but also shock the nation. The psychological impact of, say, a carrier going down (with thousands of sailors) is hard to overstate; it could rival the trauma of past military defeats. Even smaller losses, like destroyers or frigates struck by cruise missiles, would erode India's numerical advantage and prove Pakistan's point that the Arabian Sea cannot be dominated at will. Pakistan's navy, though modest, would impose serious attrition on any attacking force, as its strategy is to make the sea a no-go zone through layered defense. Indian naval planners know that even a 'victory' could look pyrrhic if key assets lie at the bottom of the ocean. A war at sea in South Asia would send shudders through the global shipping industry and India would be hit hardest. The Indian economy is heavily dependent on seaborne trade and energy imports (most of India's oil arrives via sea routes). Pakistan's navy, by virtue of geography, sits astride the arterial shipping lanes of the Arabian Sea. In wartime, it could implement a sea-denial strategy to disrupt these flows. Pakistani submarines and missile units could threaten commercial shipping along India's west coast or in the Arabian Sea choke points. Just the credible threat of a submarine on the loose would likely force merchant traffic to reroute or halt. War risk insurance premiums for vessels heading to Indian ports would skyrocket overnight. Oil tankers might refuse to enter conflict zones, leading to fuel shortages and price spikes in India. Vital exports and imports could languish. The economic cost to India, already severe from military expenditures, would compound with each day of maritime insecurity. Pakistan, with a smaller economy, would also suffer disruptions, but India's much larger stake in global trade means it stands to lose far more in absolute terms. Moreover, India's coastline hosts major refineries, ports (like Mumbai, Kandla), and industrial hubs; these are high-value targets that Pakistan could hit with long-range missiles if pushed. Damage to just one large port or petrochemical complex could inflict billions of dollars in losses and long-term setbacks. In essence, initiating a naval war would be akin to India shooting itself in the foot economically, a fact Pakistani deterrent strategy counts on. Aggression at sea would not occur in a vacuum. Internationally, India would risk diplomatic isolation if it were seen as the instigator of a conflict that endangers global maritime commerce. The Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean are busy highways for oil tankers and cargo ships heading to many countries. A naval clash could draw in outside powers eager to protect their economic interests and prevent escalation. We saw in May 2025 that the United States intervened actively to mediate and halt the fighting. Next time, the intervention might be swifter and more coercive, potentially curtailing India's freedom of action. Within the region, an Indian attempt to blockade Pakistan or land a crippling blow could backfire by rallying Pakistan's allies and sympathizers. China, for instance, has a deep stake in Pakistan's Gwadar port and overall stability; while Beijing would likely stay out of direct combat, it could apply pressure behind the scenes (or provide Pakistan intelligence and hardware support) to ensure India does not succeed. Politically at home, Indian leaders would face huge risks as well. If their gambit failed to achieve a quick win, or worse, led to heavy Indian casualties or a nuclear scare, the domestic backlash would be fierce. The Indian public and opposition would question the judgment that led to a needless war. In Pakistan, by contrast, successfully repelling Indian naval aggression (even at great cost) would vindicate the military's stance and could unite the nation in defiance. Thus, India could find itself isolated and chastened, rather than triumphant, if it underestimates Pakistan's deterrent. An attempted knockout punch at sea is exactly the kind of misstep that could spiral out of control, a point not lost on sober minds in New Delhi or Islamabad. Stability through quiet strength In the high-stakes rivalry between India and Pakistan, much attention goes to armies and air forces, while the navies often operate in the shadows. Yet, as the post-Sindoor sabre-rattling showed, the maritime domain is emerging as a new front for signaling and potential conflict. Pakistan's Navy may not grab headlines or flamboyantly brandish its weapons, but it remains the silent guardian of Pakistan's security, practicing a quiet deterrence that is no less effective for its subtlety. By quietly enhancing its capabilities, from indigenous missiles to stealthy submarines, the Pakistan Navy has ensured that India cannot take the Arabian Sea for granted. Every Indian warship commander must think twice, knowing an unseen adversary may be lying in wait. Every Indian strategist must calculate that a naval strike on Pakistan carries a serious risk of uncontrollable escalation. In this way, the Pakistan Navy, though smaller and less publicized, punches above its weight to keep the strategic balance. It neutralizes India's maritime signaling not through bluster, but through credible readiness and demonstrated will. Pakistan Navy's professionalism and preparedness were on display in May 2025, when it quietly countered India's pressure without fanfare, no Indian ship dared cross Pakistan's maritime red lines during the crisis. This positive performance deserves recognition. In an era of regional naval build- ups, Pakistan has shown that security is not about matching an adversary ship-for-ship, but about making any conflict unthinkable. The Navy's evolving conventional and nuclear deterrents serve exactly that purpose. They safeguard Pakistan's shores and sea lanes, and in doing so, protect the nation's economic lifeline and strategic sovereignty. For India, the message is clear: temper your ambitions of preemptive 'air+sea' offensives. Any future attempt to test Pakistan on the high seas would risk disastrous consequences, from sunken warships and economic calamity to potential nuclear escalation. No amount of boastful rhetoric can obscure the reality that Pakistan's deterrence is robust and ready. The quiet prowlers beneath the waves and the watchful sentinels on Pakistan's coast ensure that war at sea will harm the instigator as much as the target. Thus, wisdom dictates refraining from lighting a fuse that could set the entire region aflame. In the end, the Pakistan Navy's silent vigilance contributes to strategic stability by keeping aggressive designs in check. It may operate out of the limelight, but if peace prevails in the Arabian Sea, much credit goes to those dark hulls and diligent crews who secure Pakistan's shores, unseen, but ever prepared. The quiet deterrence continues. Dr. Rabia Akhtar is the Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lahore. She tweets @Rabs_AA and can be emailed at All facts and information are the sole responsibility of the author
Express Tribune
6 hours ago
- Express Tribune
Yuyuan Tantian flags security, tech and environmental concerns in Nvidia H20 chip
Listen to article A social media account affiliated with state broadcaster CCTV said on Sunday that Nvidia's H20 artificial intelligence chips pose security concerns for China, after Beijing raised questions over possible backdoor access. The account, Yuyuan Tantian, published an article on WeChat saying the H20 chips were neither technologically advanced nor environmentally friendly. 'When a type of chip is neither environmentally friendly, nor advanced, nor safe, as consumers, we certainly have the option not to buy it,' the article concluded. Read: US licenses Nvidia to export chips to China Nvidia did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The H20 chips were developed by Nvidia for the Chinese market after the US imposed export restrictions on advanced AI chips in late 2023. The administration of US President Donald Trump banned their sales in April amid escalating trade tensions with China, but reversed the ban in July. China's cyberspace watchdog said on July 31 that it had summoned Nvidia to a meeting to ask whether the H20 chips contained any backdoor security risks — a hidden method of bypassing normal authentication or security controls. Nvidia later said its products had no 'backdoors' that would allow remote access or control. In its article, Yuyuan Tantian claimed Nvidia chips could perform functions including 'remote shutdown' through a hardware 'backdoor'. The account's comments followed criticism of Nvidia by People's Daily, which in a commentary this month said Nvidia must produce 'convincing security proofs' to ease Chinese users' concerns and regain market trust.
