Will there be a deal with Iran?
President Trump may like this because he sees himself as a great negotiator. But he had better be careful here, because his original proposed deal is too vague and doesn't cut it as a solution to Iran's nuclear program and overall regional threat to Israel and its Arab neighbors.
While the diplomatic feelers are filling the air, there are other reports that regime muckety mucks are leaving Iran on a secret airlift, maybe heading to Moscow but no one really knows.
There is, as yet, no sign that Israel intends to slow its attacks which are, in part, now focusing on government institutions and regime leaders (other than Ayatollah Khameini who is, allegedly, off limits).
Washington is building up its forces in the Middle East and is now sending the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier task force from the South China Sea heading 'in the direction' of the Middle East, where it would join the USS Carl Vinson carrier task force already on station.
Other reports say that the US has sent a large number of aerial refueling tankers across the Atlantic, but without an as yet known destination. US warships have helped Israel shoot down Iranian missiles and drones. The UK also announced it is deploying Royal Air Force jet fighters to the Middle East.
It is not clear whether negotiations with Iran will restart. Should that happen, the original US parameters for a deal would not solve the bigger problem that must be resolved if the war is going to end.
Obviously the first priority is to end Iran's nuclear program. But what does that mean? Israel is unlikely to agree to inspection of Iranian nuclear sites as an adequate or reliable way to assure Iran does not resume its nuclear weapons programs.
The Trump administration set down a red line saying 'no more uranium enrichment,' but has not clarified how that can be achieved.
Relying on IAEA inspections is a formula that has proven a leaky vessel not only in Iran, but elsewhere. IAEA never saw the North Korean-Iranian-Syrian attempt to build a secret nuclear fuel reactor modeled on the North Korean Yongbyon reactor. Israel wiped it off the map. Nor did the IAEA ever grasp Iraq's nuclear bomb effort under Saddam Hussein.
The IAEA so-called inspections in Iran don't include the massive Fordow complex, where Iran was readying enrichment to bomb-grade uranium, or other 'secret' facilities, such as the recently discovered tritium 'rainbow' facility, part of the effort to build either boosted nuclear bombs or hydrogen weapons.
The only reliable way to end Iran's nuclear program is to destroy all the nuclear facilities in the country, while putting Iran's nuclear reactors under strict international control, not inspection.
In addition to the nuclear issue, the US needs to demand limits on Iran's ballistic missile program. Just before the outbreak of hostilities, Iran tested an as yet unnamed intermediate-range ballistic missile that can carry a two ton warhead. This missile obviously is designed to deliver a nuclear warhead. It could be that when Israel saw this test it realized it had no choice but to act against Iran.
Part of any deal must include scrapping heavy missiles and an agreement never to manufacture them again.
Israel also will demand, and rightly so, the immediate release of all the hostages held by Hamas in Gaza and a guarantee that no weapons of any kind can be transferred to Hamas, Islamic Jihad or others who intend to attack Israel. Israel knows that if it smashes Iran, Hamas is finished because it utterly relies on weapons supplied by Iran.
Finally, Iran has to agree to no transfers of weapons of any kind to the Houthis in Yemen. Israel will not tolerate missile attacks from the Houthis any more than it will tolerate Iranian attacks against Israel.
If the Trump administration wants to negotiate a deal, either the deal has to address the nuclear issue and the hostages, and Yemen, or it isn't worth anything.
Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.
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AllAfrica
2 hours ago
- AllAfrica
EU bluffing it will protect the Philippines from China
Europe will not defend the Philippines. Not in the first hour, not on day one, not at all. Malacanang can host foreign dignitaries, sign joint declarations and pose for photo-ops, but when pressure escalates in the South China Sea, Brussels will remain where it likes to be: on the margins of force. The reason is simple: the EU lacks means, mandate and will. Recent episodes confirm the reality. Trump pushed Europe into a 5% GDP outlay on American weapons, imposed humiliating tariffs and even instructed Europeans on managing a war at their own doorstep. Against this backdrop, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas went to Manila proclaiming solidarity and affinity with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr with the familiar homily on values. Yet the contrast was glaring: Europe accepts subordination in its own theater, while preaching resolve in Asia. The question thus arises: Could the actor Manila hopes will help to counter China in the West Philippine Sea ever be Brussels? Kallas used the visit to posture as a China hawk, without any leverage. Headlines proclaimed a new era of European commitment to Philippine security, inflated by 'concern' over China's 'illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive' behavior. But adjectives are not strategy. Partnerships rest on capability and intent, and Europe offers neither. If any message from the West carried weight lately, it came from France. President Emmanuel Macron, speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, cut through the fog: Europe will not fight China. 'If the elephant in the room is the day China decides a big operation against a country, will you intervene day one? I would be very cautious today. Everybody would be very cautious today,' Macron said. France, the EU's only nuclear power, its most globally deployed force and the only member state with Indo-Pacific territories, confirmed Europe's hesitation. The implication is terminal: if France won't act, Europe can't. The evidence is not theoretical. The war in Ukraine remains Europe's test. While Kyiv still pleads for weapons and air cover, Brussels debates gas payments and packages of sanctions to the same regime shelling Ukrainian cities. After 1,300 days of war, Europe has sent billions but not a single combat brigade in a war that its leaders frame as 'existential.' Macron made the linkage explicit: 'If both the USA and the Europeans are unable to fix the Ukrainian situation, I think the credibility of both the US and the Europeans to pretend to fix any crisis in this [Southeast Asian] region will be very low.' Translation: Europe's relevance in Asia is bound to its performance in Europe. And now that performance is collapsing under reluctance, fragmentation, risk aversion and submission to Washington. Another way to put it: What has the Philippines contributed to Ukraine? Nothing. And rightly so. Kyiv is not Manila's fight, just as Palawan won't be Brussels's. Nations act where their interests are threatened and their capabilities count. However, the limits run deeper than military logistics. The EU is not a state. It is a bloc of 27 governments pursuing conflicting China strategies while leaders pretend to speak as one. France defends its own interests. Germany prioritizes export flows to Beijing. Eastern Europe chases Chinese infrastructure deals. Spain seeks Chinese factories. The EU has no collective security, and strategic autonomy remains a slogan. Amid these realities, what was Kallas really pursuing in the Philippines? Her tour through Southeast Asia, capped in Manila, was less about Philippine security than about self-projection—claiming global engagement without facing the only question that matters: would Europe ever fight in Asia? The answer had already come weeks earlier in Singapore, and it was no. The greater danger, accordingly, is miscalculation. Manila could mistake symbolic support for protection—and in a military contingency, that would be catastrophic. The gap between words and power was visible from Kallas's first steps as the EU's top diplomat: 'In my first visit since taking up office, my message is clear: the European Union wants Ukraine to win this war.' A war the EU refused to fight and cannot even negotiate to end became her stage for declarations. If Brussels cannot turn mantras into force there, how could it matter in the Philippines? The High Representative's role is not to set policy, still less to deliver victories, but to echo member-state consensus. Yet some Philippine commentators have excitedly portrayed Kallas's show as proof of security cooperation, as if it somehow promised definitive defense against China—still the EU's major trading partner. And full disclosure: the EU does not even have a trade agreement with the Philippines. Therefore, will it be values or trade? Interests or illusions of protecting 'like-minded allies?' Filipino aircrews over contested waters might not be comforted by Kallas's talk of 'democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.' They need combat integration, air cover and the certainty that escalation will be met with overwhelming force in nearby waters. Europe offers none of that. Currently, when it sends vessels to the region, routes are announced in advance to avoid confrontation—presence without purpose. Political affinities don't intercept warships or deter coercion. And the US no longer pretends these performances matter. In February 2025, Vice President J D Vance dismissed European irrelevance at the Munich Security Conference. Kallas answered with defiance, calling on Europe to lead the 'free world.' Weeks later in Washington, Secretary of State Marco Rubio refused to meet her—the very reason she had flown in. And when Ukraine is discussed, EU leaders are not decision-makers but invitees at the White House, where they are lectured on how to negotiate a war they never managed. For Manila, the ambiguity should be gone. The US, Japan and Australia remain their defense partners. Brussels is useful in trade, regulation and multilateral forums. But expecting military deterrence from Europe versus China is pure fantasy. Philippine policymakers should stop imagining battalions where there are only bureaucrats. At best, Brussels can fund radar stations or back maritime resolutions; but once combat begins, if it ever does, it will be reduced to its specialty—offering 'unwavering support' from afar. So beware when the pageantry resumes. The inaugural Philippines–EU Security Dialogue in late 2025 will spark the usual theatrical outrage from Beijing—just enough for some to feel important. But no one in Zhongnanhai will lose any sleep over a summit without soldiers. Because the South China Sea is not governed by grandiloquent declarations and gatherings. It is shaped by resolve, escalation thresholds and the capacity to act without asking. If and when the next crisis comes, Manila will already know Europe can be counted on for rhetoric but will ultimately do nothing. Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa is a Hong Kong-based geopolitics strategist with a focus on Europe-Asia relations.
AllAfrica
10 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Toward a NATO-like security guarantee for Ukraine
Ukraine's president, Volodymyr Zelensky, had good cause to be optimistic following his recent White House meetings with Donald Trump and the leaders of the European 'coalition of the willing.' While a concrete peace plan has yet to emerge, Trump appears to have come around to the European position that security guarantees will be vital if any peace deal is to stick. This is real progress. But what shape would security guarantees take in the case of Ukraine, and will they be enough to deter the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, from breaking the peace at some future date? Talk of security guarantees is nothing new. Zelensky and his European allies have been stressing their importance for much of the conflict. But what does appear significant is the way in which the latest proposals have been framed. It has been suggested that Ukraine should be offered security guarantees that resemble what Italy's prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, called an 'Article 5 model.' This is a reference to the defence provision of NATO's founding treaty, which specifies that an attack on one member is an attack on them all and requires a collective response. NATO's Article 5 is the gold standard of security guarantees. The wording is open to interpretation, but no one doubts that the principle of collective defence it embodies is the core purpose of the 32 nations that make up the alliance. Article 5 is backed by a credible force that outclasses Russian military might. Certainly, questions hang over Article 5's reliability. The provision has only ever been activated once – following the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001. But the unusual circumstances of that single invocation do not render the provision any less valuable. The fact that European allies came to America's assistance (rather than the US coming to the aid of Europe) means Article 5 is a symbolic resource in transatlantic relations, which NATO's European members can wield to remind the US president of his country's commitment. This is important. Trump has periodically suggested the US would not be prepared to defend perceived alliance 'free-riders'. But the agreement at NATO's Hague summit in June to raise defence spending among the allies went a long way to head off a transatlantic rupture by allaying Trump's fears on that score. Worries that the American military presence in Europe would be summarily withdrawn have so far proved unfounded. The US president now praises NATO as being engaged with America in what the White House has called a 'new era of shared responsibility.' The true effect of Article 5 lies in the wars that have not occurred rather than those that have. Under Putin, Russia has attacked both Georgia and Ukraine. It has not invaded a NATO ally. This is why Ukraine has always been so keen to become a member of NATO, something that has been accepted in principle by most members of the alliance for some years. But since the invasion of Ukraine, that route to an Article 5 security guarantee has been expressly ruled out by the Trump administration, as well as by NATO itself. Instead, the alliance's secretary general, Mark Rutte, has referred to 'Article 5-type of security guarantees for Ukraine.' What has still to be publicly discussed is precisely what this might entail. Some of the parameters are, however, becoming clear. Trump suggested that he wants Europeans to be 'the first line of defense', with the US providing intelligence, weapons (paid for by Europe) and air support of some kind. He was quite clear that there would be no US 'boots on the ground.' Ukraine's European allies are now mulling over what their role as guarantors of security for a peace deal might look like. It has been reported that the head of the UK's armed forces, Tony Radakin, will tell a meeting of military commanders at the Pentagon that the UK is prepared to send troops to Ukraine – not as a frontline fighting force, but to provide security at ports and air bases. How many members of the coalition of the willing are prepared to do the same remains uncertain. What went unmentioned at the White House meeting was the significant set of security and defense commitments Ukraine already enjoys with the NATO allies. Since the G7 Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine of July 2023, Ukraine has signed bilateral security and defence agreements with 27 of NATO's 32 members. Typically, these provide for consultation within 24 hours if Ukraine is attacked, in order (as Ukraine's agreements with the UK and France both put it) 'to determine measures needed to counter or deter the aggression.' There are also common provisions for military capacity building, recognition of Ukraine's territorial integrity and post-war reconstruction. Taken in the round, these agreements thus already provide the political basis for a comprehensive and effective set of security guarantees. Two more things are needed. First, the bilateral US-Ukraine security agreement of June 2024, signed under the previous US president, Joe Biden, needs to be reaffirmed by the Trump administration. Second, the Europeans need to convert their latticework of agreements with Ukraine into an effective security and defense mechanism. This can be done as the French president, Emmanuel Macron, has suggested, by continuing to arm the Ukrainian military. But if the Article 5 parallel means anything, it will require – as Rose Gottemoeller, a former NATO deputy director general, pointed out on the BBC – an effective deterrent effect. And that means US participation. With minimal involvement by the US, the question is whether the Franco-British-led 'coalition of the willing' is up to the task – and whether there is the collective political will to organise and deploy a deterrent force in the face of Russian objections. These are the debates playing out in Europe and across the Atlantic – and which become daily more urgent, as Russia's advance in eastern Ukraine continues to gather momentum. Mark Webber is professor of international politics, University of Birmingham This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
AllAfrica
15 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Why President Lee Jae Myung will stop in Tokyo before Washington
Great attention in South Korea is rightfully focused on the high-stakes visit later this month of President Lee Jae Myung to Washington, DC. Worries about the future of alliance relations with the United States are growing, fed by the apparent readiness of President Donald Trump to abandon Ukraine and subordinate relations with Europe to those with Russian President Vladimir Putin. All this, however, also serves to underscore the strategic importance of President Lee's decision to stop in Tokyo on his way to Washington. Aside from the unprecedented decision to visit Japan before the United States, the August 23–24 visit allows the two Asian neighbors and allies of the United States to tightly coordinate their response to the Trump administration. South Korea and Japan face an overlapping set of challenges in managing relations with the United States under the second Trump administration. Both are under pressure to vastly increase defense spending, fork over much larger amounts of money to support US force presence, deal with high tariffs on vital exports such as automobiles and electronics, and subordinate their handling of economic and diplomatic ties with China to the Trump administration's policy. The South Korean government has closely followed the progress – and lack thereof – of Japan's trade and diplomatic talks with the United States. And to a large extent, South Korea's policy responses, from increasing direct investment to easing non-tariff barriers, have mirrored those of Japan. But Lee's upcoming meeting with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in Tokyo implies more than just policy coordination. As the South Korean leader indicated in his Liberation Day speech on August 15, there is a growing emphasis on deepening the bilateral partnership to effectively hedge against the United States' retreat from global leadership and security commitments. Lee avoided the anti-Japanese rhetoric often pushed by previous South Korean progressive administrations. Instead, his sophisticated address took note of the 'polycrisis' facing South Korea – from realigned supply chains, the collapse of the global trade order, industrial and technological transformation and climate change. In that context, he gave special emphasis to the role of the South Korea-Japan relationship: Korea and Japan have achieved industrial development in tandem. As such, we will be able to overcome the challenges of the artificial intelligence era, which is marked by competition to secure a commanding lead, when our two countries pursue future-oriented cooperation based on mutual trust. Guided by the principle of pragmatic, national interest-focused diplomacy, we will seek forward-looking, mutually beneficial cooperation with Japan while holding frequent meetings and frank dialogues through shuttle diplomacy. The stronger the trust, the higher the quality of cooperation. Unlike last year's address by then-President Yoon Suk Yeol, President Lee's speech confronted the thorny issue of history – the painful past of Japanese colonialism and ongoing issues over wartime justice and acknowledgement of South Korean victims of Japanese rule. 'I hope that the Japanese government will squarely face up to our painful history and strive to maintain trust between our two countries,' Lee added in his speech. 'I believe that such efforts will bring greater shared benefits and a brighter future for both sides.' South Korean reactions were broadly supportive, from both conservative and progressive circles, reflecting the popular support for improving South Korea-Japan relations. Ishiba's willingness to acknowledge Japan's wartime past and responsibility is widely known, particularly in contrast to the views of the right-wing faction in his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). He signaled a desire to utilize the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II to issue his own statement on the nature and lessons of the war. But leading up to August 15, the Japanese leader was under great pressure from within his own party, particularly following their loss in the July election for Japan's legislative upper house. The right-wing Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun issued a warning to Ishiba on August 11 that he should not express his 'one-sided, masochistic view of history, viewing Japan as the aggressor in the conflict. If the prime minister goes ahead and expresses such views, regardless of the timing or format, it could lend momentum to anti-Japan propaganda by China, South Korea and North Korea and risk injury to Japanese citizens.' Ishiba has tried to maneuver between these pressures and his own desire to draw lessons from Japan's mistakes that led to war. He issued a short address on August 15 at an official memorial ceremony for the war dead. 'Eighty years have now passed since the war ended,' Ishiba said in his address. 'Today, generations with no firsthand experience of war make up the great majority. We must never again repeat the horrors of war. We must never again lose our way. We must now take deeply into our hearts once again our remorse and also the lessons learned from that war.' It marked the first time in thirteen years that a Japanese leader used the word hansei , which is sometimes translated as remorse but can also be understood as self-reflection. In its Japanese usage, it implies not just acknowledging one's mistakes but also pledging to avoid such mistakes in the future. Importantly, it was first used by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, the Socialist leader who issued the standard-setting statement in 1994 on the fiftieth anniversary of the war's end, expressing not only 'deep remorse' but also referring to Japan's responsibility for 'aggression and colonial rule.' Ishiba, however, stopped short of repeating those words. While praising his nod toward facing the past, both South Korean and liberal Japanese media faulted him for bowing to pressures and not explicitly confronting history. The Asahi Shimbun pointed to the prime minister's failure to confront the strong opposition within the LDP that seeks to draw a line on any further expressions of 'apology diplomacy.' The contrast between Ishiba and the powerful right-wing LDP elements was made clear on August 15, when prominent leaders of the party, including some vying to replace Ishiba as prime minister, honored Japan's war dead at Yasukuni Shrine. The visitors included members of the Ishiba cabinet, notably Minister of Finance Katsunobu Kato and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Shinjiro Koizumi. Also visiting were close followers of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, such as Sanae Takaichi, Takayuki Kobayashi and Koichi Hagiuda. Visits by senior officials and political leaders to the shrine evoke memories of Japanese imperialism. In particular, the visit of Koizumi, considered to be the leader of reformist elements of the ruling party, drew comments. His visit 'appeared to reaffirm his alignment with Japan's nationalist right,' said the Korea Times . 'The move drew inevitable comparisons to his father, whose frequent shrine visits during his premiership strained Tokyo's relations with Seoul and Beijing.' The Lee administration was clearly encouraged by Ishiba's statement but also concerned by the Yasukuni visits. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a pro forma statement that 'strongly urges the leaders of Japan to squarely face history and demonstrate through action their humble reflection and sincere remorse for Japan's past history, and stresses that this is an important foundation for the development of future-oriented relations between the two countries based on mutual trust.' Ishiba has opened the possibility that he may issue a fuller and franker statement of his views on September 2, the eightieth anniversary of the signing of Japan's surrender. The right wing continues to raise alarms about this option. But 'Lee's first visit to Tokyo might create a more interesting opportunity' for Ishiba to make his views clear, a senior correspondent at the Asahi Shimbun told this writer. 'Tokyo and Seoul share so much in common in coping with Trump,' the veteran Japanese journalist observed. 'Lee has sealed off his populist approach, and is sending Tokyo multiple signals that the Korean progressive president is ready for a pragmatic and future-oriented relationship. Let's see how it plays out.' It is unlikely the Trump administration is even aware of these developments or understands the importance of this 'Japan First' stopover. It will be watched closely, however, not only in South Korea and Japan but in the broader region. Daniel C. Sneider is a non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America and a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University. This article, first published by KEI, is republished with permission.
