Balochistan gold rush promises Pakistan mining boom
At the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum 2025, Muhammad Ali Tabba, chairman of National Resources Limited (NRL) and CEO of Lucky Cement, unveiled what he claimed are hitherto unknown substantial gold and copper reserves in Balochistan's Chagai district.
Announced in the company of Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Muhammad Asim Munir, Tabba's claimed discovery signals a potential turning point for Pakistan's laggard mining industry at a time global gold prices are touching record highs of over US$3,400 per ounce.
NRL, a wholly Pakistani-owned firm under the umbrella of Fatima Fertilizer, Liberty Mills, and Lucky Cement, obtained an exploration permit in Chagai in October 2023. Within 18 months, it claims to have pinpointed 16 mineral-rich locations across a 500-square-kilometer expanse, with drilling at the Tang Kor, Chagai site reportedly confirming significant deposits.
Balochistan, Pakistan's largest province by area, is a geological treasure trove. The Chagai region lies within the Tethyan Magmatic Arc, a mineral-laden zone spanning Europe to Southeast Asia renowned for its copper and gold wealth.
The nearby Reko Diq mine holds an estimated 5.9 billion tonnes of ore, grading 0.41% copper and 0.22 grams per tonne of gold, ranking it among the world's largest untapped reserves.
NRL's Tang Kor website entry complements this, with early drilling showing copper concentrations from 0.23% to 0.48%, along with traces of gold and silver. Thirteen diamond drill holes totaling 3,517 meters all reportedly struck mineralized zones, underscoring the deposit's vast potential.
Pakistan faces a dire economic situation with shrinking foreign currency reserves, mounting debt and import dependency, making this discovery a potential lifeline. The nation's mineral wealth, valued at $6 trillion, has been largely untapped.
NRL's find, alongside developments like Reko Diq (where Barrick Gold targets 200,000 tonnes of copper and 250,000 ounces of gold yearly by 2028), could pump billions into Pakistan's economy and Balochistan's development.
At the same time, the golden discovery is sparking age-old concerns about fair revenue allocation for and ecological impact on Balochistan, one of Pakistan's most undeveloped and historically restive regions.
Ethnic Baloch insurgent groups frequently target resource and infrastructure investments in the province, in part on the grounds that they disproportionately serve Islamabad and its allied foreign interests, including Chinese companies, rather than local communities.
NRL's partnerships with the Balochistan government and the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), plus a $100 million exploration budget for two new licenses, thus reflect a determined effort to capitalize on this opportunity.
Balochistan's resource riches stand in stark contrast to its poverty. Supplying 35–45% of Pakistan's natural gas and brimming with minerals, the province still ranks lowest on basic human development metrics. Around 85% of the province's residents lack clean water, 75% have no electricity and 63% live in poverty.
However, these newly discovered troves could shift Balochistan's dire narrative if handled prudently and equitably. The company's stated commitment to creating local jobs and community engagement aims, at least rhetorically, to help address these gaps.
There is precedent to be doubtful about corporate vows of trickle-down. For instance, the Saindak mine, active since the 1970s, yields 15,800 tonnes of copper, 1.5 tonnes of gold and 2.8 tonnes of silver annually, yet benefits rarely reach locals.
The economic potential is immense. Reko Diq could generate $70 billion in free cash flow and $90 billion in operating cash flow over decades, according to company estimates. Should NRL's deposits match this scale, their extraction could elevate GDP, create substantial well-paying jobs and fund badly needed Balochistan infrastructure.
A homegrown player like NRL could keep more profits in-country, unlike past foreign-led ventures. Its agreements with the Oil and Gas Development Company (OGDC) and efforts to draw investors point to a scalable strategy.
Yet, optimism must be tempered. Past projects like Saindak and Reko Diq have faced disputes over revenue splits and local neglect, with Balochistan once receiving just 2% of Saindak's earnings.
For NRL's success, fair policies—guaranteeing royalties, local employment and investments in health, education and water—are essential. Frameworks like the Balochistan Development Plan and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Gwadar Port offer a blueprint but fair implementation will be critical.
The economic upside, of course, comes with environmental trade-offs. Balochistan's climate, with summers hitting 53°C and winters plunging to -20°C in higher elevations, is as harsh as it is fragile. Mining demands substantial water and energy, both scarce resources in Balochistan.
Saindak has faced backlash for depleting water and polluting groundwater with tailings and residues. Tang Kor's drilling and potential processing could worsen these problems, especially if NRL opts for downstream operations that could pollute rivers, hurt crops and aggravate health crises.
Extracting copper and gold generates significant emissions—mining contributes 4–7% of global greenhouse gases, with copper production emitting roughly 2.5 tonnes of CO2 per tonne.
At Reko Diq's scale, NRL's output could add hundreds of thousands of tonnes of emissions yearly, straining a region already hit by climate shifts like erratic rains and desertification. Dust from mining could also harm air quality and public health.
Balochistan's climate is already under siege, and mining could amplify the woes. The province has seen a rise in extreme weather—floods in 2022 devastated crops and displaced thousands, while prolonged droughts have shrunk arable land. Chagai's arid ecosystem, home to sparse vegetation and rare species like the Balochistan bear, faces disruption from mining sprawl.
Water-intensive operations risk drying up springs and wells, vital for nomadic herders and small farmers. Meanwhile, heavy machinery and blasting could destabilize the region's rugged terrain, increasing landslide risks in a province prone to seismic activity.
Without careful and studied planning, NRL's projects could tip Balochistan's delicate environmental balance toward collapse.
On the flip side, copper is vital for green tech like wind turbines and electric vehicles, potentially aiding global decarbonization. NRL's local control could enforce tougher environmental rules than foreign firms have historically followed.
Solar energy or water recycling, used in some advanced mines, might mitigate the damage. The $100 million exploration fund could be deployed to support sustainability research, balancing profit with preservation. If NRL invests even a minor share donation into Balochistan's Climate Resilience Fund, it could build trust and social license among Chaghi's indigenous communities.
NRL's Chagai find is a potential defining moment for Pakistan and Balochistan, but a positive and equitable outcome depends on learning from the past. The discovery could ease import reliance, shore up foreign currency reserves and lift Balochistan from poverty if substantial profits stay local.
The 2025 Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum, where global eyes were suddenly fixed on Chagai, highlights the stakes. Saudi Arabia's possible 15% Reko Diq stake and Barrick's $2 billion investment suggest Pakistan's mineral wealth is prime for profitable extraction.
Ultimately, NRL's gold and copper reserves are more than a geological windfall – they are crucial for Pakistan's pursuit of equitable and lasting economic progress.
For Balochistan, the discovery could herald a future where riches benefit its people and environment, not just local elites or outsiders. The task ahead for Pakistan and Balochistan is to ensure this hope doesn't fade into another tale of squandered promise.
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