How Maharashtra ‘Urban Naxal' Bill targets Property Rights

Indian Express

17-07-2025

Written by Prashant Randive
In the name of public order and national security, the line between legitimate state interest and authoritarian overreach is often blurred. The recently enacted Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill (MSPS), 2024, is a troubling example of this phenomenon. While the State justified the bill as a necessary response to threats posed by 'unlawful organisations', several provisions, particularly those that empower police to seal, seize or restrict the use of private property, pose a grave challenge to the constitutional right to property under Article 300A.
Article 300A of the Constitution stipulates that 'No person shall be deprived of his property except by authority of law.' Though the framers left it to the legislature to define the contours of the lawful deprivation, Indian courts have consistently held that this power must be exercised fairly, non-arbitrarily and with due process. Yet, Sections 9 and 10 of the new law allow the police, with prior approval of the commissioner or District Magistrate, to prohibit the use of any premises allegedly linked to unlawful activity. The law authorises eviction, sealing, and restriction of use without prior judicial oversight, without compensation, and crucially, without providing the occupant or owner a chance to be heard beforehand.
In the landmark judgement K T Plantation Pvt Ltd v State of Karnataka (2011), the Supreme Court laid down the core principles that must guide deprivation of property by the state. Most notably, the Court held that there must be a legitimate public purpose. Secondly, there must be fairness and, in most cases, compensation. Finally, the law must be subject to judicial scrutiny for reasonableness, non-arbitrariness and proportionality.
In the case of the MSPS 2024, all three constitutional safeguards appear to be compromised. First, it allows the state to seal or restrict the use of property merely based on the 'belief' of association with an unlawful organisation. This does not meet the constitutionality of the required threshold of a clearly defined public purpose. A blanket seizure of homes, businesses, or rented premises based on such vague suspicion, without establishing direct and deliberate involvement in unlawful activity, cannot be justified as serving a proportionate or legitimate public end. The concept of guilt by association dilutes the principle of individual responsibility and turns property holders into collateral damage in a scrutiny operation.
Second, the law failed to provide for any form of compensation to those whose properties are sealed or rendered unusable, often with serious livelihood consequences. While Article 300A does not mandate compensation in every instance, the Supreme Court has made it clear that it is often an inherent component of lawful deprivation, especially when action causes material harm. In the absence of compensation and with no clear path to restitution, the law violates both the spirit and substance of the Constitution's property protections.
Third, and most dangerously, the law bypasses the prior judicial oversight. The decision to seal, evict or restrict property use is taken by police with approval from the Commissioner or District Magistrate, but not a judicial authority. Review mechanisms are post-facto, limited, and internal to the executive. The Supreme Court in K T Plantation explicitly stated that such statutes must be amenable to judicial review, which implies that they must be designed in a way that embeds procedural fairness and provides a genuine avenue for redress, without preventive remedies or an impartial tribunal, affected citizens are left vulnerable to arbitrary state action.
The failure of the Act to meet these constitutional benchmarks of public purpose, just procedure and proportionality renders its property-related provision deeply problematic. Far from being an exception in extraordinary circumstances, the law risks becoming a template for routine and unchecked executive overreach, with ordinary citizens paying the price through the loss of homes, shops and shelters. While countering extremist threats, a democratic state must not wield the weapon of national security in a manner that tramples civil liberties. Laws targeting unlawful associations must not become tools for harassment, chilling dissent, or arbitrary seizure of private spaces.
Unfortunately, the MSPS 2024 resurrects colonial impulses of the idea that executive suspicion is sufficient to invade homes, shutter businesses, and override property rights. In doing so, it inverts the constitutional promise from the state that serves its people to one that surveils and punishes without accountability.
If left unchecked, such laws may set a dangerous precedent across states, normalising a 'guilt by association' doctrine with wide-ranging implications not just for activists and dissenters but also for ordinary citizens whose homes, hostels, and businesses could fall victim to vague suspicions. The Right to Property may no longer be 'fundamental', but it is still the foundation to liberty, livelihood and dignity. Any law that seeks to erode it must be subjected to the highest standards of constitutional scrutiny. The act, in its current form, fails that test.
The writer is an independent researcher and development practitioner working with Savitribai Phule Resource Centre