How to read Vietnam's F-16 purchase
HO CHI MINH CITY – Vietnam is reportedly poised to purchase F-16 fighter jets from the United States, a deal that would mark a profound shift in Vietnam's defense procurement strategy away from long-standing dependence on Russian weaponry and toward a more diversified and geopolitically calculated approach.
A 1945 report says that the acquisition, although no numbers have been revealed, is expected to be for at least 24 aircraft. The report says if and when F-16s are combined with other US platforms Vietnam desires, including C-130 Hercules transport planes, 'it could all add up to the largest defense arrangement ever reached between the two nations.'
This development comes as Vietnam faces growing challenges, both economically and strategically. In early 2025, the Trump administration announced steep 46% 'reciprocal' tariffs on Vietnamese goods, including textiles and electronics, citing trade imbalances and currency manipulation.
This trade pressure, combined with intensifying US-China competition and a waning Russia, places Vietnam at a critical juncture in balancing its foreign and defense policy.
For decades, Vietnam's air force has relied on Soviet- and Russian-made fighters—MiG-21s, Su-22s, and Su-30MK2s. These systems served Vietnam well through the Cold War and into the early 21st century.
But today, that dependency presents real risks. Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and its resulting diplomatic and logistical isolation have slowed its arms production and disrupted global defense supply chains. Maintenance, spare parts and modernization have become increasingly difficult to secure.
Vietnam, like many Southeast Asian states, is now seeking to reduce overreliance on a single supplier. Enter the US-made F-16—a versatile, cost-effective, and widely used fighter jet.
While it is not the most advanced aircraft in the US arsenal, its interoperability with allied systems and relative ease of integration make it an attractive option for countries in transition. Still, Hanoi's decision is about more than hardware. It reflects a broader strategic recalibration.
Vietnam's foreign policy doctrine—especially its 'Four No's' principle (no military alliances, no foreign bases, no siding with one country against another, and no use of force in international relations)—emphasizes independence and multilateralism.
The F-16 purchase fits within this framework, allowing Vietnam to modernize while avoiding the perception of falling into Washington's orbit.
Rather than signaling alignment with the US, the deal is better understood as an assertion of Vietnam's strategic autonomy. By engaging with multiple defense partners—including Israel, India, Japan, South Korea, and several EU countries—Vietnam is positioning itself as a regional power with options.
The regional context is crucial. Southeast Asia has become a theater of strategic maneuvering, with China asserting itself through economic influence and military presence, particularly in the contested South China Sea, where the two sides have overlapping claims.
At the same time, the US has sought to reestablish its credibility as a security partner. Countries in the region are not choosing sides, but rather hedging—building ties with all powers while maintaining sovereignty.
Examples abound: Indonesia is purchasing French-made Rafales and US F-15EX aircraft. The Philippines is deepening its military cooperation with the US while also acquiring Indian BrahMos missiles. Thailand historically flies US and European fighters but is pursuing Chinese-made submarines.
Vietnam's calculated move fits this pattern. It seeks to preserve peace and stability while signaling its willingness to adapt. The F-16 deal also opens doors for future cooperation in areas like pilot training, intelligence sharing, logistics and joint exercises—all without violating Vietnam's core principles.
Domestically, the move carries mixed perceptions. Older generations, with deep memories of Soviet support during wartime, may feel uneasy.
But younger Vietnamese—especially in urban centers—tend to be more pragmatic, economically focused and wary of China's regional assertiveness. For them, alignment with modern, capable partners like the US represents an investment in national security and global relevance.
Russia's response will likely be muted. Its own economic and military constraints limit its ability to retaliate diplomatically. Moscow may instead try to retain influence via energy deals and symbolic gestures. But its long-term hold on Vietnam's defense market appears to be loosening.
For Washington, the deal is a quiet diplomatic win. It shows that America remains a viable partner, even for countries with a history of ambivalence. Yet, US policymakers should temper expectations.
Vietnam is not becoming an ally—it is engaging on its own terms. Washington should respond not with pressure but with consistency and respect for Vietnam's strategic logic.
Ultimately, this deal represents more than a military upgrade. It is a reflection of a new strategic maturity. Vietnam is navigating a complex, multipolar world with deliberate ambiguity.
By buying F-16s, Hanoi is not choosing the US—it is choosing leverage, resilience and the space to shape its own future.
In an age where great-power competition often demands binary choices, Vietnam offers a compelling alternative: sovereignty through balance. Its evolving foreign policy serves as a case study for other nations seeking to survive—not by taking sides but by maximizing options.
Johnny Thai, a pseudonym, is a Vietnam-based geopolitical analyst and independent commentator specializing in Southeast Asian strategic affairs, US-China relations, defense diplomacy and Vietnam's evolving foreign policy posture.
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