Belgium's MR Party pushes for recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara
In a video released on Wednesday, Bouchez introduced a bill aimed at recognizing Morocco's sovereignty over the Sahara and supporting the autonomy plan proposed by Rabat.
The newspaper La Libre Belgique devoted an article in its May 14 edition to the MR's initiatives to «win over Belgian-Moroccan voters», particularly through this bill concerning a region «currently considered a 'non-self-governing territory' by the UN».
Bouchez claims to have already visited Laayoune and Dakhla and believes that «it is now clear that the sovereignty and administration of Western Sahara are effectively and legitimately in Morocco's hands».
«I hope this approach will help me build a majority of support among other political parties, while also taking into account certain demands from neighboring countries», Bouchez added.
«I hope this approach will help me build a majority of support among other political parties, while also taking into account certain demands from neighboring countries», Bouchez added.
Strengthening the Candidate and Voter Base
The Belgian newspaper notes that the liberals have long-standing ties with Morocco, the country of origin for many dual-national voters. Two years ago, a group of five Brussels MR elected officials visited Morocco.
In this context, Bouchez aims to strengthen his relationships with center-right parties in various countries to counterbalance the left, ensuring a solid base of voters — and potentially even Belgian-Moroccan candidates.
However, within other center and left-wing parties, dual-national candidates seem to be gaining ground, as evidenced by those from the Socialist or Labor Party.
With his stance on the Sahara issue, Bouchez is making a bold move to restore his image with the Belgian-Moroccan community. He still faces backlash for past controversial remarks about the Moroccan community, which he previously described as «people who have houses in Morocco and receive social benefits in Belgium».
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