Instead of nuclear weapons, give Poland a nuclear umbrella

The Hill

2 days ago

As the Polish electorate picks the country's next president, questions about its nuclear future persist. Russia's nuclear threats and insertion of nuclear arms into Belarus could create the impression that Poland is more exposed. In response, Poland could seek its own nuclear weapons, become a host for NATO weapons or turn to France and the United Kingdom for protection.
In March, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Poland must pursue 'capabilities' related to nuclear weapons, and Andrzej Duda, the current president, has urged that U.S. nuclear arms be based in the country. Poland's seeking to become nuclear armed would upset the West, but the other two options could be viable.
For over a decade, President Vladimir Putin has heightened nuclear threats to Europe. In 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, he said he was 'ready' to bring nuclear arms into play. In 2018, Putin displayed on large video screens a simulated nuclear attack on Florida and a 'super torpedo' that could render coastal cities uninhabitable.
In 2019, a new Russian ground-launched cruise missile led the U.S. to withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, with the support of NATO allies. In 2023, Russia began moving Iskander missiles into Belarus, and last June, the two states conducted joint nuclear exercises. In November, Putin said he had lowered the threshold for nuclear use.
NATO has called Russia's nuclear rhetoric 'dangerous' and said it was considering whether to put more stored missiles on standby. (The U.S. has no nuclear-armed missiles in Europe.) These modest responses could lead the Kremlin to wonder about the strength of the nuclear umbrella over NATO allies.
U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe are a visible expression of the umbrella. They are stored in five NATO states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. Under the alliance's 'nuclear sharing' program, the bombs would be delivered by allied aircraft (stealthy F-35s, except F-16s for Turkey). Only the U.S. could authorize nuclear release.
Like West Germany in the Cold War, Poland today is the main NATO ally on the Central Front. In the Soviet era, NATO judged that U.S. nuclear-armed forces in West Germany were vital to deterring and defending against potential aggression. Similar logic is relevant to Poland today.
Poland and its nuclear-armed allies might choose among three options. It could try to acquire its own nuclear arms. Poland might join NATO's nuclear sharing program as a basing country. And Warsaw might seek nuclear protection from France and the U.K.
The West would oppose Poland obtaining its own nuclear weapons. This would violate its obligations as a non-nuclear weapon state under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. With 191 adherents, it is a centerpiece of the global security order.
Thus, the West assisted Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in eliminating their leftover Soviet strategic arms and associated infrastructure, and the international community has condemned Iran and North Korea's nuclear quests.
Polish acquisition of its own nuclear forces could also spur other states in complex security environments to seek nuclear arsenals. This could increase dangers to them, from deficiencies in warning, command and control, or survivable basing, and to neighbors through collateral damage.
The second option, becoming a basing country in NATO's nuclear sharing program, has much to recommend it. Most importantly, it could reduce the risks that Russian leaders might misperceive Poland as vulnerable or unprotected.
Poland flies F-35s, which could be configured to deliver B-61 bombs. Unrefueled, Poland's F-35s could penetrate deeper into Russia than aircraft from some other allies. Poland has sufficient geographic expanse for a survivable force.
Russia's nuclear threats and full-scale war on Ukraine justify NATO's suspending its 1997 assurance of no 'intention, plan, or reason' to place nuclear arms in new member states. At that time, NATO said it and Russia did 'not consider each other adversaries.' The security environment today is far different.
A third option has been gaining attention, in part because of uncertainty about the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Duda has voiced a recurring interest in a French nuclear umbrella. The new German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has called for nuclear talks with France and the U.K.
Past French attempts to develop concerted deterrence with Germany have been challenging. Unlike France, the UK participates in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and has 'assigned' its nuclear forces to the defense of the alliance. Poland benefits from this.
France has a more ambiguous role in Europe's nuclear deterrence. While France has long made clear that its vital interests have a European dimension, Paris is not interested in offering a nuclear sharing program similar to NATO's. Providing nuclear reassurance to Poland could boost financial costs. Perhaps Poland could assist the French nuclear aviation mission, such as with training, refueling, or post-attack recovery.
Given these obstacles, some have suggested the creation of a French-U.K. joint venture to reassure Poland. A foundation exists. Since the Chequers Declaration of 1995, France and the U.K. have deepened nuclear cooperation.
Poland could decide to pursue both NATO nuclear sharing and protection from France and the U.K. From a military perspective, combined efforts might complicate Russian targeting and be a hedge against political disruptions.
William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at RAND and professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy. In a career in the foreign service, he was deputy U.S. negotiator in U.S.-Soviet Defense and Space talks in Geneva and ambassador in negotiations there to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.